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1.1. General Statement and Background  
This study investigates co-relation between legal doctrine of remedies and their 
practical application in most influential Western jurisdictions and international 
codifications in the context of current demands of international trade and suggests possible 
adjustments to the theory, satisfying existing economic needs. 
The contract is an expression of voluntary agreement between the parties (two or 
more), sometimes called promise, with purpose of establishing legal obligation (rights and 
responsibilities) entered in written or oral form
1
. Every legal order has own requirements 
to formation of the contract, offer and acceptance, which confirm the fact of conclusion of 
the mutual agreement. Contract law largely varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction due to 
historical development in different local traditions and micro-economies. In response to 
contractual breach each state has developed own structure of remedies and enforcement 
procedure. This creates national borders to the worldwide trade. In the “era of industrial, 
economic and social expansion”2 and world globalization occasional legal transplants no 
longer adequately protect conflicting social interests. Over 100 years ago it was noticed, 
“moral stigma to law violation has been… eradicated”3. Legal theory has to adjust to the 
present social and economic realm in order to produce satisfactory results in serving 
overall progress. 
In general contract law in Western jurisdictions is rooted in or otherwise influenced 
by the Roman law and derives from the principle pacta sunt servanda. Traditionally 
remedies, both statutory and contractual
4
, played economic function of altering behavior of 
the party
5
 to contract in order to ensure its performance, which was required irrespective of 
changes in subjective or objective circumstances. In order to preclude breach of moral 
promise the remedy of specific performance has been developed.  Same deterrence 
                                                        
1
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contract.  
     
2
 See for the crisis in the modern legal science Fowler V. Harper, Scientific Method in the Application of 
Law, Dakota Law Review, 1927, Vol. 1, p. 111. 
3
 Id, supra note 2. 
4
 See Remedies for Breach of Contract, http://law.freeadvice.com/general_practice/contract_law/remedies 
_breach.htm. 
5
 In this work term “party” is used in relation to both parties of the bilateral obligation; terms “aggrieved 
party”, “non-breaching party”, “obligee”, “promisee”, “creditor” and similar are used as synonyms unless 
otherwise follows from the context; terms “breaching party”, “obligor”, “promisor”, “debtor” and similar are 
used as synonyms unless otherwise follows from the context; terms “seller” (“provider” and similar) and 
“buyer” (“purchaser”, “client” and similar) may be used in relation to either creditor or debtor depending on 
the context. 
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principle promotes punitive remedies, e.g. penalty, playing role of legal sanctions against 
the party in breach. Such remedies form group of so-called non-compensatory remedies. 
Further development and growth of the market economy, enhanced progress of 
financial and legal theories, enhanced discussion of the non-performance or breach of a 
contract due to changes in economic or factual situation, when obliged party realizes that 
“the performance he will receive under the contract is no longer more valuable than the 
performance he must provide” 6 , so called by Goetz and Scott “regret contingency” 7 . 
Economic theory proposed that the contract should require performance unless non-
performance (breach) would result in “greater joint wealth” 8 . Doctrine of “efficient 
breach” suggested that damages should be reasonable and sufficient alternative of due 
performance, able to compensate for the loss caused by the breach
9
. Hence the remedy 
became a substitute to the failed performance and gained compensatory function. 
 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
The area of remedies is one of those in legal science, which are deeply grounded in 
the socio-economical motives. Ideally remedies should be shaped in a process where legal 
science provides form for the economical content; in response to social request correct 
formulation of the legal remedial terms should provide desirable economic impact on the 
business. Nevertheless legal science is not solely driven by economical mechanisms and 
incentives; major principles of law are historically based on moral and ethical doctrines 
and values. Law is a product of society and is intended to serve its good. Therefore 
products of legal science should be developed and studied in their integrity an interrelation 
with the economic and social prerequisites, and altered when required.  
There is no unity and ultimate clarity between different views in the contemporary 
legal science on the nature of the contractual remedies and their functions. Plurality of 
views and difference in the approaches may be explained by adhering to postulates of 
                                                        
6




 See Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 
Yale Law Journal, 1980, Vol. 89, p.p. 1261-1300. 
8
 Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, Bell Journal of Economics, 1980, Vol. 11, p.p. 
466-490. 
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different legal theories on contract and its role in the process of exchange and 
consumption. Apart from the academic disputes, enhanced complexity of international 
trade, elimination of borders in the world economy, processes of legal unification and 
harmonization require practical solutions implemented in the contractual terms, equal 
protection to the parties irrespective of the governing substantive law and procedural rules. 
Preference for either compensatory or non-compensatory remedies no longer serves needs 
of contemporary contract law or economic efficiency. 
In the international commercial law remedies present an outstanding example of 
foundation created by virtue of legal transplantation, influenced by various legal orders, 
academic doctrines, and court precedents. Simultaneously remedies are significantly 
affected by tensions and contradictions persisting between legal systems. Hence the whole 
purpose of the remedies, serving protection of the contracting parties, may be hindered if 
the agreement incorporates system of remedies, which may not be fully enforced under 
governing law.  
Traditional comparativistic studies elaborate on numerous differences and 
contradictions between similar remedies in different jurisdictions, preventing their 
productive utilization and creating impression of antagonistic collision. In this work I 
follow modern approach that focuses on finding zones of convergence between legal 
orders and remedies developed within, basis for further harmonization of remedial regime 
across jurisdictions and possible option of the productive utilization in the international 
contract.  
 
1.3. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this work is to explore potential for comprehensive and harmonized 
system of remedies across jurisdictions to benefit modern international contract. This 
purpose is achieved through understanding the nature and scope of remedies, available in 
the major Western legal orders, from the position of their resemblances and convergence. 
For the purpose of this work I only consider contractual liability expressed in the remedies, 
negotiated and implemented by the contracting parties, but not tort liability, in particular 
not product liability issues, which have separate mandatory regulation. In most of 
considered jurisdictions commercial liability is strict and does not depend on fault of the 
breaching party (intention, negligence, mistake), therefore reference to the liability grounds 
is made only when respective system specifies them, such as fault-base liability (Germany) 
or control-base liability (Finland). Judging general effects of respective legal order upon 
 10 
contractual non-performance I make assumptions for alternative solutions, which may 
adjust existing disadvantages and improve status of contracting parties, if adopted in the 
legal theory and implemented in the contract. Necessity of such adjustment is presented in 
the current work as a part of legal science evolution and natural progress, which is 
supported by prospective analysis of historical development of both academic science and 
legal precedent in each considered jurisdiction.  
All remedies are considered herein as integral elements in the systemic context, 
performing respective functions in restoration of justice and fairness. Each remedy is 
inspected from the angle of its economic effects, benefits and disadvantages for the 
contracting parties, or, in other words, “economic efficiency”. Additionally every remedy 
is evaluated in terms of its exclusive application or ability for cumulating with others, as 
well as from the position of freedom of choice or place in the hierarchy of remedies. 
Elements and functions of the research objects are considered in the historical continuum 
of their development in theory and court practice and compared to other legal orders and 
within successful attempts of European unification and international harmonization
10
. 
Based on this analysis I propose possible ways of overcoming existing flaws in legal 
science and respective adjustments in the international contracts.  
Effective utilization of the whole spectrum of remedies is demonstrated on the 
example of the standard construction contracts, intended both for international and 
domestic contracting. The latter are considered in conjunction of elements of sale of goods 
and provision of services with elaboration on respective outcome for the structure of 
available remedies.  
I have selected construction contract standards as example for the carried our 
investigation due to the following reasons: 1) its complex nature, adopting elements of 
various contractual types, 2) its application to the long-term relationships, emphasizing 
context of the change in the parties’ circumstances, 3) its operation in the international 
environment, characterized by conflict of jurisdictions, 4) its codified nature, 
demonstrating integrity of elements from different legal systems and adopting them for the 
regulation of the same relationship. 
Summarizing, the purpose of this study is not merely to understand how to avoid or 
cheat the law by creating contractual disguise for respective remedies and their application 
or to resolve the conflict of choice for the governing law of the negotiated contract. Main 
                                                        
10
 I refer to international codification example of Vienna Convention on Sale of Goods, 1980. 
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goal is to understand where in each respective legal system lays the area for convergence 
of the contractual remedies and how it can be used for further harmonization of the 
contract law in the universal and national format in order to benefit economy and society. 
 
1.4. Research questions and methods 
This work does not aim to provide detailed retrospective into historical background 
and specifics of each legal system or review all legal theories in the field of contractual 
remedies.  This research is limited to general insight into the origins of each respective 
remedy, including both theoretical and practical aspects, as well as to rather broad 
overview of contract law essentials and principles in each respective legal order. 
Restrictions are made in order to understand which purpose each remedy is intended to 
serve and what place it occupies in respective jurisdiction. Investigation is focused on 
comprehension of nature of remedies, their economic and social benefits and flaws, 
options of implementation in the international contract and legal enforcement in case of 
contractual breach. Based on the received results I analyze compatibility and interrelation 
of remedies from various national laws, European unification and international 
codification, and attempt to offer adjustments in the current legal doctrine and international 
contract law, which would allow utilization of each remedy advantages and overcoming its 
drawbacks.  
Research questions are: 
1. What remedies are currently available under international contract; 
2. How economic disadvantages of specific performance can be overcome; 
3. Is termination of contract a remedy and how its economic efficiency can be 
enhanced; 
4. What pitfalls compensation of damages may have and how they can be 
eliminated; 
5. What is interrelation between penalty, liquidated damages, punitive damages and 
limitation of liability; and how efficiency of these remedies can be increased; 
6. Is price reduction a functional remedy;   
7. Is withholding a remedy and how it correlates with economic efficiency; 
8. Shall construction contract be treated as sale of goods or performance of services; 
how qualification may affect remedial system; 
9. Given all existing contradictions, is there a possibility to utilize all remedies and 
enhance their efficiency in one contract. 
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Methods of my research include general scientific methods and methods of legal 
research in particular: 
i) induction, e.g. brining specific evidence to the general conclusion-assumption 
that explicitly different remedies in opposite jurisdictions serve the same purpose and 
provide equal protection; 
ii) deduction, e.g. forming a conclusion that even though generally accepted 
measure of damages is expectation, requirements set in practice for the establishment 
of the recoverable loss enforce the reliance measure instead; 
iii) analysis of each respective remedy, its functions and place in the system; 
iv) normative or legalistic, e.g. studying sources of law and court cases;  
v) comparison of remedies in several legal systems and comparison remedies to 
each other;  
vi) historical – following chronological development of the remedy within each 
policy and in time continuum in general; 
vii) interpretation of terms and conditions of legal statutory and academic sources. 
 
1.5. Structure and Sources 
This work is divided into three main chapters, accompanied by introduction and final 
conclusion.  
In the first chapter I provide definition of remedy, its functions and overview of 
contractual theories and general differences between Common and Civil law systems, 
explaining dissimilarities in formation of remedies in various legal orders. For this purpose 
I utilize legal dictionaries, articles on legal history, development of law and legal science 
in general, books and articles on legal theories of contract, law-and-economy studies, 
selected statutory acts and court cases. The chapter is followed by the intermediate 
conclusions in respect of definition and nature of remedy. 
Second chapter is devoted to the specifics of each remedy in respective jurisdictions, 
including analysis of local statutory and case law. In the second chapter I also analyze 
economic effects and drawbacks of the remedy and illustrate its application in the 
international environment through the prism of European codification. My research is 




, Great Britain, USA, international codifications in the area of contracts and sales; 
preparatory documents of legal reforms, official commentaries to the statutory law, 
extensive case law, legal statistics; articles and books regarding general studies of national 
legal systems and comparative legal studies; literature in respect of legal and economic 
analysis of each contractual remedy. Each subsection of the second chapter is followed by 
intermediate conclusions related to each reviewed remedy. 
In the third chapter I study review history of development of the construction 
contract, combining elements of sale and service; application of each remedy in the 
standard construction contracts in their productive combination and ways of enhancing 
economic efficiency. This chapter is built on analysis of the international and national soft 
law codifications in the form of industrial standard contracts; articles and books on history 
and specifics of construction industry and construction contract standards in particular; 
interrelation between sales and services in the construction and application of the sales 
laws by default, respective case law; literature on application of each respective remedy in 
the context of construction contract, its role in the system of industry specific remedies as a 
whole, and particulars in the national and international environment. Third chapter is 
divided into two sub-chapters, each followed by intermediate conclusions. 
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 For the purpose of this work provisions of Finnish law are considered in the chapters devoted to the 
analysis of the Civil law systems, nevertheless I have to mention that it is recognized fact that though 
Scandinavian/Nordic legal system was built on the principles of the Civil law, it gained certain specifics and 
current national laws include elements not pertinent to the Civil law order, for instance sales law include 
elements borrowed from Common law, as shown below. 
2. CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES: DEFINITION AND NATURE 
2.1. DEFINITION AND NATURE OF REMEDY 
Origins of the word “remedy” can be found in Old French, Latin and Indo-European 
languages starting from the years 1175-1225 with the medical meaning of “cure”, 
“treatment”, “relieve” and “healing”12. Figurative use of the term begins approximately 
from the year 1300.  
In legal science remedy is defined as a principle armored with different instruments 
to preserve the right, to prevent wrong and to counteract, as well as to correct and to rectify 
an evil/ fault/ error, and also to restore and to enforce good
13
. It is further considered as the 
“means to achieve justice in any matter in which legal rights are involved”14.  
Remedy comprises an integral part of each right and is recognized as essential to the 
concept of “ordered liberty” 15 , enabling functioning of rule of law 16 . In other words 
remedies define exact value of abstract rights and enforce them
17
. 
Legal remedy may have the following functions: preventive (protective), restorative 
and corrective, which can serve independently or be complementary to each other. But 
what is “right” or “wrong”, what shall be protected and how far the enforcement can go is 
defined by the particular legal order developed by science and practice. 
Preventive function of the remedy is realized by virtue of rule of law or term of 
contract, providing for such remedy in case of breach; it is passive until the breaching 
action happens. Breach of right/obligation activates remedy. Corrective and restorative 
functions of remedy become vital through the legal enforcement, both private and public. 
Remedies may be granted under substantive/ material law (or contract) or procedural law 
(used to secure different stages of the court trial, e.g. extraordinary, provisional/ interim)
18
. 









 See Cases Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 1997, 
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/521/702/case.html; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1803, 
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/5/137/case.html; See also case Ashby v. White 92 ER 126, 1703, 
expressed right to remedy in Common law, stating that each right should have means to “vindicate and 
maintain it, and remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it”, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashby_v_White. 
16
 See Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy under Due Process, 
San Diego Law Review, 2004, Vol. 41, p. 1639. 
17
 See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, Harvard Law Review, 1979, Vol. 93, p. 1; Paul 
Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, Yale Law Journal, 1983, Vol. 92, p. 587; Daryl J. Levinson, Rights 
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, Columbia Law Review, 1999, Vol. 99, p.p. 857, 885-897; Accord 
Tracy A. Thomas, supra note 16, p. 1638. 
18
 See for more on this issue Michael J. Cumberland, Separate, but Equal Treatment for Contract Damages, 
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There is no unity and clarity in the contemporary legal science between different 
views on the nature of the contractual remedies. Here is one example of the existing 
academic contradictions. On one side we have an opinion (Yehuda Adar, 2008) that in 
Anglo-American system remedy is principally defined as a legal response (action) to a 
“civil wrong” and the law of remedies intended to determine exact remedy (sole or 
cumulative) against respective group of civil wrongs, while in civil law system remedy is 
primarily understood as part of the obligation, “entitlement [right] arising out of the breach 
of an obligation (or duty) and taking the form of a burden [alternative duty] imposed on the 
person responsible for that breach”19. We can find opposite view (Ignacio Marín García, 
2012), according to which these two legal traditions have distinctive concepts of contract 
liability: in common law remedy is just an alternative of the same obligation, while in civil 
law system remedy is effect from non-performance of obligation or sanction
20
. The 
confusion, probably, stems from mixing different contractual doctrines and their sources
21
 
without giving proper consideration to the complexity of legal reality and the entire system 
of remedies. Study of single remedy outside of the systemic context will only render 
unfruitful debates and create further confusion, because things are not black-and-white in 
the modern legal science. Below we analyze that the traditional antagonistic contradictions 
between the compensatory and punitive functions of remedy have been ceasing, because 
they no longer satisfy needs of the modern diversified economy and trade. As Richard 
Craswell correctly noted, “to lawyers who think of remedies as protecting discrete, 
identifiable interests, the prospect of a continuum of remedies to choose from may seem 
odd. To economists who view remedies in instrumental terms, though, there is nothing at 
all odd about this”22.  
Even though “no consensus has yet been attained as to the exact meaning and scope 
of the …basic concepts”23 of “remedy” and “law of remedies”, it is generally accepted that 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Arkansas Law Review, 1967-1968, Vol. 21, p.p. 167 – 175. 
19
 See Yehuda Adar, Gabriela Shalev, The Law of Remedies in a Mixed Jurisdiction: The Israeli Experience, 
Tulane European and Civil Law Forum, 2008, Vol. 23, p.p. 5, 11. 
20
 See Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts, American 
Comparative Law Journal, 1995, Vol. 43, p.p. 427-444. 
21
 In §1201(1) USA UCC (version effective from 01.07.2013), sub-section (ff) defines “remedy" as any 
remedial right to which an aggrieved party is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal; in accordance with 
sub-section (hh) of the same section “right” includes remedy,  
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/entireuccbook_18831_7.pdf. 
22
 See Richard R. Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 183, 1999, 
p. 17. 
23
 See Yehuda Adar, Gabriela Shalev, supra note 19, p. 4. 
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legal remedies are the measures of securing legal rights, Ubi jus ibi remedium
24
.  
Undisputable that historically significant distinctions were developed in contract law 
in different legal orders
25
 (in our case most influential Common law and Civil law systems 
are considered), derived from the traditions, legal practice and academic science; many 
deviations could also be found between national legislations within the same legal 
tradition
26
. Nevertheless focusing on irreconcilable contradictions and blatant differences 
in both systems only shattered the existence of interdependence and mutual influence of 
legal institutions in the modern world. There is plenty of scientific material describing and 
analyzing divergence of remedies and their application in different legal orders and 
reflecting on difficulties of creation of a unified structure where they all will productively 
work for the purpose, moreover there is no consent on the common purpose.  
In the current work instead of following the traditional analysis of the remedies I 
follow more recent trend
27
 and look at them from a different angle. I concentrate on 
                                                        
24
 Latin legal maxim that translates “where there is a right there is a remedy” and means that infringed right 
shall be protected or restored. This right exceeds traditional English view by including right to action. 
Therefore a right goes along with a remedy. See case Ashby v. White, supra note 15, and also 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803110448446. 
25
 See John W. Salmond, The History of Law, Law Quarterly Review, 1887, No X, p. 166. He noted more 
than hundred years ago: “general theory of contract is almost entirely of domestic origin”.  
26
 Pacta sunt servanda as a basic principle of the contract law is accepted across jurisdictions. But when it 
comes to formation of the contract, in many civil law jurisdictions written form is a precondition of the 
contract enforceability, while in Germany, United Kingdom and Nordic states such requirement is not 
mandatory. This problem is referred to as “battle of forms”, See Dominik Kallweit, Towards a European 
Contract Law: For a Prosperous Future of International Trade, Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review, 2004, Vol. 35, p. 271. Distinctions in Common and Civil contract laws can be found in the 
regulation of offer and acceptance, application of principle of good faith and others, See e.g. Hugh Beale, 
The Impact of the Decisions of the European Courts on English Contract Law: The Limits of Voluntary 
Harmonization, European Review of Private Law, 2010, Vol. 3, p.p. 501-526. In some Civil law jurisdictions 
it is impossible to terminate a contract without obtaining an order from the court, meaning that the breach of 
the contract by one party doesn’t necessary give right to another party to stop its performance, See also Reg 
Thomas, Construction Contract Claims, Second Edition, 2001, Palgrave, UK, p.5, while in Common law, 
where the aggrieved party in case of breach chooses to terminate the agreement, it comes to an end and both 
parties are released from the obligation, See e.g. case Vitol SA v. Norelf Ltd., AC 800, 1996, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vitol_SA_v_Norelf_Ltd, Accord Contract Damages, series of lectures, 
InsiteLaw on-line magazine, Section 8.1.3, http://www.insitelawmagazine.com/ch9remedies.htm, See also 
below section on termination as a remedy. Enforcement of  penalty clause or specific performance in 
Common law is exceptional, while in Civil legal policy it is a generally accepted remedy, on penalty See e.g. 
Reg Thomas, Id, p. 6; Liquidated Damages and Penalties, Virginia Law Review, 1915, Vol. 2, No.4, p. 290; 
David Brizzee, Liquidated Damages and the Penalty Rule: A Reassessment, Brigham Young University Law 
Review, 0360151X, 1991, Vol.1991:4, p. 1613; See also below section on penalty as remedy; on specific 
performance See e.g. Dominik Kallweit, Id, p. 273; Gerard de Vries, Right to Specific Performance: Is there 
a Divergence between Civil- and Common-Law Systems and, If So, How Has It Been Bridged in the DCFR? 
European Review of Private Law 2009, Vol. 4, p.p. 582-583; Tracy A. Thomas, supra note 16, p.p. 1633 – 
1646). 
27
 Today many legal comparativists challenge thesis of divergence between English, French and German law, 
illustrating developing unity in many ways, See e.g. Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to 
Comparative Law, 3d ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, Vol. II, p.p. 83-94; Barry Nicholas, The 
French Law of Contract, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, p.p. 83-84; Ole Lando and Hugh Beale 
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finding areas of convergence and common intentions between different legal approaches, 
as well as rationale, which predetermines and explains similar logic and reason behind 
obvious but superficial alterations. Understanding the background of the remedies helps 
finding available alternatives of their application, aiming at the same goal, and generates 
more clear vision of the latter.  The results of such investigation in turn assist in finding 
way of applying elements from various systems to the general benefit of the international 
commercial transactions and their participants
28
. At the same time we shall not ignore that 
individual perceptions of jurists from different systems may vary to great extent, and while 




Often said that Common contract law and the system of remedies was highly 
promoted by economical contemplations and practical demands, while Civil law was 
rooted in academic science, elaborating on moral aspects of law, and hence - has more 
theoretical basis. Explanation of these differences can be found in historical background of 
the development of the each judicial system. When studying place and purpose of each 
remedy in its systemic context, we can better understand its logic and function.   
It is widely accepted fact that origins of Civil law lay with ancient Roman law, which 
later was affected by Germanic customs, canon law and transformed into jus commune 
under great influence of the Catholic Church and emerging legal academia. That explains 
why written law and its codification were at heart of the Civil law. French Civil Code 
(Napoleon Code) was enacted in 1804; German Civil Code – in 1900.  Both Codes 
contemplated of general provisions, applicable to all types of contracts, and special norms, 
regulating different types of contract. Both French and German laws originally considered 
specific performance as a primary remedy, which court had to award if the plaintiff 
demanded it, with the exception of cases when it could not been performed. This approach 
was based on the understanding of the contract as moral, not only legal obligation. Such 
                                                                                                                                                                       
(eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston, 2000, 
p.p. 178-179; John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and Common 
Law’, in Mauro Cappelletti (ed.), New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe, Leyden, Sijthoff, 1978, p. 
195; Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 1996, Vol. 45, p. 52; Catherine Valcke, Convergence and Divergence Between the English, 
French, and German Conceptions of Contract, European Review of Private Law, 2008, Vol. 16:1, p. 2. 
28
 See Franz Wieacker, Foundations of European Legal Culture, American Journal of Comparative Law, 
1990, Vol. 38, p.p. 1-29; Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, The 
New Law and Economics Development. A Critical Appraisal, David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, eds., 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.p.19-73; Stephen Diamond, Histories of the Movement 
Not-So-Critical Legal Studies, Cardozo Law Review, 1985, Vol. 6, p. 695. 
29
 See Catherine Valcke, supra note 27, p. 6. 
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interpretation of the Civil law remedy doctrine was widely shared by professionals. 
Common law starting from XII century was mostly developed by the Royal Courts 
into institute of different forms of action, creating legal precedents. Leading remedy was 
and is damages, which initially played the role of substitute performance. Secondary 
remedies of equity were derived from doctrines of cannon law and provided for the 
supplementary remedy of specific performance in case damages were unable to 
compensate for the breach of contract. Progress of contract law in England was enhanced 
by Industrial revolution (1770-1870). Serious legal reform occurred only in XIX century, 
when equity merged with Common law of actions, resulted at first in the general system of 
writs (case law) and providing for future development of contract law and remedies. This 
nevertheless did not mean that Common law was alien to doctrine of moral promise as an 
essence of a contract.  
It would be incorrect to deny that economy and legal science, Roman law and legal 
customs, ecclesiastical and secular legislators affected both systems’ development. 
Correlation of legal sources, process of legislative borrowing, internalization of education 
and trade, all together explain why different legal orders share same general principles and 
overall structure of remedies. To certain extent major difference between legal orders may 
be explained in more simplistic way from the fact that court developed Common law, 
while Civil law directed court practice. That also may explain why contract law as a 
separate and solid branch was developed earlier in Civil law jurisdictions than in Common 
law countries.  
Specific performance is only one example of how different ways in historical 
development in both legal orders brought to similar results in the modern state of affairs. 
As I demonstrate below courts in both Civil and Common law jurisdictions may refuse 
application of this remedy, if it would be unfair or would impose undue hardship on the 
respondent, or would cause unjust enrichment. I also show that there is more space for an 
award of damages in Civil law jurisdictions than it seems on the first sight, and both orders 
have room for substitute performance. 
In the similar way I analyze all major remedies and their interrelation and interaction 
in the modern international trade.  
Prior to forming better understanding of the existing system of remedies and their 
correct application in the contract law it is necessary to get general insight into different 
theories of contract (and its functions) per se. As it was correctly stated in one of the recent 
comprehensive researches on the matter, before reviewing how “the approach to 
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contractual remedies can differ …in the Common Law and French law it is first necessary 
to understand how those remedies work within the wider context of the legal system as a 
whole”30. Similarly in another respected comparative work it was noted: “the study of a 
particular legal situation cannot be conducted in isolation from its institutional context”31. 
 
2.2. NATURE OF REMEDY THROUGH THE CONTRACTUAL THEORIES
32
 
2.2.1. Classic View on Contract as a Free Bargain (Holmes)33.  
Holmes was close in his views to positivists
34
, stating that law is an objective 
standard evolved from subjective law (primitive notion of revenge and later notion of 
morality). Theory promoted unity of civil and criminal liability. Breach of law is a breach 
irrespective of the motives. True intentions of the party did not matter, but only 
interpretation of the contract by “reasonable man”. Precondition of promise enforceability 
was consideration, and asserted consideration was product of bargain. It promoted 
indifference toward the intention to breach or to perform and provided for the strict 
liability approach
35
. The theory simultaneously aimed at restriction of liability within the 
contract in order to maximize contractual freedom
36
. Contractual damages should be low, 
punitive damages should not be allowed. In Holmes’ view, liability for lost profit was 
“dangerously liberal”37; such compensation must be justified only upon proof that the 
breaching party knowingly and intentionally had anticipated the special risks of loss that 
the promisee sought to recover. Reliance on representation was insignificant; no legal 
                                                        
30
 See Thomas D. Musgrave, Comparative Contractual Remedies, University of Western Australia Law 
Review, 2008-2009, Vol. 34, p. 301. 
31
 See Donald Harris and Denis Tallon (eds.), Contract Law Today: Anglo-French Comparisons, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 391. 
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 There are various classifications of these theories available, and the purpose of this paper is not to present 
them all, but only give insight into this matter within the scope, enough to understand difference in the 
development of the systems of remedies; presented theories are liberal in nature, for more on this topic and 
for some alternative theories See e.g. Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in Contract, Boston 
University Law Review, 2009, Vol. 89, p.p. 1431 – 1435. Nevertheless noteworthy in respect of the same 
theories, which are listed herein, mention that Melvin A. Eisenberg divided them into “autonomy theories” 
(promissory theory, consent theory, reliance-based theory and rights-based/entitlement theory) and 
“revealed-preference theories” (economic theories), See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in 
The Theory of Contract Law, Peter Benson (ed.), 2001, p.p. 206, 223-235.  
33
 See Juliet P. Kostritsky, When Should Contract Law Supply a Liability Rule or Term?: Framing a Principle 
of Unification for Contracts, Arizona State Law Journal, 2000, Vol. 32, p. 1290.  
34
 See Patrick J. Kelley, Critical Analysis of Holmes's Theory of Contract, Notre Dame Law Review, 2000, 
Vol. 75, p.p. 1681- 1775. 
35
 See Oren Bar-Gill, and Omri Ben-Shahar, An information theory of willful breach, Michigan Law Review, 
2009, Vol. 107, p. 1480. 
36
 See Timothy J. Sullivan, Book Review of the Death of Contract - By Grant Gilmore, William & Mary Law 
Review, 1975, Vol.17:2, p. 412. 
37
 Id, p. 406. 
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claim was justified unless bargained-for consideration could be shown. Classicists intended 
to restrict legal intervention in “free play…of human conduct”38. Freedom of contract was 
considered supreme. 
 
2.2.2. Contract as Tort (Grant Gilmore, 1974) 39.  
Prof. Gilmore analyzed how classical theory of contract was eroded by modern 
concepts. He had shown that the courts generally appraised “expectation interest”, initially 
restrictively applied in case Hadley v. Baxendale
40
. Sec. 90 of the US First Restatement of 
Contracts established reliance as a precondition for the contractual enforcement, while 
keeping the Holmesian definition of bargained-for consideration in Sec.75 of the same act. 
Restitution has received continual development. Importance of commercial practices and 
the parties’ actual intentions became the new dimension of contract study, and liberal 
theory lost its influence
41
. Classical notion of contractual freedom surrendered to modern 
rules of equity; rule of the strong was substituted by the protection of the weak.  
 
2.2.3. Contract as a Promise and Expectation Damages (Charles Fried) 42. 
Essential principles of promissory theory are: 1) strict not fault-based liability and 2) 
ex post approach to compensation
43
. According to the theory, the law (as moral and legal 
obligation) is built around three notions of trust: 1) reliance on the trustworthy 
representations of the counter-party and exposing the latter to liability if the 
representations are incorrect (tort law); 2) general motivation of performance towards the 
counter-party, making reliable representations and acting even to own detriment in order to 
fulfill the promise (contract law); 3) forming future expectations based on counter-party’s 
representations (fiduciary law).  
Principle of expectation damages was implemented in US Restatement (Second) of 
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 Id, p. 412. 
39
 See Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract, Ronald K.L. Collins (ed.), Second ed., Ohio State University 
Press, 1995. 
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 9 Ex 341, 156 ER 145, EWHC Exch J70, 9 ExCh 341, 9 Ex Ch 341, 1854, 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Exch/1854/J70.html. 
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other theories, as shown below. 
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 Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation, Harvard University Press, 1981; 
See also Paul G. Mahoney, supra note 6, p. 117. 
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 Daniel Markovits, and Alan Schwartz, The Expectation Remedy and the Promissory Basis of Contract, 




. This remedy was intended to put the non-breaching party in the 
position she
45
 would have occupied had the contract been fulfilled. Damages in this case 
were calculated as difference between the performed and the promised, with addition of 
consequential and incidental losses
46
.  
Modern proponents of this theory (Markovits and Schwartz, 2012) reject critics from 
both defenders of specific performance, disgorgement and efficiency theory. They suggest 
that theory shall be understood as general promise of a seller to a buyer of either: to sell 
goods or services or to transfer money in the amount, which a buyer would receive from 
selling/using the goods, which they call “dual performance”47. From law-and-economics 
theory position, expectation damages create incentives for obligor to behave efficiently, in 




It is interesting to note that prior to the latest reform German sales law, following 
Roman tradition, was entitling a buyer to the expectation damages
49
. 
Nevertheless official comment to UCC stated: “the essential purpose of a contract 
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 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (§ 344) identifies several promisee’s interests contract law 
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 See Daniel Markovits, Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation 
Interest, Virginia Law Rev., 2011, Vol. 97, p. 1948.  
48
 See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, California Law 
Review, 1985, Vol. 73, p.p. 11-19; Richard R. Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory 
of Efficient Breach, California Law Review, 1988, Vol. 61, p.p. 630-631, 646-656; Gerhard Wagner, Buyers’ 
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 German doctrine developed two ways of calculating damages in case of sales contract breach: i) “small 
expectation damages” – money to be paid in case of delivery of non-conforming good accepted by a buyer 
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Gerhard Wagner, Id. 
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between commercial men is actual performance and they do not bargain merely for a 
promise or for a promise plus the right to win a lawsuit”50. 
 
2.2.4. Contract as Consent51. 
Derived from the promissory theory, consent doctrine suggested justifying contract 
enforcement on the merits of the mutual willful consent of the parties hereof to be bound. 
Pitfalls of the promise theory are identified as: (1) incapacity to explain objective contract 
theory of assent as contractual
52
, (2) frustration to understand contract law’s “gap fillers” 
as contractual, (3) moralizing the enforcement from individual perspective
53. In contract 
law the source of duty is not the law, as in tort law, not the undertaking party, as in 
promise theory, but “special sense of consent”54 – commitment to be legally liable, in the 
way it was communicated to another party, not in the way it was thought. Indication of the 
intention to be legally bound is presence of bargain. “Because we cannot read each other's 
minds… only the “reasonable” or objective interpretation of the commitment will establish 
the clear boundaries”55. 
Some studies unite all above described theories under the title “classic theory of 
contract” 56 , characterized with freedom of contract, based on promise, bargain for 
consideration, and expectation measure of damages, distinguished from reliance theory, 
which dominated from mid-XIX century until early XX century, excluding consideration 
of morality or policy
57
. 
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 §2-609(1) UCC (1999), cited in Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach 
and Tortious Interference, Fordham Law Review, 2000, Vol. 68, p.p. 1085, 1094. 
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2.2.5. Reliance Interest in Contract (Fuller and Perdue)58. 
This theory was the most influential in American legal thought and created basis for 
the current legislation. Founders of the theory defined three groups of interests, which can 
be harmed in case of contract breach: 1) expectation (expected by aggrieved party value of 
the performance); 2) reliance (value aggrieved party would receive by not-agreeing to the 
contract); 3) restitution (extra benefit of the breaching party resulting from the breach)
59
. 
They argued that reliance interest deserves most protection: it corrected an unjust loss by 
the aggrieved party and prevented overcompensation from the breaching party. Reliance 
damages put the injured party in the same foreseeable position as if the contract had never 
been made. 
Theory disapproved shift from corrective justice to distributive justice and hence, the 
law intervention, and rejected measurement of the contract recovery by the value of the 
promised performance. This theory was strongly supported by normative and descriptive 
analysis.  
“Modern legacy”60 was given to the doctrine in the §344 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts stated that all remedies serve to protect one or more of the three interests of a 
promisee
61
. For many years it was academic standard of teaching law of remedies.  
This theory was profoundly criticized on its merits on many occasions
62
. For instance 
prof. Craswell argued that postulates of reliance theory are outdated from the position of 
modern analysis
63
. Tested three interests against substantive policies and their goals, 
including economic efficiency, contractualism, retributivism, distributional goals, 
corrective justice and general ideological analysis of modern scholars, Craswell illustrated 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, California Law Review, 2000, Vol. 88, 
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 See Lon L. Fuller, William L. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, Yale Law Journal, 
1936-37, Vol. 46, p.p. 52 – 96; See also Patrick S. Atiyah, Essays on Contract, Oxford University Press, 
1988, p.p. 42 - 43, 80 - 82. 
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 See Richard R. Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, San Diego Law Review, 
2003, Vol. 40, p. 1179. 
60
 See Richard R. Craswell, supra note 22, p. 9. 
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 Some even express view that reliance theory diminished contract to tort and restitution, See Peter Jaffey, 
supra note 56, p. 1.  
63
 See Richard R. Craswell, supra note 22, p. 4. 
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that legal science and practice went far beyond reliance doctrine and adopted division of 
protected interests; he also shown that the priority of the reliance damages is no longer 
supported by reality. R. Craswell offered new gradation: (1) remedies above expectation, 
(2) remedies that approximate expectation, and (3) remedies below expectation
64
. 
Prof. Craswell agreed that restitution and similar to it reliance can be awarded as 
remedies, but only among others, there are many interests, served by the remedies, and 
many other ways in which the remedy shall be calculated. Protection of the reliance 
interest owes more to tort than to contract: they both calculate effect of the breach ex ante, 
while expectation remedy is calculated ex post.  
Some justification was made by R. Craswell to the general rules of the expectation 
damages’ calculation, e.g. the rule of proof of the latter with reasonable certainty, even 
though courts are also entitled to alter the grade of certainty they consider ‘reasonable’, 
depending on the circumstance of the case. He also noted that some losses and some 
profits might be difficult to prove
65
. The cases, in which measuring expectation remedies 
based on the reliance interest, are often related to calculation of liquidated damages and 
lost profits
66
. Some components of the expectation damages may be also suspended by the 
courts, if they were not reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party or could have been 
mitigated by the aggrieved party, or may be excluded by the material or procedural rules, 
i.e. legal fees or compensation for emotional distress. 
Despite some court awards of the reliance damages, expectation damages still remain 
the standard remedy. If calculated in a proper manner, the latter creates a number of useful 
incentives: take precautions, efficiently choose between the breach and performance, and 




2.2.6. Law-and-Economics Efficiency Theory.  
Application of economic methods to the legal research started in 1960’s in the US, 
and gradually spread to Europe though in a more resistant way (Michael Schilling, 2009; 
Qi Zhou, 2011). There are different types of economic analysis of law, which give way to 
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many streams in studies of efficiency: of reliance, of performance, of breach, and other
68
. 
Despite the heavy critics of the shortcomings of economic analysis, there are sound 
explanations to the wide scope of its influence. Economists find interrelation between 
action/decision/remedy and incentives
69
, and predict future behavior and effects (Craswell, 
1999; Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, 1998); they are forward-looking, not searching for the 
interest to be protected, but for increase in the general prosperity or utility by participation 
in respective welfare-enhancing transactions. Different aspects of contract law were 
evaluated from the efficiency perspective
70




This theory was built around novel interpretation of pacta sunt servanda principle 
given by Holmes
72
 as alternative obligation between performance and payment of 
(expectation) damages (default rule)
73
, compensatory, but not punitive in nature, because 
breach was no longer considered wrongful, as long as it met requirements of efficiency 
(not every breach). The breach was considered efficient when breaching party calculated 
better economic outcome from the alternative use of the resources/ deal than from 
performance and was prepared to compensate to the non-breaching party value equal to the 
performance. In the center of this doctrine, according to protagonist Richard Posner, 
positioned economic principle of the distribution/ allocation of the scarce resources to the 
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users that value them most
74
. Economic efficiency was calculated by using two methods: 
Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency and Pareto-efficiency
75
. As a result of the calculation in case of 
efficient breach and efficient compensation the non-breaching party suffered no losses, 
because she was placed in the position, it would have been should the contract been 
performed, and therefore not worse off, while breaching party was better off. It was even 
demonstrated that in some cases non-breaching party could also be better off upon the 
breach
76
. Professors Goetz and Scott (as the theory proponents) employed category of 
efficient-man, who was always predictable and capable of making strictly efficient 
decisions. As a result of his actions efficient breach would lead to a merely just 
compensation – the one that “adequately mirrors the value of performance”77. Accordingly, 
expectation measure provided incentives for efficient decision to perform or breach
78
. 
Nevertheless it did not produce efficient levels of reliance, because stimulated the 
promisee to rely on the performance
79
. 
Despite the fact that Pareto-efficiency had theoretical advantages, it had serious 
practical drawbacks
80
. For instance, courts would not be able to make award of damages 
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 According to R. Posner, “In some cases a party would be tempted to breach his contract simply because his 
profit from breach would exceed his expected profit from completion of the contract. If his profit would also 
exceed the expected profit to the other party from completion of the contract, and if damages are limited to 
the loss of expected profit, there will be an incentive to commit a breach. There should be”, See Richard A. 
Posner, supra note 73, p.p. 89 - 90. 
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worse off and external costs mostly exist, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_efficiency.  
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not Pareto improvements. The Kaldor–Hicks methods are typically used as tests of Pareto efficiency rather 
than as efficiency goals themselves. They are used to determine whether an activity moves the economy 
toward Pareto efficiency. Any change usually makes some people better off and others worse off, so these 
tests consider what would happen if gainers were to compensate losers or vice versa. 
 Kaldor–Hicks criterion is the taking into account of only the absolute level of income, not its 
distribution, meaning difference between poor and rich and difference in utility change of both by affecting 
them in the same way, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaldor–Hicks_efficiency.  
76
 See Daniel Markovits, Alan Schwartz, supra note 43, p. 812. 
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 See Charles J. Goetz, Robert E. Scott, supra note 73, p. 558. 
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 See John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, Journal of Legal Studies, 
1972, Vol. 1, p.p. 277-304; Steven Shavell, supra note 8, p.p. 466-490; Lewis A. Kornhauser, supra note 68, 
p.p. 683-725. 
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 See Paul G. Mahoney, supra note 70, p. 123. He also notes that the reliance measure has the same flaw. 
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 Pareto efficiency argues against specific performance and higher than expectation damages, as both 
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based on Pareto criteria, because it would always make defendant worse off
81
. Many 
commentators challenged postulates and methodology of this theory. For instance, Ian 
Macneil (1982) saw major flaw of the theory in application of behavioral models of “man-
outside-society” for predicting actions of a “man-in-society”82; moreover it unreasonably 
simplified complex human behavior, ignored differences in types of contract, legal 
conflicts, and causes of breach, all commonly referred to as “externalities”83. Another 
critical argument against this theory is limitation of damages, which can be recovered from 
the position of their certainty and foreseeability, exclusion of legal costs and transaction 
costs
84
, breach of the freedom of contract principle and moral hazard
85
. 
Melvin Eisenberg also criticized expectation measure of damages, stating that the 
parties did not bargain for relief, but for performance. In his reasonable view, they always 
failed to make promisee indifferent between the performance and relief, being commonly 
measured as difference between contract price and market price (or the promisee’s lost 
profits, which was a rare case, because consequential damages were not generally 
awarded) given limitations of reasonability and foreseeability, excluding lost time and 
legal costs, and risk of insolvency. He stated, “The theory of efficient breach does nothing 
                                                                                                                                                                       
discouraging efficient breach, but it cannot provide strong reasoning, because in both cases a promisor will 
benefit and a promisee will be harmed. Kaldor-Hicks argues that expectation damages are equal to the caused 
loss and against both higher and less than expectation damages, See Mark Pettit, Jr., Private Advantage and 
Public Power: Reexamining the Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract Damages, Hastings Law 
Journal, 1987, Vol. 38, p.p. 432 - 434. See also Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of 
Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, Virginia Law Review, 1980, Vol. 66, p. 1447. 
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 Additionally Commonwealth courts have long tradition of qualifying breach of contract as a wrongful act, 
See e.g. cases South Wales Miners’ Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Company Ltd., AC 239 (HL), 1905; 
George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd., QB 284, 304 (CA), 1983; Williams v. Roffey 
Bros. & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd., 1QB 1, 1991, All cited in Nina C.Z. Khouri, supra note 72, p.p. 751- 
753. 
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 See Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, Virginia Law Review, 1982, Vol. 
68:5, p. 961. 
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 See Ian R. Macneil, Contract Remedies: A Need for Better Efficiency Analysis, Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, 1988, Vol. 144:1, p.p. 12 -14, 29. Macneil’s relational contract theory had his own 
flaws. It was noted that it is more to the economic and its methods than just restricted part analyzed by 
Macneil. It is true that many of economic models are static, but they are complemented by dynamic methods, 
used in assessment of efficiency between different legal rules. His model of “schizo-man”, who is “entirely 
selfish”, but simultaneously “entirely social” is highly controversial. Even though efficiency model can be 
considered as simple in comparison with relational theory, in turn taking all factors in consideration, in the 
latter case some factors still will remain omitted, and simplicity of the theory does not a priori proves its 
defectiveness. See comments by H.J. Vosgerau and K. E. Scott to Macneil’s article, Id, p.p. 31- 38. 
84
 They include costs incurred in making an economic exchange: search and information, bargaining and 
bidding, policing and enforcement, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transaction_cost. See also Robert Cooter 
and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 4th ed., 2004, p.p. 91-92. 
85
 See Nina Khouri, supra note 72, p. 749. 
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to promote efficiency” 86, and because the expectation damages were not based on cost, 
they were not compensatory in direct sense (could not ensure reliance and limit recovery, 
e.g. lost profit, legal costs) and not efficient
87
. As he correctly affirmed, not always a seller 
was aware of the true value, which a buyer placed on the commodity, not always could 
predict changes in the buyer’s value (failure in Overbidder Paradigm)88 . Additionally 
instead of breaching the contract there was possibility to negotiate its termination and 
establish the real value, which the promisee would accept in lieu of performance
89
. The 
problem ignored by Eisenberg was that termination in such case would require mutual will, 
and not always the promisee would agree to it, despite the “efficient” exit payment offered 
by the promisor. Undisputable though was that expectation measure created incentives for 
unnecessary precautions and excessive reliance. 
Reliance theory proponents were naturally anxious to prove that the legal 
intervention of the state should merely extend to protection of reliance interest, covering 
expectation only in exceptional cases. They justified that the major difference between 
reliance and expectation damages was in the object each of them protected. Expectation 
measure intended to place a promisee in the position she would have been, if the contract 
had been performed, by offering substitute of the performance. Reliance measure on the 
contrary aimed to secure the non-breaching party’s position before the promise was made, 
by removing effects of the breach. Fuller and Perdue alleged that protection of the 
expectation interest should only serve better protection of the reliance
90
. Consequently, the 
only uncovered by the reliance expectation loss was of an “extra advantage”, that the 
promisee would receive from the exact performance comparing to the substitute 
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 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, supra note 70, p. 978. The only paradigm in which breach is justified is 
Mitigation Paradigm, Id, p.p. 1016, 1021 – 1024. 
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89
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efficiency [of termination]”, See Sidney W. DeLong, The Efficiency of a Disgorgement as a Remedy for 
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, which she had to prove first.  Prof. M. Pettit (1987) declared that logic 
could not explain the choice between reliance and expectation. In his opinion, 
comprehensive protection of the reliance interest would ensure compensation of all losses 
sustained by a promisee. And the difference originated from the starting point of damages 
measure: 1) at the time when the promise was made (reliance fully compensated for the 
contract obtainable elsewhere and expectation damages were over-compensatory) or 2) the 
value of the promise itself (expectation damages compensated for the actual loss – full 
performance of the more favorable contract). From this point, expectation compensated for 
the wrong due to the breach, granting the promisee additional benefits, and reliance – only 
for the promise itself
92
.  Hence the final question was: should law award more or less 
extensive compensation? 
Prof. Craswell responded: “compensatory remedies are never efficient. Remedy that 
is most efficient in serving one goal might not be most efficient in serving another”93. In 
some cases, he continued, economic efficiency would not require fully compensatory 
damages. Referring to the efficient breach, he suggested dividing the breaches of contract 
into “willful” (deliberate decision, known, intentional, fraudulent, made in bad faith) and 
“accidental” (unintentional decision, affected by not deliberate events– increase in costs, 
incorrect work, and occurrence of a better offer). Most of accidental breaches were 
efficient, according to Craswell, and hence required more restrained compensations. 
Liability should increase, but remain limited, in case where efficient breach was willful. 
General rule on damages should assume strict liability and award of expected damages in 
high values. But the risk of liability should not prevent efficient breach, because it would 
give right incentives to renegotiate, increase the price or otherwise eliminate the deterrence 
of the efficient breach. In his opinion, it was easier for the court to evaluate optimal 




From the stand point of the corrective justice wrongdoer should compensate the 
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 Mark Pettit, Jr. contended that two factors illustrate interrelation between expectation and reliance: 1) loss 
of expected benefit from the performance usually includes reliance loss; 2) reliance may also comprise some 
lost opportunities and expenditures. He further argues that expectation losses are caused by the breach, while 
reliance losses are caused by the contract formation, therefore they would occur in any case, except for 
litigation costs. See Mark Pettit, Jr., supra note 80, p.p. 418 - 422. 
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 Id, p. 426. 
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 See Richard R. Craswell, supra note 59, p. 1149. 
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 See Richard R. Craswell, When is a Willful breach “Willful”? The link between Definitions and Damages, 
Michigan Law Review, 2008-2009, Vol. 107, p.p. 1501- 1515. 
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wrong, but there was no clarity on the extent of the compensation. Economics offered 
method to measure remedy in principle
95
, which created best incentive to perform or 
breach, and best consequence of the latter. For the economists the compensatory nature of 
the remedy was irrelevant, only the efficient result, which may not require fully 
compensatory damages’ award96 . Therefore optimal remedy could be above or below 
expectation damages. R. Craswell proposed optimal calculation for damages’ 
compensation by applying special “multipliers” and evaluating their efficiency. Same 




Craswell also discussed compensation based on property rule, and the analysis of 
different remedial theories would be incomplete without mentioning it. Professors 
Calabresi and Malamed (1972) defined the property rule as protection of ex ante 
entitlement of its holder to set the price, enforce his terms and remain immune against 
forced transactions, while liability rule in their opinion, provided lower protection against 
trespass
98
. Modern development of this concept suggested following remedies: a) 
propertized compensation (of pre-trespassed asking price); b) disgorgement of the 
trespasser’s profit; or alternatively c) market-price compensation. According to Craswell, 




Some of the recent developments of the economic theory, i.a. by Robert Scott and 
George Triantis (2004), promote the shift of the purpose of remedies from compensatory 
(which was borrowed in the XIX century from the tort law) to contract-market difference 
option, and argue that aggrieved party in non-consumer contracts shall not be placed in the 
position as if the contract have been performed, but shall only be awarded contract-market 
alteration as damages on default, which can be either over- or under-compensatory; they 
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 It is accepted that economical methods are not flawless, and depending on application they can bring to 
different results. In one example, used by R. Craswell, he stated that the toaster caused a fire would induce 
greater consequential damages for the house-owners of the expensive and modest houses. And maybe if 
money-wise it is true, but in relation to their wealth the result may be the opposite: in both cases people lose 
their home, but for wealthy people it may be not as dramatic as for poor. This argument of cross-
subsidization and adverse selection was also criticized by M. Eisenberg on its merits. See Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, supra note 70, p.p. 985 – 986.  
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2238. 
98
 See Gideon Parchomovsky, Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, Northern University Law Review, 
2009, Vol. 103, p.p. 2, 15. 
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particularly maintain enforcement of the agreed-to remedies, even though violation 
expectation principle
100




2.3. Intermediate Conclusions  
It is not possible to review all contractual theories, and it is not the purpose of this 
work. I further use results of this general overview for forming better understanding of the 
major differences between remedial systems in Common and Civil law by detecting 
influence of the respective theories on development of the latter. 
Three essential categories of remedies under current investigation are – damages, 
specific performance and termination of contract – and all of them are available in both 
Common and Civil law systems; different is the weight each of them carries, interest it 
protects and purpose it satisfies.  Other remedies that are under consideration in the current 
work: liquidated damages and penalty, performance withholding, and price reduction. 
Application of these remedies, their functional options and alternatives available in both 




                                                        
100
 See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, supra note 89, p.p. 1435 - 1451 
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3. TYPES OF CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES 
3.1. REMEDY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
3.1.1. Specific Performance in Civil Law  
In Civil law specific performance has traditionally been a primer remedy for the 
breach of contract.  
French Civil Code
102
 (FCC) defines contract as agreement by which a person(s) bind 
himself, toward another to transfer, to do or not to do something (Art. 1101 FCC); 
legitimate agreement becomes law for its counterparties (Art. 1134 FCC). To do or transfer 
something is considered as the equivalent of what is transferred or done and includes gain 
or loss for each party, depending on uncertain event (Art. 1104 FCC). Obligation to 
transfer or do defines value, for which contract is made (Art. 1106 FCC). One of the 
essential requisites of the contract validity is consent of the party (Art. 1108 FCC), which 
is absent if given by mistake, due to duress or deception (Art. 1109 FCC). In case of absent 
consent contract is not void just by the rule of law, but shall be established by the court 
(Art. 1117 FCC). Interesting that Art. 1118 FCC recognizes certain situations of contract 
invalidation due to loss. Agreements may be revoked by mutual consent or under 
provisions of law (Art. 1134 FCC). Agreements shall be interpreted based on common 
intention of the parties, not on the literal meaning of the terms (Art. 1156 FCC). 
According to Art. 1136 FCC an obligation to transfer implies delivery of a thing to 
the creditor on pain of damages. Mere fact of an agreement makes the creditor the owner 
of the thing, with division of the transfer of the ownership and the risk (which transfers at 
actual delivery) (Art. 1138 FCC).  
Consequences of non-performance of the obligation to do or not to do are damages 
(Sec. 1 Art. 1142 FCC). Nevertheless even though this rule reads as general, it is applied in 
small number of cases
103
, e.g. when the obligation of doing is essential or of personal 
nature, or when it will require interference with personal liberty in case of obligation not to 
do (undue judicial supervision), and the court will not order to perform. Primer rule is not 
that obvious and set forth in the Art. 1184 FCC on application of subsequent condition in 
case of non-performance: agreement stays partially in force and aggrieved party has choice 
to demand performance (if it is still available) or to dissolve the contract and demand 
damages and interest. Court decides whether to grant specific performance and provide 
                                                        
102
 Original version dated of 1804, version used in this work is with amendments dated 2006, 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations. 
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 Thomas D. Musgrave, supra note 30, p. 336. 
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defendant with extension for performance or terminate the contract. 
Specific performance also includes creditor’s entitlement to hire a third party to 
perform obligation at the expense of the defaulted party or to purchase from a third party 
(Sec. 2 Art. 1142, Art. 1144 FCC); that is called “surrogate performance”104 and plays role 
of indirect performance insuring. In order to establish default of a debtor she should be 
given a notice (Art. 1139 FCC); damages are due upon such notice (Art. 1146 FCC).  
§311 of German Civil Code
105
 (BGB) states: “Unless otherwise provided by a 
statute, a contract between the parties is necessary in order to create an obligation by legal 
transaction or to alter the content of an obligation”. §241 BGB stipulates duties arising out 
of an obligation: performance or refraining from an action. BGB does not provide for a 
comprehensive concept of the contractual breach, but rather offers three types of non-
conforming performance or “breach of duty” (Vertragsverletzungen): i) failure to comply 
with duties arising out of an obligation; ii) delayed performance; iii) impossibility of 
performance
106
. Distinctive principle of German law is fault-based liability: an obligor is 
liable for deliberate and negligent acts and omissions (§276, §280 (1) BGB). This rule used 
to have an exception:”…a debtor is responsible, unless it is otherwise provided”. Recent 
reform substituted this exception with “unless stricter degree of liability is available”. In all 
cases of failure to deliver, to deliver properly or of delay an obligor should not be liable for 
damages if she is not liable for the failure. Responsibility of an obligor for non-delivery 
without fault is repealed (§279 BGB). 
Right to specific performance is implicit in §241 BGB. §275 BGB sets forth 
preclusions for specific performance: 1) performance is impossible for obligor or any third 
party; 2) it requires expenses, manifestly disproportionate to the obligee’s interests; 3) it is 
unreasonable or of personal nature. Notion of performance impossibility has long history, 
and BGB traditionally distinguishes different types of impossibility: objective (nobody can 
perform) and subjective (obligor cannot perform); initial (existing at the contracting stage) 
and subsequent (after conclusion of contract); partial and total. The old version of this term 
excluded specific performance irrespective of the debtor’s fault107. After reform of 2002 
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 Originally enacted in 1900, reformed in 2002, version used in this work is with amendments dated 2013, 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/. 
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 See Manfred Pieck, A Study of the Significant Aspects of German Contract Law, Annual Survey of 
International and Comparative Law, 1996, Vol. 3:1, p. 119.     
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 See Reinhard Zimmermann, Breach of Contract and Remedies under the New German Law of 
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initial and subsequent performance became equal and fault factor – actual. Nonetheless 
new version of BGB diverges between practical, economical and moral impossibility.  
If obligor fails to perform, obligee should fix a reasonable period of time for due or 
substitute performance, unless there is clear refusal of obligor to perform or certain 
circumstances justifying resort to claim for compensation (§281 (1)-(2), §286 (2:3) BGB), 
or time of performance is determined by calendar date or can be defined in accordance 
with it. If type of breach of duty makes fixed period vain, warning notice shall be sufficient 
(§281 (3), §286 (2:4) BGB). Claim of performance excludes compensation in lieu of 
performance (damages) and vice versa (§281 (4) BGB). Previously BGB demanded that 
fixing the period would be combined with a warning that performance would not be 




If in result of non-performance an obligor obtains a substitute for an object owed, an 




In accordance with Finnish Sale of Goods Act (Kauppalaki, 355/1987)
110
 (“FSGC”) 
in case goods are not delivered or delivery is delayed, a buyer is entitled to require 
performance or declare the contract avoided and claim damages (Sec. 22 FSGA). The 
buyer may choose to hold to the contract and require performance, unless there is 
impediment the seller cannot overcome or performance would require disproportioned to 
the buyer’s interest sacrifices, or if the buyer defers her claim for unreasonable long time 
(Sec. 23 FSGA). A buyer has right to fix additional period for performance of a seller (Sec. 
25(2) - (3) FSGA). Pursuant to Sec. 51 and Sec. 54 (2) and (3) FSGA a seller has right to 
similar remedies. In case a buyer cancels an order for specifically manufactured or ordered 
goods, a seller may demand the payment, if cancellation will cause her substantial 
detriment or uncertainty of compensation of sustained loss due to cancellation. The seller 
loses this right, if the goods have not yet been delivered and she defers her claim for 
unreasonably long time (Sec.52 FSGA). A seller is also entitled to demand from a buyer 
reasonable cooperation in fulfillment of performance, unless there is impediment 
preventing the buyer from doing so or unreasonable delay in the seller’s demand (Sec. 53 
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3.1.2. Specific Performance in Common Law  




Section 52(1) of English Sale of Goods Act (1979)
112
 (English SGA) limits 
application of specific performance to the cases of “ascertained” goods, which are “clearly 
identified and agreed at the time of contract” formation 113 . In any case discretion of 
application is with the court, including situations where a buyer is put in hardship
114
, which 
means there is no legal certainty for the plaintiff applying for the remedy. If the goods are 
considered to be unascertained, equitable remedy as specific performance cannot be 
awarded, as established by the leading case Re Wait
115
. In another case
116
 the opposite 
decision is reached, where in case of selling non-specific goods court has granted specific 
performance, considering the state of the market. Traditionally specific performance was 
considered as remedy claimed by the buyer only, but practice established right of the seller 
to demand acceptance of delivery and compensation of losses alongside
117
. 
US Uniform Commercial Code
118
 (UCC) distinguishes the agreement as bargain of 
the parties (§1-201 (b (3) UCC) from the contract as total legal obligation between the 
parties, resulting from agreement (§ 1-201 (b (12) UCC)
119
. Remedies intend to place 
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aggrieved party in as good position as if the contract has been fully performed (§1-305 
UCC) (expectation damages). Specific performance implements both bargain and 
indifference doctrines, which are basic principles of the contract law
120
.  
Under §2-716 UCC specific performance can be affected by the court where the 
goods are unique or in other proper circumstances; additionally court may order payment 
of the price, damages or other relief as my deem just. A buyer has right to receive 
identified goods, if he is unable to find substitute or under the reasonable circumstances 
such effort is not justified. Doctrine of specific performance is expounded by three 
subsidiary rules: 1) damages presumed inadequate when the subject of the contract is 
unique and 2) in respect of real property; 3) prevention of specific performance in respect 
of services of personal nature or causing undue judicial supervision. Current general 
opinion expresses that specific performance is awarded more often, than conventional 
policy prescribes
121
. American legal doctrine of specific performance is divided into three 
mainstreams: 1) considering that specific performance should be granted routinely
122
; 2) it 
should be more restricted (efficient breach theory); 3) it should be awarded, unless a 
special moral, policy or practical reason prevents is in a certain group of cases, or if a 
“virtual” performance is available (Eisenberg, 2005).  
Major reasons in favor of specific performance are: 1) it is the best way to ensure 
indifference principle; 2) implementation of the bargain principle
123
; 3) stimulates efficient 
information exchange.  
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Vol. 119, p. 926. 
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Objections against specific performance are: 1) pitfalls of enforcement process
124
 
(from position of society specific performance is very intrusive and coercive and inherent 
of judicial error risk); 2) opportunism of a promisee: (i) the latter decides should she sue 
for damages or performance
125
; (ii) undermining the mitigation of damages rule
126
; (iii) a 
seller, demanding specific performance or damages, is indifferent which remedy to apply, 
whereas a buyer can choose: to sue for damages only, which would be calculated at the 
time of breach or to sue for specific performance along with damages, which would be 
calculated at the time of award. 
Prof. Eisenberg proposed (2005) to transform the principle of specific performance:  
1) from the court-centered rule, where a court decides if damages are adequate or the 
goods are unique, to the promisee-centered, based on assessment of availability of the 
goods in the market as substitute for delivery; 
2) from complicated and contradictory reasoning of damages’ adequacy to more 
credible evidences of availability of substitute performance
127
; 
3) from unclear standard to legal certainty. 
Eisenberg also elaborated on the idea of cover or “virtual” specific performance. The 
principle of cover transaction is implemented in §2-712 of UCC: after a breach a buyer 
may in good faith without undue delay purchase reasonable substitute and recover from a 
seller as damages difference between the price of substitute performance along with 
incidental or consequential damages minus expenses saved in consequence of breach. 
Hence “cover” is an act and a remedy. Cover provides four advantages over expectation 
damages and specific performance per se: 
1) buyer himself choses substitute performance; 
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2) cover damages are easier to prove; 
3) minimizes social and private costs; 
4) circumvent disadvantages of traditional specific enforcement. 
This cover principle of Common law is analogous to the principle of surrogate 
performance in Civil law. We can see a good example of similarities of the end result, 
achieved in different legal doctrines; it also more precisely reflects practical aspect of the 
contract law in relation to current world economy. If to take a closer look on more recent 
instruments of International codification, we can see different ways of how divergence of 
specific performance in Civil and Common law doctrines was overcome. 
 
3.1.3. Specific Performance in International Unification Sources  
Draft Common Frame of Reference
128
 (DCFR) divides remedies for breach of 
monetary
129
 and non-monetary obligations. In the former case it adopts right to damages 
(III, Art. 3:302 DCFR) while in the latter case – specific performance (III, Art. 3:302 
DCFR). Similar provision can be found in The Principles of International Contract Law
130
 
(PECL) Art. 9:101 and 9:102, with only difference: PECL precludes specific performance 
in case of availability of substitute transaction for both monetary and non-monetary 
obligations, while DCFR – only for monetary 131 . In case where non-performance is 
excused, i.e. if a breaching party proves that it encountered unforeseen impediment beyond 
its control and notified another party within reasonable time (Art. 8:108 PECL), aggrieved 
party may not claim performance and damages (Art. 8:101 (2) PECL). Similar provisions 
are stipulated by DCFR (III, Art. 3:104 and Art. 3:101 (2) respectively). 
Art. 28 of Vienna Convention on Sale of Goods
132
 (CISG) provides for a right of a 
party to require specific performance of any obligation by the counterparty, but not for an 
obligation of a court to award it, unless it would do so under its own law
133
. In accordance 
with Art. 46 (1) CISG a buyer may require specific performance, save she resorted to 
another exclusive remedy. But CISG doesn’t explicitly name this remedy available for the 
seller. A buyer may require delivery of substitute goods in case of fundamental breach 




 In all reviewed legal systems contract price may be claimed when it is due and action in court for its 










regarding the goods conformity (Art. 46 (2) CISG). Violation of contract considered 
fundamental if it deprives the other party of what she is entitled to expect under the 
contract, unless the party (reasonable person) in breach did not foresee such result (Art. 25 
CISG). A buyer may fix additional time for performance (Art. 47 CISG). Art. 48 CISG 
entitles a buyer to search for substitute performance without unreasonable delay and 
inconvenience and does not deprive her from claiming the damages alongside.  
 
3.1.4. Intermediate Conclusions 
French and German Civil Codes provide definition of a contract and arising out of it 
obligation to do or refrain from doing something. FCC refers to “non-performance” or 
default of obligation while BGB to breach of duty or non-conforming performance. BGB 
provides for fault-based liability. Both orders ensure resort to specific performance as the 
primer remedy, unless precluded by listed circumstances of impossibility. Both codes 
consider an option of “surrogate” or substitute performance. Resort to specific 
performance under FCC and BGB exclude claim of damages, which considered an 
alternative remedy together with contract termination or as a separate remedy in case of 
performance delay. 
UCC distinguishes between agreement as result of bargain and contract as 
formalized obligation, providing for strict liability irrespective of fault. Common law treats 
specific performance as exceptional remedy. UCC allows cumulative application of 
specific performance and damages. 
Court practice in both systems demonstrates that earlier established difference 
between awards of damages and specific performance is currently narrowing.  
International unification sources prescribe different treatment of monetary and non-
monetary obligations with award of specific performance. CISG allows this remedy as 
exclusive but leaves application to the local courts under their laws. 
In Finnish law specific performance is an exclusive remedy, alternative to 
termination. 
Specific performance is preferable remedy where a promisee faces difficulty in 
proving lost value of the performance and hence damages would be undercompensated
134
. 
Advantages of specific performance are: 1) serving indifference principle; 2) implementing 
bargain principle; 3) stimulating exchange of information between the parties. 
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Disadvantages are: 1) legal uncertainty, 2) opportunism of non-defaulted party. In all 
jurisdictions this remedy reasonably requires interference of the court. 
All reviewed legal orders and codifications offer remedy of specific performance 
with alternative option of surrogate or cover performance, when a buyer can recover from 
the defaulting seller difference between original and substitute performance, acquired 
elsewhere. This alternative performance, if available, is capable of eliminating drawbacks 





3.2. REMEDY OF TERMINATION; RESTITUTION 
3.2.1. Termination in Civil Law  
 In French law termination (avoidance/resolution) is possible in all cases of contract 
breach, including willful breach (non-performance or defective performance) and breach 
due to force majeure (equivalent to frustration in Common law) by virtue of Art. 1184 of 
FCC
135
. It is available as alternative to claim of specific performance and coupled with 
claim for damages. It can be only enforced by the court order and depending on 
circumstances court can grant additional time for performance, unless parties explicitly 
agreed in the contract that breach of certain terms would encounter termination. Therefore 
it is for the court’s discretion to decide how serious is the breach to render termination or 
to adjust the contractual terms, or in case of partial performance decide if compensation of 
damages would be sufficient and contract can remain in force. 
According to Art. 1610 FCC where a seller fails to deliver, a buyer may at her choice 
apply for avoidance of sale or for “being vested with possession”; in all cases she can 
claim damages if she has suffered the loss (Art. 1611 FCC). In case of sale of immovable 
thing, or of definite and limited thing, or with higher capacity and measure follows the 
sale, and the value of additional benefits is 1/12 higher than stated, a buyer has an option to 
pay excess of the price or repudiate the contract (Art. 1618-1620 FCC). In the latter case a 
seller has to return the price (if it was paid) and the costs of the contract (Art. 1621 FCC). 
French law does not have same division of conditions and warranties as Common 
law, however it is interesting that it stipulates two warranties, which a seller implies: 1) 
against dispossession; 2) against defects. If warranty of possession was breached a seller 
can claim all together (Art. 1630 FCC): 1) return of the price (at least the price, if the 
thing was diminished); 2) price of the fruits (if he shall return them); 3) expenses related 
to warranty and contract; 4) damages minus profit, if he made any (Art. 1632 FCC). In 
case of latent defects a buyer has a choice to return the thing and get restitution of the 
price or keep the thing and get price reduction, assessed by experts (Art. 1644 FCC), and 
in case a seller knew of defect – also claim damages (Art. 1645 FCC). 
If a buyer does not pay the price, a seller may apply for the avoidance of the 
contract (Art. 1654 FCC). In case of sale of commodities and movables, avoidance takes 
place by the virtue of law, for the benefit of a seller (art. 1656 FCC). Two additional 
reasons for avoidance and rescission are introduced in French law: 1) through the power 
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of redemption (where a seller reserves such right in the contract, but only within five 
years, Art. 1659 FCC) and 2) due to loss of a seller in sale of immovable (cheapness of 
price, where the loss exceeds 7/12 of the price within two years, Art. 1674 FCC). 
It is noteworthy that in contract of hire (service), an employer may terminate the 
contract at any time without any reason with compensating a contractor all his expenses, 
works and lost price (Art. 1794 FCC). 
Court order for resolution of contract annuls it retrospectively as it has never been 
signed and provide for mutual restitution. However when the contract is successive or 
continuous in nature (e.g. lease) resolution will not be retroactive
136
.  
Based on principle pacta sunt servanda Roman law has never recognized right to 
termination of contract, and stemming from it old version of BGB did not contain general 
statutory right to termination
137
. Predominant concept of performance impossibility 
implemented in BGB automatically releases the creditor from performance in certain 
cases. This doctrine through legislative reform is combined with a new notion – failure to 
comply with a duty
138
. Earlier party terminating a contract (meaning putting an end to the 
contract) could not claim damages, which considered continuation of the contractual 
obligation, based on the rule derived from German General Commercial Code 1861
139
. 
Amendments to BGB have changed this principle: under §325 termination of bilateral 
contract does not preclude right to claim compensation. Debtor’s liability in case of 
termination is still formally fault-based, even though by virtue of the reform fault became 
presumed (until proven otherwise). But remedy of termination does not longer depend on 
fault, and this is one of the significant changes upon the reform. 
Right to terminate can be reserved in contract or statutory based. Pursuant to §323 
BGB non-performance or failure to perform in accordance with contract gives right to an 
aggrieved party to terminate on notice with providing additional time, which may be 
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excluded in certain cases (implicit or explicit refusal to perform, inconvenience of notice, 
fixed date of performance, etc.), unless the breach was immaterial or an obligee drastically 
contributed to non-performance. According to §323(4) BGB an aggrieved party may 
terminate a contract before performance becomes due if it is obvious that the preconditions 
for termination will be satisfied, which is similar to the doctrine of anticipatory breach. 
Termination is effected by declaration to a breaching party (§349 BGB), and both parties 
are released from their duties to perform in perspective. Effects of termination are laid 
down in §346 BGB: any performance received shall be returned along with benefits 
derived from such performance, and any unjust enrichment must be returned; in addition to 
that an obligee may demand compensation for the loss due to the breach of duty (at least 
obligee must be reimbursed for necessary expenditure under (§347(2) BGB). Nevertheless 
termination does not annul the entire contract, which explains the specific restitution 
regime, preventing unjust enrichment. 
If restitution in kind is impossible due to nature of the received, its consumption or 
transformation, deterioration or destruction, it has to be substituted with compensation for 
value. Right to compensation diminished, if defect that gives the right to termination: i) 
became apparent only during the processing or transformation (deterioration/destruction) 
of the item, ii) is due to obligee or iii) has occurred in the hands of a buyer who has taken 
the due care. The latter case is controversial, because in accordance with §346 BGB risk of 
accidental loss and deterioration passes to a buyer when the thing is handed over. Right to 
declare a contract void in such case transfers risk back to a seller. This risk reverse is 
justified by the fact that termination happens due to failure of an obligor, resulting even 
without a fault in breach of duty, which shall entail consequence of carrying the risk. In 
French law such risk would be borne by a buyer (Art. 1647 FCC). Under Common law 
general rule
140
 risk transfers along with the title on transfer (Art. 20 English SGA), and if 
the goods are perished before the transfer without fault of either party the contract will be 
avoided (Art. 7 English SGA). 
In case of breach of sales contract for non-delivery general rules on termination will 
be applicable. In the event of defects right to termination is second available remedy after 
demand of specific performance with alternative of claim for price reduction (§437 BGB). 
In case a seller refused supplementary performance (removal of defect or supply of non-
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defective good) or repair provided by her failed twice it is not necessary for a buyer fix 
additional time before the termination (§440 BGB). 
Terms of BGB regulating contracts for work/service play only limited role for 
construction of buildings, mainly regulated by instruments of soft law
141
. According to 
§634 BGB a customer has as a third remedy termination of the contract with an alternative 
of price reduction. Only if supplementary performance (removal of defect or performance 
of the work again) is unsuccessful or unreasonable for the customer, she has right to 
terminate without fixing additional time (supplementary to the general exceptions for the 
same). A contractor also has right to terminate due to failure of the customer to cooperate 
in acceptance of the work performed subject to fixing additional time combined with 
declaration on termination in case of non-performance by the end of the fixed period (§643 
BGB). Special right to terminate the contract on notice is reserved for the customer at any 
time without reason (§649 BGB); in such case the contractor is entitled to demand agreed 
remuneration minus expenses she saves due to termination or benefits she acquires from 
that. 
In Finland under Sec. 25 of FSGA a buyer may declare contract avoided on notice 
within reasonable time (Sec. 29 FSGA) in case of the seller’s delay if a breach is 
substantial and a seller was aware of the buyer’s purpose. A buyer may fix additional time 
for performance and terminate only if seller declared unwillingness to perform.  A buyer 
may declare a contract avoided on account of a substantial defect in goods by notice given 
within reasonable time (Sec. 37, 39 FSGA). A seller may declare the contract avoided in 
the similar way if delay in payment is substantial or a buyer fails to cooperate (Sec. 54, 55, 
59 FSGA). For both parties avoidance is possible in installment contracts (Sec. 44, 56 
FSGA). Anticipatory breach is regulated in chapter 11 FSGA. In case of avoidance both 
parties are released from the obligations and entitled to claim restitution of what have been 
received (Sec. 64 FSGA) and compensate acquired benefits (Sec. 65 FSGA) (reasonable 
compensation and interest on the paid price). Termination may be substituted by new 
delivery (Sec. 65, 66 FSGA). 
 
3.2.2. Termination in Common Law 
In Common law there are two types of termination: 1) for default (provided by 
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 or law) or 2) for convenience (provided by the contract only). We consider only 
the first one from the angle of the default law rules. Default law rule ensures right to 
terminate a contract where it is repudiated or fundamentally breached. Termination is 
always coupled with right to search damages’ compensation or alternatively restitution. 
Termination may be effectuated without reference to the court.  
Repudiation takes place when one party indicates (explicitly or implicitly from 
conduct) that she no longer intends to be bound by the contract and will not perform, but 
unlike in case of breach, the reason for repudiation lays with inability, not readiness or 
unwillingness to perform, and gives an innocent party initiative to terminate or demand the 
performance. 
Repudiation may also occur before performance is due or complete if a contracting 
party indicates, either expressly or implicitly from her conduct, that she will not perform 
her contractual obligations. This type of repudiation is known as anticipatory breach
143
. 
Fundamental breach happens when non-breaching party has been significantly 
deprived of the benefit that was the purpose of the contract
144
. Such breach has been 
traditionally defined based on division of contractual terms into warranties and conditions.  
It is not relevant that the defendant desires to perform his part of the contract, if she is 
unable to do so. In the early period termination was almost impossible and non-breaching 
party had a burden of proof; failures on the side of the breaching party related to quality of 
goods and time of performance, commonly defined as representations, only gave rise to 
sue for damages for dishonesty. Contract remained valid and breach of less important 
terms became known as breach of warranty
145
. If the breach was so serious that destroyed 
the essence of contract, non-breaching party was entitled to terminate the contract and 
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claim money paid, as well as damages for the breached promise (indebitatus assumpsit)
146
. 
Old Sale of Goods Act (1893, UK) implemented distinction between warranties and 
conditions, transferred into the current English SGA (1979)
147
. 
Complicated and discretional criteria of defining whether the breached term was a 
condition or a warranty and apparent injustice resulted from such approach brought to 
development of the third type of contractual conditions – intermediate term, which was not 
condition in the accepted sense, but serious breach of it could constitute a fundamental 
breach, and a new test of assessment was laid down by the Court of Appeal in 1962, in the 
case of Hong-Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd.
148
.  
It is obvious that due to complexity of the matter courts hear each case of termination 
on merits and investigate numerous circumstances (significance, consequences of the 
breach for parties, place and purpose of the contractual term breached). That explains why 
in Common law it is so important to draft contract termination clauses with wide 
consideration of possible circumstances and possible affecting factors and their 
consequences. 
In this respect it is also important to make difference between termination and 
rescission of contract
149
. Termination is a self-help remedy, allowing the injured party to 
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cease own performance due to breach or repudiation of the other party
150
, which is 
termination of contractual obligation for the future. Rescission on the other hand is 
retrospective termination of the contract, its complete avoidance, which fully nullifies the 
contract as if it has not been signed. Rescission is “hidden within restitution for breach” 
(Kull, 1994). Rescission hence can be enforced only by the court decree. In case of 
termination the plaintiff may elect damages for breach, measured by expectation or 
reliance; in case of rescission – demand restitution in quantum meruit, for the market value 
of his own partial performance, and extended through recent court practice to 




Initially restitution for breach was available only when breaching party was 
“willfully or inexcusably in default” (Keener, 1893). In XX century it was accepted in 
cases where a breach was so significant that discharged the aggrieved party from her 
obligation (Corbin, 1964). The whole purpose of it was to prevent unjust enrichment by a 
breaching party
152
. Pursuant to the traditional English approach, rescission is not available 
for the breach of warranty once the property has passed to a buyer. On the opposite, 
American doctrine allows that from the early period, and compromise is incorporated in 
UCC, which allows rescission after acceptance for the substantial nonconformity of goods. 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment permits rescission only in case 




In accordance with UCC “termination” follows when either party has right by virtue 
of contract or law to put an end to the contract without its breach; as result all obligations 
for the future cease while right based on prior breach of performance survives (§2-106 (3) 
UCC). “Cancellation” happens when one party puts an end to a contract due to the breach 
by another party with the same end result, but cancelling party also preserves right to 
remedy due to the breach (§2-106 (4) UCC). In case of repudiatory breach (§2-610 UCC) 
aggrieved party may suspend her performance and may either await the performance or 
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resort to remedy for breach
154
. In such case a seller may withhold delivery, resell and cover 
damages, recover damages for non-acceptance or cancel (§2-703 UCC). A buyer in case of 
repudiation or non-delivery may cancel and claim the paid price, and in addition to that 
cover and claim damages or claim damages for non-delivery (§2-711 UCC)
155
. Damages 
for non-delivery will be calculated based on the proof of market price, as difference 
between it and contract price, including incidental and consequential damages less saved 
expenses (§2-713 UCC). §2-708(2) UCC provides that if the market price is inadequate to 
put a seller in as good a position as performance, then the measure of damages is the profit, 
including reasonable overhead, which the seller would have made from full performance 
plus incidental expenses and damages
156
. §2-718 UCC establishes that the buyer’s right to 
restitution is subject to offset to the extent that a seller establishes a right to recover 
damages under this provision.  
Restitution is not available if a seller fully or substantially performed his obligation 
(§373 (2) Second Restatement of Contracts) or in case delivering goods on credit (§§2-
702, 2-703 UCC), but has not been paid, absent fraud by a buyer.  
According to §374 Restatement (Second) of Contracts a breaching party is entitled to 
restitution for any benefit that she has conferred by way of partial performance or reliance 
in excess of the loss that she has caused by her own breach (guilty party restitution)
157
, 
unless parties agreed on liquidated damages, allowing a non-breaching party to retain part 
or whole benefit in two available forms – according to §371 Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts - either the reasonable value of the benefit conferred (measured by replacement 
cost) or amount the benefited party’s value has increased158. 
Rescission as a remedy is criticized for its economical inefficiency
159
, moral hazard 
and allowance of opportunism on the side of the rescinding party. Contract enforcement 
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would lose sense if routine award of rescission and restitution become available. 
Nevertheless it is also argued that restitution can become an effective remedy, providing 
parties with incentives for due performance, only if it will be purely restorative of price, 




3.2.3. Termination in International Unification Sources 
Instruments of international unification also provide remedy of termination. Art. 
9:301 PECL entitles the aggrieved party to terminate the contract if non-performance of 
the other party is fundamental or in case on non-fundamental delay additional time was 
fixed under Art. 8:106 PECL – after expiration of such time. Breach is considered 
fundamental if it substantially deprives non-breaching party of expected result (unless the 
breaching party have not foreseen and could not reasonably foresee such result); or non-
performance is intentional or gives reason for non-reliance on the future performance; or 
otherwise the strict compliance is of essence (Art. 8:103 PECL). Pursuant to Art. 9:103 
PECL aggrieved party may terminate a contract by notice, but loses its right if she has not 
given notice within reasonable time after becoming aware of the breach. The termination 
may take place automatically without sending a notice, if the breaching party is excused 
for non-performance under Art. 8:108 PECL. Art. 9:304 PECL provides for termination in 
case of anticipation of fundamental non-performance. Effects of termination (Art. 9:305 
PECL): 1) parties are released from future performance and obligation, but rights and 
liabilities accrued prior to termination remain unaffected; 2) provisions on settlement of 
disputes and those intended to terminate after termination remain unaffected (for instance, 
confidentiality obligations). Terminating party may reject previously received property 
received, if its value reduced due to non-performance (Art. 9:306 PECL). Upon 
termination aggrieved party may recover money paid for non-received or properly rejected 
performance (Art. 9:307 PECL). Party who supplied property, which can be returned, may 
recover it, if it was not paid or other counter-performance was not received (Art. 9:308 
PECL). If rendered performance cannot be returned and was not paid or compensated by 
counter-performance then reasonable value of it can be recovered (9:309 PECL). There is 
no clear notion of restitution in PECL. 
In accordance with DCFR contract can be terminated at any time, if provided for by 
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the contract (III, Art. 1:108), or in case of breach - by notice within reasonable time (late 
notice invalidates right to terminate III, Art. 3:508 DCFR). Additional period for cure may 
not be served in case where the breach is fundamental, intentional or anticipated, or cure 
would be inappropriate in the circumstances (III, Art. 3:203 DCFR). Definition of 
fundamental breach is compatible with the one in PECL (III, Art. 3:502 DCFR). 
Termination is available on delay after fixing additional time (III, Art. 3:503 DCFR) and in 
case of anticipated non-performance (III, Art. 3:504 DCFR), and also if a creditor demands 
reasonable assurance of performance, but is not provided such (III, Art. 3:505 DCFR). 
Indivisible obligation can be terminated as a whole, but termination of the divisible 
obligation shall be more strictly grounded (III, Art. 3:506 DCFR). Effects of termination 
are regulated by III, Art. 3:509 DCFR and are similar to those provided for by PECL. 
Termination does not preclude claim for damages. Unlike PECL, DCFR sets forth notion 
of restitution in respect of benefits received by performance (III, Art. 3:510 DCFR): party 
received benefits from performance should return them, which can be reciprocal; money 
paid should be returned; return of a thing can be substituted by its value (measured at the 
time of performance), in case transfer would cause unreasonable effort or expense; 
reduction in value should be compensated (III, Art. 3:512, Art. 3:514 DCFR); 
improvement and usage should be reasonably reimbursed (III, Art. 3:513 DCFR). 
Restitution is excluded to the extent that conforming performance was reciprocal, unless 
further non-performance reduced value of performed part (III, Art. 3:511 DCFR). 
In accordance with Art. 49 (1) CISG, a buyer may declare the contract avoided in 
case the failure by a seller constitute a fundamental breach or – only in relation to non-
delivery – a seller do not deliver within additionally fixed period or declares unwillingness 
to deliver within that period. Nevertheless in cases where the goods have been delivered, a 
buyer loses right to avoid the contract unless she declares late delivery void within 
reasonable time before it’s made or in respect of other breach – if it’s been declared within 
reasonable time from the moment the breach is known or should be known, or expiration 
of additionally fixed time for rectification (Art. 49 (2) CISG).   
 
3.2.4. Intermediate Conclusions  
Judging by the functions termination plays in all researched orders, we may conclude 
that it is a remedy in case of contractual breach. Conducted study shows significant 
differences between French and German rules, but in both jurisdictions termination can be 
cumulated with damages. In France it requires court intervention, in Germany it is a self-
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help remedy. In Civil law orders distinctive procedures provided in case of termination of 
sale contract and service agreement; the latter is more liberal, and the former is more 
restricted. In France breach of different warranties leads to different outcome, which 
reflects some similarities with breach of warranty and condition under English law.  
American law combines rules similar to both Civil law policies, which however only 
available if substantial performance has not happened yet. Regular termination is a self-
help remedy coupled with claim for damages or restitution, applicable in case of 
repudiation (performance inability or repudiatory breach) and in case of fundamental 
breach. UK and US laws engage divergent qualification of the fundamental breach: in 
English law breach of condition and intermediate term and in US law also breach of 
warranty in case of substantial non-conformity. Second Common law procedure is 
rescission (cancellation) – retrospective annulment of contract like in France, which can 
only be enforced by the court.  
Analysis shows that court plays similarly significant role in permitting termination 
with damages’ compensation or preserving the agreement and awarding specific 
performance both in France and Common law jurisdictions. German law and unification 
rules do not require court intervention, but special preconditions should be fulfilled. In 
respect of remedy of termination significance of the principle pacta sunt servanda is 
recognized in all considered legal orders. And notice on termination is prescribed in all of 
them. All reviewed systems allow explicit incorporation in the contract right to termination 
without revert to the court and stipulation of own definition of fundamental breach. 
Although we have to admit that in Civil law jurisdiction court and law have wider 
competence in prescribing additional time for performance (adjusting the contract). 
Termination works in retrospective in French law and in case of rescission under Common 
law. In German law, in case of regular termination under Common law, and pursuant to 
unification rules termination affects obligation in perspective: i) a creditor is not precluded 
from claiming damages upon termination; ii) certain contractual terms stay in force; iii) 
past performance remains intact if the parties are willing so and termination is partial. 
German law though employs restrictive restitution principle, while other jurisdictions have 
more liberal approach to the return of the acquired benefits. German law insists on the fault 
based principle, even loosened during the latest reform, but other regimes in practice have 
the same effect by demanding a breach to be fundamental in order to grant termination, 
therefore the end result is the same. Claim of specific performance excludes remedy of 
termination in all policies. 
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This remedy is highly criticized for economic inefficiency, moral hazard and risk of 
terminating party opportunism. Therefore its application should be restricted to cases of 
fundamental breach, limited judicial supervision seems reasonable to prevent misuse, and 
best solution would be to regulate this right in the negotiated contract, and it should have 
perspective effect only. 
 
3.3. REMEDY OF DAMAGES’ COMPENSATION 
3.3.1. Damages in Civil Law 
French law on damages was set by the XVII century, and then incorporated into the 
Code civil in 1804. Under the Art. 1147 FCC debtor should be ordered to pay damages due 
to non-performance or delay in performance, unless he proves that non-performance was 
caused by reason of force majeure (Art. 1148 FCC) or fortuitous event (equivalent to 
Common law frustration). Hence damages are divided into damages due to lateness 




French lawyers often refer to damages as “equivalent performance”, or “substitute 
performance”162 (exécution en équivalent)
163
, which intends to put the aggrieved party into 
the same position as if the contract would have been performed (expectation). The court 
can award damages as primary remedy in lieu of performance in kind, or as a 
supplementary measure, in combination with either specific performance or termination of 
contract in order to ensure full compensation. Therefore damages in general case include 
actual loss the creditor has suffered and the profit she has been deprived of (Art. 1149 
FCC), but the court is only required to award the total sum without explicit determination 
of each type of damages. Criteria for determination of damages are set forth in the Art. 
1150 and 1151 FCC: causation and remoteness, established respectively as direct and 
immediate consequence of the non-performance that is foreseen or could have been 
foreseen at the time of the contract formation (ex ante). Lack of direct causal link between 
the breach and the loss precludes damages’ award. Criterion of foreseeability is not 
applicable in case of the debtor’s fraud (intentional breach). The court determines 
foreseeability on the objective basis of the reasonable man. Hence application of the two 
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criteria is successive: first established direct causal link, and then foreseeability of 
damages. There is no obligation to mitigate damages in French law. 
Pursuant to BGB obligee may claim compensation for the breach of duty arising out 
of the obligation to perform unless obligor is not liable for the failure (§280(1) BGB). 
BGB avoids term “non-performance”, because deficient or partial performance is not 
complete, but still performance; this adherence to traditional terminology approach causes 
many practical problems of law application
164
. The claim for damages is still based on the 
notion of fault, but after reformative reversal of burden of proof to the debtor, fault is no 
longer considered as “requirement” for the claim165.  Damages are divided into: 1) in lieu 
of performance; 2) for delay; 3) “simple” damages166. 
Compensation in lieu of performance can be demanded in case of non-performance 
or undue performance upon termination of the contract. It is subject to additional 
requirements: obligee should fix additional reasonable time; in case of improper 
performance compensation in lieu could not be demanded, if the breach of duty is 
immaterial; claim for performance excludes claim for damages in lieu of performance 
(§281 BGB). If failed party disregards interests or rights of non-breaching party, the latter 
can demand compensation in lieu of performance, unless it is unreasonable to expect to 
accept the performance – the infringement of ancillary duties (§282 BGB). In case 
performance is impossible or unreasonably burdensome, an obligee may demand 
compensation in lieu of performance (§283 BGB). Instead of compensation the promisee 
may claim reimbursement for wasted expenses incurred as a result of a reasonable reliance 
on the performance, unless the purpose of such expenses would not have been achieved 
even in case of the due performance (§284 BGB).   
Upon delay, while the contract remains intact, a compensation can be claimed 
subject to prior notice demanding performance, which places obligor in default after 
expiration of additional time (§§280 (2), 286 BGB). If the payment is late a creditor is 
entitled to the interest on the delayed sum (§288 BGB). 
Reform intended to cover by the rules of the §280 (1) BGB the consequential loss, 
i.e. damage suffered by an obligee as a result of a breach of a contract
167
. Old law called 
this “positive malperformance”. A creditor should be placed in the position in which she 
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would be as if a debtor has performed. On the other hand §281 BGB requires an obligee to 
provide additional time for the due performance, which makes impossible compensation of 
the consequential loss. Therefore development of the future practice in this respect is left to 
the courts. 
Division of obligations to primary (specific performance) and secondary (damages) 
explains the complexity of obtaining damages compensation by necessity to balance 
conflicting interests of an obligor and an obligee
168
: gradual application of existing rules on 
fixing additional time and sending notice still protects interests of a creditor in case of non-
performance by allowing to resort to the claim of damages, but on the other hand prevents 
placing unreasonable burden on the obligor, who may have made efforts to provide for the 
specific performance, and in some cases the latter can be easier to obtain than prove 
damages. During latest reform amendments to special norms for sales and service contracts 
were adopted regarding compensation of damages. If a seller procures goods with defects 
of quality (§434 BGB) or title (§435 BGB), and rejects or fails to perform supplementary 
duties (§239 BGB) a buyer may claim compensation or reimbursement for wasted 
expenses (§437 (3) BGB). Similar rules set forth regarding the service contracts (§§633, 
636 BGB). Hence German policy adopts both expectation and reliance measures. Damages 
for failure to perform can be claimed only together with termination of the contract. 
In Finland in accordance with Sec. 27 (1)-(2) and Sec.40 (1) FSGA a seller has a 
strict “control liability” for the buyer’s direct losses, while liability for indirect losses will 
require fault of the seller or warranty (Sec. 27(3)-(4) and Sec. 40(2)-(3)
169
.  Sec. 67(1) 
FSGA introduces principle of full compensation based on the “adequate causation” 
principle (similar to German policy), but in practice elements of foreseeability are noted 
and other similarities with English law
170
. For instance, duty of mitigation is prescribed by 
Sec. 70(1) FSGA, according to which if the injured party fails to mitigate her loss, she 
should bear corresponding part herself. 
Division between direct and indirect damages is based on the explicit definition of 
the indirect losses in Sec. 67(2) FSGA, namely losses as consequences of lost 
production/turnover, inability to use for the purpose, loss of contracts, damage to property, 
other similar losses, with explicit exception of mitigation losses (Sec. 67(3) FSGA). 
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Noteworthy is Sec. 70(2) FSGA, according to which awarded damages may be adjusted if 
the amount is unreasonable given possibility of the breaching party to foresee and prevent 
the loss and other circumstances.  
Some researchers note that national courts in EU Member states demonstrate 
preference for expectation damages awards (measured ex post)
171
. Financial Economic 
Theory expressed in the doctrine of put/call option to default suggests that aggrieved party 
should be compensated on the reliance basis, which value is reflected in the contract price 
at the formation. Kraizberg and Arenst (2000) predict that European Court of Justice will 
tend to rule based on ex ante regime. 
 
 
3.3.2. Damages in Common Law 
English contract law began to develop only in the second half of the XVIII century, 
and rules on damages were not shaped until middle of the XIX century, before that records 
of decisions on damages were very rare
172
. By that time French legal academia has issued 
number of significant books, which were translated into English language, e.g. Pothier’s 
Trait des Obligations, published in 1761 and translated in 1806, and widely influenced 
legal science in Europe and overseas.   
Finally in the year 1848 in the case Robinson v. Harman
173
 rule of remedy for 
contractual infringement was formulated: “…Where a party sustains a loss by reason of a 
breach of contract, she is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with 
respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed”174. As I noted above, French 
and German policies are built on the same principle. The main purpose of the 
compensation was defined, but not its scope. Only starting from the XX century American 
legal theory significantly developed and produced number of sound and influential 
doctrines, forming modern contract law, extrapolating throughout the Common law 
countries and the rest of the world. 
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Revolutionary for Common law criteria for damages’ compensation were formulated 
in 1854 in case Hadley v. Bexendale
175
 and “this limitation on liability for breach of 
contract to the ordinary level of losses, unless the promisee informed the promisor 
otherwise, has been accepted ever since in the common law world”176. First rule stipulated 
that damages could be recovered by an obligee when her loss was a natural consequence of 
the breach as could be assessed by any reasonable person as a result of the breach 
(reasonability), thus dividing damages into direct (general) and consequential (special). 
And the second rule was a contemplation test – foreseeability by both parties of the loss, 
which did not arise naturally, at the time of the contract formation as a probable result of a 
breach, i.e. rule for the calculating ex ante damages, for which the breaching party should 
be liable. The principle of the remoteness
177
 of the damage was restated in 1949 in case 
Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd.
178: “In cases of breach of 
contract the aggrieved party is only entitled to recover such part of the loss actually 
resulting as was at the time reasonably foreseeable as liable to result from the breach. What 
was at that time so foreseeable depends on the knowledge then possessed by the parties, or 
at all events by the party who later commits the breach”. The rule of assessment 
foreseeability from the position of the breaching party was analogous to the provision of 
Art. 1150 FCC. Nevertheless further limitation of liability was adopted in 1969 in case 
Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos
179
, stating that objective foreseeability cannot form the basis of 
the contemplation test, because it will imply liability for any type of damage, which is 
reasonably foreseen in the way it is regulated in tort law
180
.  
As is demonstrated above, Common law traditionally protects three types of interests 
(Restatement (Second) of Contracts §344 “Purposes of Remedies”): 
1) expectation (“distributive justice”, measured based on the “successful transaction” 
method ex post) – secures benefit of the bargain and intends to place a promisee in the 
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position as if the contract has been duly performed; 
2) reliance (“restorative justice” measured using the “no-transaction” method) – prevents 
harm to the non-breaching party, securing the costs she may have incurred relying on the 
contract, intends to place a promisee in the position prior to the promise formation; 
3) restitution (“corrective justice”) – prevents unjust enrichment by depriving promisor 
of the received benefits, intends to put a promisor in the position prior to the promise
181
. 
§1-106(1) UCC defines the purpose of the remedy as placing the aggrieved party “in 
as good position as if the other party had fully performed”, excluding consequential, 




Sections 50, 51, 53 of English SGA (1979) also secure expectation measure (in cases 
of non-acceptance or non-delivery of goods and breach of warranty, including loss of 
profit, loss of bargain and of opportunity).  
In the recent case Transfield Shipping Inc. v. Mercator Shipping Inc. (“Achilles”)183 
House of Lords stated: “…it is no longer sufficient to show that the loss …suffered is a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the breach”, and recoverability of the loss may 
depend on acceptance of responsibility for the exact requested loss and the market 
expectation consideration. 
§347 Restatement (Second) introduces limitation on the expectation interest claim, 
referring to respective sections of the act: §350 Avoidability, §351 Unforeseeability; §352 
Uncertainty; §353 Emotional Disturbance. §349 Restatement (Second) provides aggrieved 
party with alternative to recover reliance interest (all incurred expenses less those which 
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would have been incurred anyway). 
As was noted above, the expectation measure was more extensively employed in 
damages’ awards184. Calculation methods for damages awards were categorized by prof. 
Cooter and Eisenberg (1985) into five groups: 1) substitute price; 2) lost surplus; 3) lost 
opportunity cost; 4) out-of-pocket costs; 5) diminished value. According to §2-712(2) 
UCC a buyer is allowed to recover difference between the cost of the cover transaction and 
price of the breached contract. §2-706 UCC procures a seller with recovery of difference 
between resell and contract price –both with incidental damages (reasonably resulted from 
the breach - §2-710 UCC and §2-715 UCC). In case of non-acceptance or repudiation §2-
708 UCC entitles a seller to recover market price difference with incidental damages and 
lost profit; §2-709 UCC provides her with the right to initiate action for the price (and 
incidental damages). In case no damages resulted from the breach are proved, small sum 
can be fixed as nominal damages (§346(2) Restatement (Second)). 
According to Sec. 432 of the Contract Code proposal (1993) drafted by English Law 
Commission
185
, no action for damages should be allowed when no loss is incurred. 
Pursuant to Sec. 437 (foreseeability) and 438 (uncertainty) of the same proposal damages 
should be available only if are foreseeable at the time of contracting and such result is a 
serious possibility in case of breach, liability for which are reasonably asserted. Damages 
should be proven, lost chance evaluated at the time of the breach, uncertain loss should be 
limited to fair assessment of likelihood. Court may also compensate reliance interest under 
the Sec. 599 of the draft. 
Another feature distinguishing development of Common contract law is doctrine of 
loss mitigation (§350 Restatement (Second); §2-706, §2-708, §2-7010 UCC): damages are 
not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk or 
burden. Its primary idea appeared in 1677 in case Vertue v. Bird
186
, but was significantly 
developed starting from XVIII century, and in 1872 in case Frost v. Knight
187
 mitigation 
was declared a necessary factor affecting measuring the damages, as obligation of the 
aggrieved party to take reasonable measures in order to prevent increase of damages. Duty 
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of mitigation is also proposed in Sec. 439 “Avoidable and avoided loss” of English 
Contract Code proposal. 
Regarding cumulating matter, Sec. 384(1) Restatement (First) of Contracts (1932) 
states that damages and restitution are alternative remedies for a breach of contract. The 
bringing of an action for one of these remedies is a bar to the- alternative one, unless the 
plaintiff shows reasonable ground for making the change of remedy (Sec. 381(2) 
Restatement (First)). Contrary specific performance and compensation in money are not 
alternative remedies, thus both forms of relief may be given in the same proceeding, but 
not for the same injury (Sec. 384(2) Restatement (First))
188
.  
Compensatory nature of damages in Common law was axiomatic for a long time, but 
as many other institutions of the law, it has been affected by the development of the legal 
system, order and economy, and internalization. Notion of non-compensatory damages 
penetrated system of court precedent and triggered legal studies and discussions in 
professional literature. Polemics is built around the consequences of the non-compensatory 
damages for the Common legal system and its essentials. In the case Attorney-General v. 
Blake
189
 loss had no monetary value and compensatory damages could not be granted, 
however the House of Lords allowed financial recovery and noted that “…damages are not 
always a sufficient remedy for breach of contract…When the circumstances require, 
damages are measured by reference to the benefit obtained by wrongdoer”190. In their 
nature such damages are usually qualified as restitutionary. If compensatory damages are 
measured based on the sustained loss, non-compensatory damages are constructed of the 
benefits received by an obligor as a result of the contractual breach
191
. Analysis of the 
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breached contract (unjust enrichment); 2) recovery of the value received under the breached contract for the 
rendered services (quantum meruit and quantum valebat); 3) restitution for wrongs – commitment of the 
wrong deeds at the expenses of the plaintiff (disgorgement damages); 4) hypothetical release damages – for 
lost opportunity to bargain for release from contract (recognized in case Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v. 
Parkside Homes Ltd, 1 WLR, 798, 1974, http://swarb.co.uk/wrotham-park-estate-ltd-v-parkside-homes-ltd-
chd-1974/. See Ian McNeil Jackman, The Varieties of Restitution, Sydney: Federation Press, 1998, p.p. 109-
131; James Edelman, Restitutionary Damages and Disgorgement for Breach of Contract, Restitution Law 
Review, 2000, p.p. 129, 132; Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1989, p.p. 40- 44. Awards in Blake case included: 1) account of profits – return of the profit acquired 
by the wrongful conduct; 2) loss of performance in the form of specific performance or injunctive relief, 
cited in Joanna Khoo, supra note 122, p. 23. 
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recent cases, i.e.: Esso Petroleum Co Ltd. v. Niad Ltd.
192
, Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX 
Enterprises Inc. and another
193
, and World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wide Wrestling 
Federation
194
, shows exceptional nature of the awards of non-compensatory remedy – 
return of the fraudulent profits. Recognition of non-compensatory damages as a general 
remedy will certainly shake Common law system; it also will create legal uncertainty and 
practical difficulties in establishing the grounds and measure of such damages, but this is 
nothing new and identical deficiencies eminent to compensatory damages. Claim for 
compensatory damages is never ensured and certain. On the contrary, traditionally if no 
substantiated loss is demonstrated as a result of the breach, an obligee would be entitled 
only to nominal damages, which may seem unfair. In these circumstances calculation of 
the promisee’s loss by measuring the profit, earned by a promisor due to the contractual 
breach, can restore fair outcome under the compensatory damages’ doctrine without 
denying it. Acceptance of a non-compensatory remedy will destroy the doctrine of efficient 
breach and all rational in it by allowing surrender of all received profits as a result of the 
efficient breach. Simultaneously it creates hazard of opportunism: a promisee has an 
incentive to cause a promisor to breach the contract, because it would make the former 
better off than if the contract would have been performed. It may be argued that non-
compensatory damages would serve contractual integrity best when specific performance 
is not available. Nonetheless the same purpose can be reached by simple understanding of 
a contract as twofold obligation: primary performance and alternative compensation (from 
position of economic theory). Irrespective of all benefits general award of non-
compensatory damages would entail same objections as general award of specific 
performance.  
Evident that damages’ doctrine in Common law currently requires alternation. 
Broadening of the notion of loss as well as varying measures of compensation would better 
serve system of justice and would eliminate theoretical contradictions within the existing 
policy. Concurrently balance between compensatory and punitive damages should be 
maintained and at all times should be measured against legal certainty and economic 
efficiency. 
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 EWHC 6 (Ch), All ER (D) 324, 2001, http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2001/458.html. 
193
 EWCA Civ 323, FSR 46, 1 All ER (Comm) 830, EMLR 25, 2003, 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2003/323.html. 
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 EWCACiv 286 (CA), 2007, 1 All ER (Comm) 129, 2008, 
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3.3.3. Damages in International Unification Sources 
PECL, DCFR, UNIDROIT and CISG provide for similar rules with few deviations. 
Art. 9.501 PECL and Art. III-3:701 DCFR entitle a creditor to recover damages for non-
performance, unless default is excused. In case of no loss no recovery is available
195
. Loss 
in both cases includes future loss, which is reasonably likely to occur, and also non-
pecuniary loss (PECL) or economic and non-economic losses
196
 (DCFR). Both 
codifications secure expectation interest (Art. 9:502 PECL and Art. III-3:702 DCFR), 
covering suffered loss and deprived gain. Foreseeability test is prescribed by Art. 9:503 
PECL and Art. III-3:703 DCFR and Art. 74 CISG
197
. However in case of PECL and DCFR 
(and UNIDROIT principles) foreseeability refers to loss, which breaching party “foresaw 
or reasonably have foreseen at the time of conclusion of the contract as likely result of its 
non-performance”.  Methods for calculation are based on evaluation of the difference 
between contract price and the substitute transaction or current market price. 
Comparatively in Art. 75 CISG emphasis is on loss, which was “foreseen or ought to have 
foreseen in light of known circumstances … as a possible consequence of the breach”. Art. 
5 CISG excludes non-pecuniary damages from the scope of CISG and refer matter to be 
dealt with according to national laws.  
 
3.3.4. Intermediate Conclusions 
Compensation of damages is the remedy that demonstrates great diversity of 
                                                        
195
 In two European jurisdictions damages awarded in case of no loss – UK and France, in the latter case 
under the Art. 1145 FCC – in case of breach of obligation not to do something, See notes to the Art. III-3:701 
DCFR, supra note 128.   
196
 Economic – loss of income or profit, expenses incurred and reduction in value of property; non-economic 
– pain and suffer, impairment of the quality of life. Non-pecuniary damages can be recovered under English 
law, See for physical pain and inconvenience cases Godley v. Perry, 1 WLR 9,Q.B., 1960, 
http://ahsanlaw.blogspot.fi/2012/01/case-laws-on-sales-of-goods-act-1930.html; Hobbs v. London and South 
Western Railway Company, LR 10 Q.B. 111, 1875, http://swarb.co.uk/hobbs-v-london-and-south-western-
railway-company-1875/; See for disappointment when the contract promised enjoyment case Jarvis v. Swan 
Tours Ltd., QB 233 (CA), 1973, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jarvis_v_Swans_Tours_Ltd; See for “giving 
peace of mind” cases Heywood v. Wellers, QB 446 (CA), 1976, http://swarb.co.uk/lisc/ProNe19701979.php; 
Bliss v. SETRHA, I.C.R. 700 (CA), 1985, https://www.law.kuleuven.be/personal/mstorme/c9-4.pdf. Limited 
recovery available only if explicitly stated in the law in Germany, Italy, Dutch, Finnish, Danish and other, 
See e.g. §253(1) BGB and §651 BGB, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-private-law_en.pdf. 
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 In France additional test of “immediate and direct” consequences is applied, but it is questionable if it 
adds value to assessment; nevertheless it excludes compensation of indirect damages in all cases, See notes to 
the Art. III-3:703 DCFR, supra note 128; Contra in Germany foreseeability test is rejected and adequate 
causation principle is applied instead – must be cause by the breach and occur in the ordinary course of 
things (foreseeability at the time of breach). Criterion of certainty is generally required by many systems, but 
its application is not strict across jurisdictions, including England, Id. See also Ole Lando, Foreseeability and 
remoteness of the damages in Contract in DCFR, European Review of Private Law, 2009, Vol. 17:4, p.p. 
619–639. 
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implementation in all studied jurisdictions. Irrespective of many legal transplants formal 
difference is maintained, for instance in damages’ classification. In French law two main 
categories are of actual loss and lost gain; compensation covers damages due to lateness 
(delay damages) and in lieu of performance (compensatory damages in case of non-
performance). In Germany damages are divided into: i) delay damages; ii) compensatory; 
and iii) “simple” damages. In French law, like in Common law policy, damages are 
interpreted as equivalent of performance, but the promisee is offered more liberal choice of 
remedy: specific performance or full compensation (actual loss and lost profit), hence 
hierarchy of remedies is more strict – specific performance plays primer role and damages 
are secondary, while it is reverse in Common law. Measure of damages under FCC is 
expectation, calculated ex ante. Applicable tests are: directness, causation, remoteness and 
foreseeability. Damages in France and Germany can be awarded separately or cumulated 
with other remedies except specific performance. No obligation of mitigation exists in both 
Civil law regimes. Pursuant to BGB claim of damages is subject to notice fixing additional 
time for performance. General measure is expectation, but party may choose reliance and 
reimburse wasted expenses. Applicable test is adequate causation; evaluation of 
foreseeability is rejected. Court practice indicates examples of ex post awards.  
In Common law damages divided into compensatory (recovery of sustained loss), 
non-compensatory (recovery of benefits of breaching party) and nominal. Measures of 
calculation include reliance, expectation and restitution, with duty to mitigate in all cases. 
Both ex ante and ex post calculations can be found in the case law. Can be cumulated with 
specific performance, but exclusive with restitution. Establishing causation/directness of 
damages is pertinent to Civil law, while remains imprecise in the Common Law. Though 
connection between the defendant’s breach and the plaintiff’s loss is considered necessary, 
there are only few cases explicitly referring to it, mainly where chain of causation was 
affected by an intervening act or event
198
. In the United States test of causation was fully 
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 Compare with tort law examples Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex 243, 1850, (Pollock CB advocated a 
foreseeability test for remoteness); Smith v. The London and South Western Railway Company, LR 6 CP 14, 
1870–71 (seven members of Exchequer Court uphold directness rule); Re Polemis & Furniss, Withy & Co. 
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substituted by the remoteness assessment, but in England and Australia the concepts of 
causation and remoteness have been kept separate
199
.  
Hence in both systems damage for breach of contract is recoverable if there is causal 
link whether it is established by directness (France), adequate causation (Germany) or 
remoteness (in variations of directness, contemplation, foreseeability of a reasonable man, 
intent and assertion of risks).  
PECL and DCFR promote principle: no loss – no recovery. Loss implies future loss. 
Measure of damages is expectation and applicable test is foreseeability.  
Finnish law protects direct losses, engaging both test of adequate causation similar to 
German with elements of foreseeability, implying duty to mitigate from Common law.  
It is not obvious that application of different tests of assessment brings the courts in 
Civil and Common law jurisdictions to dramatically different conclusions in their 
judgments regarding damages’ compensation (due to the tests themselves), more or less 
they all refer to what is considered just and fair. Despite general absence of mitigation duty 
in Civil law, based on reasonability criterion court may reduce damages for loss, to which 
a promisee has contributed. Development of the case law and international contract law 
brings closer notion of actual loss with reliance loss and lost profit with expectation loss. 
Therefore we again can see development of convergence between all legal orders in 
relation to the damages compensation.  
Due to difficulty of predicting the amount of the actual damages at the time of 
contracting this remedy can create barriers to the efficient contracting and efficient breach, 
and may lead to over-performance of the contract, meaning that the party which considers 
itself better off the contract still proceeds with economically burdensome performance due 
                                                                                                                                                                       
awareness); See also cases Seven Seas Properties Ltd v. Al-Essa (No.2) 1 WLR 1083, 1993; Balfour Beatty v. 
Scottish Power plc., SLT 807, 1994, accord Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd., 
supra note 178; Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos, supra note 179 (while in tort any reasonably foreseeable damage is 
legitimate,  in contract, the defendant must contemplate that the loss was “not unlikely to result from the 
breach” (higher degree of probability required); H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd., 1 
QB 791, 1978 (liability for all losses, as could have been reasonably foreseen at the time of the breach, as a 
possible consequence of it); The Pegase or Satef-Huttenes Albertus SpA v. Paloma Tercera Shipping Co SA, 
1 Lloyd’s LR 175, 1981; South Australia Asset Management Co v. York Montague, 3 All ER 365, 1996 (on 
causation interpretation); Jackson v. Royal Bank of Scotland, UKHL 3, 2005, upholding twofold test from 
case Hadley v. Baxendale; Transfield Shipping Inc. v. Mercator Shipping Inc., supra note 183 (foreseeability 
based on individual circumstances, market situation, reasonable consideration of ascertained risks). See also 
case Brown v. KMR Services Ltd., 4 All ER 598, 1995 (foreseeability in respect of the type of loss, not the 
extent of it), all cited at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remoteness_in_English_law. See also doctrine novus 
actus interveniens for breaking the chain of causation, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Novus_actus_interveniens. 
199
 See Thomas D. Musgrave, supra note 30, p. 365. 
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to low reliance factor
200
. It also may lead to under-performance, because damages may 
exclude some of the losses
201
 and actual level may be hard to prove. Court play crucial role 
in award of this remedy, which is impossible, or at least highly unlikely, without judicial 
intervention; therefore costs of recovery may be quite high and legal certainty rather low. 
Extending notion of compensatory damages by including additional measure of 
calculation based on recovery of unjustified benefits of the defaulting obligor may serve 
better fairness and continuity of the contract. At the same time there should be place for 
benefits of the efficient breach. Parties and judiciary should have possibility to choose 
between reliance and expectation, ex post and ex ante, depending on more just and fair 
outcome. Elimination of further inefficiency is possible by adopting tailored provisions on 
compensation in the negotiated contract. 
 
3.4. PENALTY AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES; LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
3.4.1. Penalty in Civil Law 
Penalty clause in the contract provides for ex ante sanction for breach in the form of a 
fixed sum, which should be paid, not in lieu of performance, but to secure performance, 
therefore it is of the punitive nature, not compensatory
202
. Application of this remedy 
reveals the most distinction in the Common and Civil judicial systems
203
.  
Initially Napoleonic codes provided for the precise enforcement of the penalty 
clauses
204
. Nonetheless consequently most of European jurisdictions incorporated principle 
of the judicial review and reduction of the disproportionate penalty clauses. New 
provisions of Italian Civil Code were enacted in 1942 (Art. 1384); the Portuguese – in 
1966 (Art. 812); FCC – in 1957. Articles 1152 and 1226-1233 FCC regulate penalty, 
which can be adjusted (increased or decreased) by the judge “even of his own motion” on 
the grounds of equity. Only in Belgium (and England) courts are prescribed to set aside/ 
declare void excessive contractual penalties, which are against public order
205
. Spanish law 
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 See Comments and Notes to Art. III-3:701 DCFR, supra note 128, p.p. 938 – 941. 
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 Unlike specific performance that applicable in perspective only, penalties can be ordered in retrospective, 
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144, http://encyclo.findlaw.com/4610book.pdf. 
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by the Contracting Parties, European Journal of Legal Studies, 2012, Vol. 5:1, p.p. 98-123. 
204
 Id, p. 101. 
205
 See Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 
American Business Law Journal, 2001, Vol. 38, p. 652; Ignacio M. Garcia, supra note 203, p. 101. In Art. 
420(3) of Japanese Civil Code penalty is defined as determination in advance of the amount of compensation 
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solely withholds position of penalty clauses enforcement (rejecting grounds of equality), 
with only exception of partial or irregular performance, where judge is allowed to 
intervene
206
. However it is noted that judicial intervention in France is restricted to the 
obvious disproportion without any justification
207
. French courts use in assessment 
retrospective (ex post) test comparing stipulated penalty and actual damages or the scope 
of the partial performance. Art. 1229 FCC prohibits cumulative penalty, therefore 
aggrieved party has to choose it instead of the performance
208
, and is deprived of claiming 
statutory damages, unless penalty is provided for the delay. Exclusivity of penalty 
application was recommended by Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Resolution 
(78) 3 Relating to Penal Clauses in Civil Law (1978).  
Modern promoter of the penalty Ugo Mattei (1995) supports view that severe penalty 
gives incentive for correct and timely performance. He defines efficient contract through 
combination of penalty and “insurance premium”, reflected in the price209, following the 
path, earlier created by prof. Goetz and Scott
210. “Efficient level” of penalty, in his opinion, 
lies between excessive and incentive, but always exceeds damages. That in turn creates 
efficient contract and supersedes need for efficient breach (which accordingly, is against 
Civil law tradition), because comparatively high price accompanied by penalty clause 
should cover the risk of rejecting subsequent offer. According to U. Mattei, penalty more, 
than other remedies, has potential for optimal (efficient) solution, as it ensures the risk of 
contractual breach and secures stability of contract, establishes the reliability of a seller 
and subjective value of performance, and prevents litigation. Protagonists of penalty are 
certain that in efficient system forfeited damages’ clauses should be treated as any other, 
derived from freedom of contract. General economic theory is based on strict enforcement 
                                                                                                                                                                       
due for damages, and penalty clauses are presumed to be enforceable and judicial intervention is precluded, 
Id, p. 655. 
206
 According to Ignacio M. Garcia, Spanish Supreme Court rejects review of the penalty clauses on the 
grounds of equity (STS, 15.10.2008, RJ, No5692), however the tentative bill is pending, proposing the 
changes in line with other states and majority of the scholars supports the reform, See Ignacio M. Garcia, 
supra note 203, p.102. 
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 Id, p. 103. Additionally French courts may order and define quite high amount of penalty in case of 
prescribed specific non-performance, which to be paid to a promisee. In U.S. non-performing promisors may 
be obliged to pay fine too, but for the “court contempt” and fine is to be paid to the court, See Gerrit De 
Geest, Filip Wuyts, supra note 202, p. 143.  
208
 Italian Civil Code (Art. 1383), Portuguese (Art. 811) and Austrian (§1336.1) follow the French approach. 
The Spanish law (Art.1153 SCC) allows cumulative penalty, if such right has been given in the contract 
itself, See Ignacio M. Garcia, supra note 203, p. 104. 
209
 If a risk prevention cost is below “insurance premium” and penalty risk, which creates situation where a 
buyer is risk averse and a seller is risk neutral. See Ugo Mattei, supra note 20, p. 428. 
210
 Prof. Goetz and Scott proposed the model of the most efficient insurer of the contract. See Charles J. 




, unless penalty was introduced unconscionably. Accordingly penalty 
safeguards buyer from non-performance and protects property rights, while liability 
limitation secures seller in case of underperformance and even provides incentive for such. 
Common law system, which declares penalties, as bargains in terrorem, null and void, and 
accepts limitation of liability clauses, according to U. Mattei, undermines freedom of 
contract, and hence is inefficient. French model, allowing penalty, as alternative to specific 
performance, is coherent with freedom of contract dogma, and thus close to efficient. He 
insists that traditional French doctrine separates penalties and damages entirely, because 
penalty serves as insurance of specific performance. It is true that Art. 1226 FCC states: “A 
penalty is a clause by which a person, in order to ensure performance of an agreement, 
bounds himself to something in case of non-performance”. However, U. Mattei completely 
omitted first part of the Art. 1229 FCC that states, “A penalty clause is a compensation for 
the damages which the creditor suffers from the non-performance of the principal 
obligation”. Nevertheless, even admitting that penalty enforces (ensures) due performance, 
it is hard to explain why it should be more than subjective value of the performance, 
reflected in the contractual price. It is similarly difficult to explain, why fear of penalizing 
should be the best incentive to perform a contract; the latter is expression of free will for 
the promised performance and if it ceases to exist, why it should be punished? U. Mattei 
creates an impression that a contract can only be performed if it has a penalty clause. In his 
opinion, efficient French model was eroded in 1975 by empowering the judge to reduce the 
excessive penalty. Consequently general convergence between French law and Common 
law regarding penalties creates only confusion in the courts and for the contracting parties, 
increasing legal uncertainty and enhancing litigation, as U. Mattei exaggerated.  
According to §339 BGB penalty is payable in case of default, if provided for in the 
contract. §341(1) BGB allows cumulative penalty. Additionally promisee is entitled to 
claim statutory damages in excess of the amount of penalty according to §§ 340(2) and 
341(2) BGB
212
. Pursuant to §343 BGB the penalty may be reduced by the judge (prior to 
its payment) to reasonable amount if it is disproportionately high (upon consideration of all 
interests of the obligee). 
Civil law courts in most of European jurisdictions have powers to reduce excessive 
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 “…In general the law was not concerned either with the fairness or justice of the outcome…” Patrick S. 
Atiyah, An introduction to the Law of Contract, 1989, 4
th
 ed., p. 9 cited in Larry A. DiMatteo, supra note 
205, p. 635. 
212
 Art. 161-2 of Swiss Code of obligations (Part 5 of Civil Code) allows recovery of the damages in excess 
of the penalty, http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/2/220.en.pdf, See also Ignacio M. Garcia, supra note 203, p. 106. 
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penalties by adhering to the same principle of justice and fairness. Penalty can be awarded 
for breaches in the past – and can ensure specific performance; helps allocating risks and 
safeguarding pacta sunt servanda principle by protecting from third party bid
213
. 
Concept of liquidated damages is also long recognized in Civil law doctrine
214
 along 
with the penalty, but ordinarily not incorporated in the state laws. It is quite common to 
distinct between penalties’ and liquidated damages’ clauses215. I review this matter in more 
details below. 
Scandinavian laws in general
216
 and Finnish laws in particular, provide for the 
reformation/invalidation of the penalty clause, which is unfair, or application of which 
would lead to an unfair result (Sec. 361 Finnish Contracts Act (Laki 
varallisuusoikeudellisista oikeustoimista, 228/1929)
217
 and Sec. 70(2) FSGA). 
Nevertheless Finnish law impliedly confirms validity of the stipulated payment clauses
218
. 
Remedies that are not incompatible can be cumulated (e.g. termination along with damages 
or penalty)
219
. Limitation of liability is not precluded, unless it is contrary to mandatory 
provisions of law. 
 
3.4.2. Penalty, Liquidated Damages and Limitation of Liability in Common Law 
Commonwealth courts may often declare penalty clause unenforceable based on the 
principle of just compensation. They act in line with arguments some of the law-and-
economics theorists
220
, seeing negative effect of this remedy in its supra-compensatory 
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 Gerrit De Geest, Filip Wuyts, supra note 202, p. 154. 
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Common Law Comparison, RedSmith, spring 2008, p.p. 4-5, 
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 See Comments and Notes to Art. III.–3:712 DCFR, supra note 128, p.p. 979 – 980. 
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 See Comments and Notes to Art. III–3:703 DCFR, supra note 128, p. 803. 
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Law Journal, 2003, Vol. 112, p.p. 859, 862; Tai-Yeong Chung, On the Social Optimality of Liquidated 
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280, 282-283. 
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nature due to over-performance, which is considered unjust and unfair
221
, creation of 
additional transactional costs of excessive precaution and other externalities
222
. Some 
proponents of the theory of efficient breach also serve as antagonists of the penalty
223
. 
Accordingly it discourages efficient breach
224
 and creates barrier for efficient contract, 
because market does not provide enough information to balance the bargaining power of 
the parties and consequentially restricting competition, preventing new actors from 
entering the market by holding parties bond by the contract
 225
. At the same time theorists 
of the efficiency doctrine accuse traditional “penalty doctrine” of outdated judicial 
paternalism and inefficiency of invalidating liquidated damages clauses, proposing that 
courts should  routinely enforce the latter and instead scrutinize unfairness in bargaining
226
 
(as long as just compensation is provided to the obligee in case of efficient breach)
227
. I 
agree that routine enforcement of penalty would increase risk of legal error (court 
enforcement)
228
, being applied without consideration, and creates opportunism hazard, 
giving promisee an incentive to induce breach of the contract in order to get extra sanction 
or to abuse rights via unreasonable extension of the delay period prior to filing a claim.  
The nature of penalty is punitive and the general idea of remedy in Common law is 
compensatory. Nevertheless in American tradition separately was developed the concept of 
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, which as such is not generally accepted in Civil law, e.g. in Germany 
punitive damages were declared against public order and international arbitration awards in 
respect of punitive damages were denied
230
. But under close review we can find 
similarities between penalty and punitive damages
231
. Both remedies are directed at 
punishment, deterrence from future similar breaches and (private) legal enforcement
232
. 
Punitive damages represent non-public fines equal to penalty for misconduct
233
, and 
defined not based on the suffered loss, but based on the level and nature of misconduct
234
. 
Hence they are action– and breacher–oriented and prospective (same as penalty). 
According to §355 Restatement (Second) and §1-106 UCC and §1-305 UCC punitive 
damages are not recoverable for the breach of contract unless the latter constitutes tort. In 
some US states part of the punitive damages’ awards may go not to the aggrieved party, 
but instead to the state or special organization
235
. Recently new limitations on punitive 
damages were introduced on all levels of American judicial system: federal, state 
legislators and U.S. Supreme Court
236
. Recent legal studies also determine victim-oriented 
compensatory function of the punitive damages. Additionally award of these damages 
covers legal costs of the aggrieved party in civil process, which are not commonly 
recoverable, because under American adjudicating rule each party bears its own costs, 
                                                        
229
 See on the historical development Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of the 
Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, The American University Law Review, 1993, 
Vol. 42, p.p. 1269 – 1333. 
230
 See Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law – Tendencies Towards Approximation 
of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 2003, Vol. 78, p.p. 107; Accord 
Madeleine Tolani, U.S. Punitive Damages Before German Courts: A Comparative Analysis With Respect to 
the Ordre Public, Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law, 2011, Vol. XVII, p.p. 185 – 207. 
231
 See e.g. Madeleine Tolani, Id, p. 206. It is interesting that despite current formal differences, both systems 
(US and German) passed through the identical development in attitude towards compensation of non-
pecuniary damages, from total restriction to escalating the awards, See e.g. case Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 
Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1989 (referring to the reluctance of awarding damages for mental disturbance), 
http://openjurist.org/ /f2d/1462/floyd-iv-v-eastern-airlines-inc; See also Volker Behr, Id, p.p. 127 – 136. 
232
 Defined in number of cases, See e. g. Pray v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1289, 1986,  
https://www.casetext.com/case/pray-v-lockheed-aircraft-corp/; Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool 
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 2001, http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/532/424/case.html; Long v. Sears 
Roebuck & Co., 877 F. Supp. 8 (D.C.), 1995, https://www.courtlistener.com/dcd/8aco/long-v-sears-roebuck-
co/. 
233
 See William Schwartzkopf, John J. McNamara, Calculating Construction Damages, 2
nd
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enormity of the offence” and the degree of fault), http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/94-896.ZO.html. 
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while in most of Civil law systems party losing the case shall cover procedural costs of the 
winning party. Traditional attitude of German courts towards punitive damages has also 
changed from German Federal Supreme Court judgment in 1955 declaring in relation to 
damages for pain and suffering, that ”tortfeasor owes the victim satisfaction for what he 
has done to him”237. In famous cases of Princess Caroline of Monaco the same court has 
multiplied the damages
238
. Later under pressure from European Court of Justice in relation 
to implementation of Directive 76/202/EEC article 611a BGB was introduced, legalizing 
punitive damages in cases for discrimination and harassment. Therefore we may conclude 
that punitive elements of remedies are acceptable in both Common and Civil law systems. 
As alternative to the contractual penalty in the Common law system is usually 
considered a liquidated damages’ (LD) clause, which is meant for estimation of the 
damages in case of contractual default (originally ex ante).  
Primary Commonwealth courts evaluated liquidated damages (LD) clauses based on 
single-pronged test of parties’ intentions (e.g. case Frick Co. v. Rubel Corp.239): if it was 




Later approach developed into contradictory twofold: 1) was the amount reasonable 
estimate at the time of the contract formation (“reasonability”); 2) was the accurate 
amount difficult to estimate or prove (“uncertainty”) (cases Ashley v. Dilworth241, Phillips 
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. Restatement (Second) on Contracts states in §356 that damages for 
breach can be liquidated in the contract only “at the amount that is reasonable in the light 
of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss”. 
Unreasonably large LD are unenforceable “on grounds of public policy as a penalty”244. 
§2-718 UCC incorporates three-pronged test
245
 (case Berger v. Shanahan
246
): 1) 
reasonable estimate of anticipated damages or actual harm caused by the breach; 2) 
difficulties to prove the loss; 3) inconvenience or non-feasibility of obtaining alternative 
adequate remedy.  
Many researches note that Common law provides award of less than full damages 
based on the expectancy interest
247
. Hence the denial of additional transactional costs and 
other subjective (incl. non-pecuniary) costs creates the basis for challenging efficiency and 
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fairness of Common law approach to damages’ compensation in the first place 248 . 
Nevertheless some proponents of the efficiency theory see LD clauses as “double 
responsibility at the margin” 249 providing promisor with incentive to take efficient 
precautions and promisee - with incentive to efficiently restrict reliance expenses. 
Additional mechanism of liability limitation was introduced in Common law and 
generally accepted in contract laws across jurisdictions
250
. In France invalidating LL for 
intentional and grossly negligent non-performance, as well as “a clause limiting liability 
which contradicts the essential obligation in a contract …, by application of article 1131 of 
the Code civil”251, evaluation standard is established by the court precedent. Pursuant to 
§242 BGB LL clause shall be evaluated for good faith and intentional non-performance 
may not be excused according to §242 BGB, liability for intentional non-performance 
cannot be excluded according to §276(2) BGB. Sec. 36 of Finnish Contracts Act 
(228/1929) prescribes test of fairness and entitles courts annul LL in case of intentional 
non-performance.  
Limitation of liability (LL) is regulated in §2-719 UCC, according to which parties 
may explicitly agree to limitation of recoverable damages or to exclusive remedy
252
. 
Principle difference between LD and LL is that the former is intended to deal with over-
liquidation and the latter with under-liquidation
253
. Reasonability test is not generally 
applicable to the LL clauses
254
. LL clause may be invalidated if limited or exclusive 
remedy fails to provide remedy consistent with the “essential purpose of the contract”255. 
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This does not prevent the party to resort for another remedy provided for by the law. 
Consequential damages may be excluded under §2-719(3) UCC (except for personal 
damages in consumer cases). Therefore enforceable LL clause should guarantee minimum 
adequate remedy
256
. Sometimes it is called “reversed penalty”257 . There is no similar 
enforceability standard for LD and LL, though courts generally enforce LL clauses
258
. For 
instance, generally accepted in sales law, LL imposes hierarchy of remedies and limits 
them to repair, replacement or refund. LL limits the amount of the recoverable damages, 
but damages still should be proved, unlike in case of LD. Additionally it was proposed that 
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while reasonably high LD renders incentive to perform, LL discourages performance
259
. 
But in our opinion, this can be true only in relation to unreasonably small maximum 
liability. LL clause can also be built based on the same principle as LD and respond to 
criteria of reasonability and fairness. According to R. Craswell, “optimal deterrence” of 




3.4.3. Penalty, Liquidated Damages and Limitation of Liability in International 
Unification Sources. Theoretical basis for harmonization 
In 1979 Secretary-General of the UNCITRAL prepared the report on LD and penalty 
clauses, comparing implementation in both legal systems
261
. Research revealed the 
following features in common: 1) payment of sum, defined at the formation (ex ante) and 
excluding proof of actual loss, upon contractual breach; 2) motivation of performance; 3) 
limitation of liability, acceptable in all systems; 4) auxiliary nature (to be paid only in case 
of non-excusable breach of main obligation); 5) prevention of unjust enrichment provided 
for in every policy. Report emphasized the following distinctions: 1) conditions for validity 
depend on punitive nature; 2) calculation ex post (penalty) and ex ante (LD); 3) different 
approaches to accumulation with other remedies; 4) right of the court to reduce amount of 
penalty
262
. Thus legal uncertainty is created in all considered orders: in Common law court 
may set aside the LD clause as excessive; in Civil law – court may reduce penalty. 
Attempts for harmonization are made both in legal doctrine and practice. Theory of 
efficient penalty elaborates views of U. Mattei and accepts judicial intervention only in the 
cases of “inefficient bargaining” (from position of the doctrine of unconscionability)263 and 
in the form of adjustment (based on certain criteria), but not rejection of the penalty 
clauses. Such development is intended to eliminate the LD law and substitute it with the 
efficient penalties. According to promoter of the theory L. DiMatteo, the clash between 
classical contract theory and theory of the efficient breach in essence comes to difference 
in perceiving the contract by the former as rational bargaining between fully informed, 
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equal parties and by the latter as irrational bargaining between parties, who have lack of 
information and often unequal.  
Common law penalty doctrine is reevaluated from position of game theory
264
 (Eric 
L. Talley, 1994) that suggests that over-compensatory (“over-liquidated”) or under-
compensatory (“dramatically under-liquidated”) penalty annulment has positive effect by 
inducing more efficient contractual negotiations through reducing parties’ incentives for 
deceptive behavior and misrepresentation. 
Prof. Craswell (1999) defines ideal penalty as equal “to the harm caused by the 
violation multiplied by one over the probability of punishment” and promotes multiplier 
principle (and its alternatives) and deterrence function of the punitive damages, 
demonstrating their acceptance in the court practice
265
. Multiplier should be calculated on 
case-by-case basis, changing depending on fault variations; accordingly, that provides 
incentive to improve promisor’s behavior and facilitates general improvement of the 
performance
266
. Number of theorists argues in favor of subjective behavioral tests while 
ordering for the punitive damages
267
. It seems reasonable to assess fault in awarding 
penalties in contract law, as it accustomed in tort law, because the nature of punitive 




UNCITRAL in the Text of Draft Uniform Rules on Liquidated Damages and Penalty 
Clauses allows cumulative penalty, when it was explicitly stated in the contract (1981). 
UNCITRAL Uniform Rules (1983, not adopted) provided for penalty clauses to be 
enforceable in any case with right of judicial reduction
269
.  
                                                        
264
 On advances in Game Theory See also Eric A. Posner, supra note 220, p.p. 875-877. 
265
 See e.g. cases BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, supra note 234; Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33,1996, 
http://openjurist.org/79/f3d/33/kemezy-v-peters; FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 1989, 
http://openjurist.org/877/f2d/614/federal-deposit-insurance-corporation-v-wr-grace-and-co. See also Richard 
R. Craswell, supra note 22, p.p. 26, 57 and supra note 97, p.p. 2186 – 2187. Additionally existing remedies 
can take punitive forms as well, for instance methods of measuring expectation damages for unfinished or 
faulty performed work: one method based on decrease in market value resulting from particular defect in the 
work; second – awards full cost of fixing or completing the work, - R. Craswell calls them “punitive cost-of-
completion awards”, supra note 22, p. 60. 
266
 Richard R. Craswell, supra note 97, p. 2200. 
267
 E.g. Mark F. Grady, Punitive Damages and Subjective States of Mind: A Positive Economic Theory, 
Alabama Law Review, 1989, Vol. 40:3, p.p. 1198-1201. 
268
 Note that U.S. Supreme Court declared arbitrary or unreasonable state court punitive damages violating 
Due Process principle, E.g. cases BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, supra note 234; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18, 1991, http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/499/1/case.html. See also 
Tracy A. Thomas, supra note 16, p.1641. 
269
 Ignacio M. Garcia, supra note 203, p. 113. 
 76 
Council of Europe adopted Resolution (1978) on Penal Clauses in the Civil Law
270
, 
which stipulated judicial control over manifestly excessive penal clauses and reformation 
of the latter. Factors of determination included the following: 1) comparison of the pre-
estimated damages with the actual damages suffered; 2) legitimate interests of the parties, 
covering promisee’s non-pecuniary interests; 3) category of contract and its standard 
nature; 4) circumstances in which contract was made, bargaining positions of the parties; 
5) was the breach in good or bad faith.  
PECL does not include explicit notions of either penalty or LD, defining “agreed 
payment for non-performance”. However Art.  9:509(1) PECL states that the aggrieved 
party should be awarded the sum, specified in the contract in case of non-performance, 
irrespective of its actual loss. Nevertheless the non-performing party is liable only for loss, 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the contract formation (excluding the intentional or 
grossly negligent default) (Art. 9: 503 PECL). Similarly to BGB, Art. 8:102 PECL does 
not deprive a party of its right to demand cumulative remedy. The specified sum may be 
reduced to a reasonable, if is grossly excessive in relation to the actual loss and other 
circumstances (Art. 9:509(2) PECL). Art. 8:109 PECL allows clauses excluding or 
restricting remedies “unless it would be contrary to good faith and fair dealing”271. 
DCFR defines “stipulated payment for non-performance” (Art.III-3:712 DCFR) to 
which a creditor is entitled irrespective of the actual loss, which may be reduced to 
reasonable amount in a way, analogous to PECL. Notes to the article define purpose of the 
penalty to coerce performance of the principal obligation, while LD aim is to pre-estimate 
future creditor’s loss due to non-performance272. Similarly to PECL, Art.III–3:703 DCFR 
limits liability to foreseeable loss “at the time when the obligation was incurred” (unless 
the non-performance was intentional, reckless or grossly negligent). Art.III-3:102 DCFR 
permits cumulative remedies (damages in addition to other), however in the official notes 
to the article it is stated that stipulated payment replaces damages
273
. Art.III–3:703 DCFR 
incorporates LL clauses by implication, invalidating those that refer to damages for 
personal injury, caused intentionally or by negligence, as well as those which are unfair or 
contrary to good faith and fair dealing
274
.  
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CISG does not have express penalty provisions. From one point of view, reference to 
penalty may be assumed under Art. 74 CISG: sum, which the party ought to have foreseen 
at the formation of the contract
275
. Nevertheless traditional view is that under CISG (Art. 




3.4.4. Intermediate Conclusions 
Both French and German law recognize penalty and allow judicial intervention, but 
in France court may order decrease or increase of stipulated penalty, while in Germany – 
only decrease. Under FCC cumulating of penalty with other remedies is not allowed, 
except case of delay. Council of Europe also supports exclusivity of penalty. On the 
opposite, BGB accepts application of penalty with other remedies. 
Recognized benefits of penalty are: awards for breach in the past, allocation of risks, 
safeguarding contract stability and ensuring specific performance. Among acknowledged 
shortcomings of this remedy are named: supra-compensatory nature, stimulation of over-
performance (against theory of efficient breach), creation of additional transactional costs 
and disproportionate precaution costs, basis for legal error and abuse of rights.  
Penalty is rejected in Common law due to its punitive nature. Accepted alternative is 
remedy of liquidated damages (LD). UCC establishes three criteria for evaluation of LD: 
reasonability (ex ante), uncertainty (difficulty to prove loss), and inconvenience of 
application for another remedy. While LD deals with over-liquidation and does not require 
establishing of actual losses, limitation of liability (LL) is intended to prevent under-
liquidation and involves calculation of damages. LL may be invalidated if it is contrary to 
the purpose of the contract. 
LL is also accepted across jurisdictions; FCC and BGB provide for invalidation of 
unfair terms. Indirectly LL is generally enforced in sale laws by introducing strict 
hierarchy of remedies: repair, replacement, and refund.  
At the same time American system accepts concept of punitive damages, while 
German law completely denies it. Nevertheless close study shows that punitive damages 
are close to penalty (private law fines), enforceable in German policy. Elements of legal 
uncertainly are inherent in all orders. 
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As for economic efficiency of penalty, I can hardly share U. Mattei’s 
disappointment, because law modifications are always preceded by changes in economic 
and social sphere. Enhancing complexity of commercial reality explains difficulty with 
introducing a clear cut between penalty and limited liability clauses. Legal rules should 
serve the needs of contemporary economy and should adjust to the changes. U. Mattei 
admits that incompetent judges can misuse the efficient model
277
, confirming that even 
good laws may not work in a corrupt system, and courts have always played and will play 
significant role in establishing justice. Contracts are generally made with purpose of 
performance, not breach or litigation. Economic reality has changed since the adoption of 
FCC; these days negotiating parties often have different bargaining power and 
transactional costs. At the same time it is not unreasonable to question entitlement of the 




Recent proposals for modification and general development trends in American and 
English laws provide for stronger basis for LD / LL enforceability
279
. Same liberalization 
of the traditional approach can be found in the late court decisions
280
. Additionally legal 
gap is narrowing in relation to the punitive damages and general acceptance of punitive 
function of the remedy in addition to compensatory
281
. 
Despite still existing differences, it is obvious that common intention of the 
regulation in all reviewed systems is setting reasonable and fair amount of pre-negotiated 
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compensation in case of breach of contract, which should reduce legal costs and prevent 
necessity of proving losses
282
. In both cases courts intend to play safeguarding role 
reviewing LD and penalty clauses. In my opinion, implementation of the agreed damages 
clauses should be freely available, as long as they are negotiated by the parties, represent 
reasonable estimate of possible damages in case of contractual default and risk sharing 
between the parties
283
, but they should not be excessive, covering reasonable and fair 
amount of various damages incurred by a promisee due to the promisor’s breach. Grounds 
for determining disproportioned penalties are sufficiently established by Council of Europe 
in Resolution on Penal Clauses in Civil Law. It also seems reasonable that claim for 
penalty should exclude compensation of damages for the same breach. 
Successful utilization in optimal and efficient way of all reviewed remedies: penalty, 
LD and LL - can be found in international industrial standards of contracts for building and 
construction, as demonstrated below. 
 
3.5. REMEDY OF PRICE REDUCTION 
3.5.1. Price Reduction in Civil Law 
Price reduction is a monetary remedy for non-conformant performance, historically 
developed from Roman law concept of actio quanti minoris
284
. Applying it an aggrieved 
party makes unilateral declaration to a buyer, accepts the defective performance and does 
not intend to terminate the contract or enforce its original terms. This remedy is legacy of 
the Civil law tradition, and is not generally accepted in Common law with some 
exceptions
285
. Art. 1644 FCC entitles a buyer to recover part of the purchase price in the 
amount, determined by the expert, or alternatively – to rescind the contract and recover the 
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. Price reduction is calculated ex ante – at the time of the contract 
formation as ratio between conforming and defective goods’ value according to BGB, but 
– ex post according to Art. 50 CISG and Sec. III-3:601 DCFR, at the time of performance. 
Some consider it to be of the restitutionary nature and partial avoidance of the contract
287
, 
others - set it aside as a separate remedy, explaining that it should be distinguished from 
contractual avoidance, right of set-off or damages, and should be treated as contract terms 
adjustment: quality/quantity vs. price
288
, third – notify similarity with withholding289. I 
agree that price reduction has similarities with restitution, but there are also certain 
differences in the circumstances and the order of its application from the standard 
restitution in case of contract rescission, which makes it stand apart and be alternative to 
damages.  
Price reduction is preserved in most of the European jurisdictions, e.g. in Art. 1644 
FCC (and Art. 1617 FCC for immovable property) and §437(2) and §441 of BGB as part 
of the seller’s warranty for the latent defect and alternative to the rescission of the contract. 
This remedy may be used without recourse to the court, is not dependent on the actual 
losses, and may be seen as self-help remedy
290
. Difference in the value under considered 
statutory laws should be defined by the expert or by the court itself. 
In Finland pursuant to the Sec. 37 – 38 FSGA if the remedy of the defect or delivery 
of the substitute goods is not available or not effected within a reasonable time after a 
buyer has given notice to a seller, the buyer is entitled to demand the price reduction (as an 
alternative to the avoidance of the contract), unless goods are second-hand or sold at 
auction.  
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3.5.2. Price Reduction in Common Law 
English law has institutionalized this remedy in course of implementation of the 
Directive on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees 
(1994/44/EC)
291
, but similar results have been reached previously through other available 
measures
292
. Sec. 30 and Sec. 53 of English SGA imply price reduction regarding 
delivered goods defects in the form of the proportional payment for the quantity breach in 
the former case
293
 and breach of warranty or quality in the latter. In case of the contract 
frustration and force-majeure event court may order return of the paid amount and payment 
for the benefits received prior to discharge of the obligation, subject to deduction of 
incurred expenses, or payment of fair sum as determined by the court under Sec. 1(3) of 
the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943
294
, which however is not applicable in 




Some similarities can be found in American Commercial Code. According to §2-508 
UCC a seller (acting in good faith) is entitled to cure rejected non-conforming delivery 
under certain circumstances and Sub-sec.2 makes reference to the “money allowance” 
offered by the seller additionally to the cure, which may be treated as price reduction. §2-
601 UCC establishes “perfect tender” rule, according to which a buyer may reject any part 
of non-conforming delivery or accept it in full. §2-608 entitles a buyer to revoke his 
acceptance within reasonable time in case of assumption of the cure of a latent defect by a 
seller and demand price refund pursuant to §2-711 UCC. According to §2-709(1a) and §2-
607(4) UCC respectively burden of proof of the rejected goods’ conformity is with a seller, 
and non-conformity of the accepted goods – with a buyer. Therefore similar results may be 
reached by application of more complicated measures. 
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While preparing amendments to UCC revisers pursued harmonization with CISG 




3.5.3. Price Reduction in International Unification Sources 
Art. 50 CISG is drafted from the perspective of a buyer and states: “If the goods do 
not conform with the contract and whether or not the price has already been paid, a buyer 
may reduce the price in the same proportion as the value that the goods actually delivered 
had at the time of the delivery bears to the value that conforming goods would have had at 
that time”, unless a buyer refuses to accept performance or a seller remedies lack of 
conformity (Art. 37 or Art. 48 CISG). Nevertheless the burden of proof in respect of the 
reduced value is on a buyer
297
, therefore it is not extensively used
298
. Under Art.45(1) and 
Art.45(2) CISG cumulative application of price reduction and damages is not precluded, 
unless under Art.79(5) CISG damages are exempt due to force-majeure event. Even though 
not frequently used, this remedy may protect a buyer in the situation that would not be 
adequately remedied by the damages’ compensation solely299. 
According to Sec. III-3:601 DCFR a party accepting non-conforming delivery may 
reduce the price proportionally to the decrease in the value of the performance at the time 
of performance, or, if price is paid, may recover the excess from the other party. Use of 
this remedy precludes recovery of damages for reduction in the value of the performance 
(but preserves entitlement to damages for any further loss).  
Art. 9:401 PECL stipulates rules identical to DCFR. 
Price reduction under CISG, DCFR and PECL does not require expert appraisal and 




3.5.4. Intermediate Conclusions 
Actio quanti minoris is one of the earliest consumer protection remedies
301
, which 
developed into more wide commercial contracts’ remedy. Currently most of the sale laws 
provide hierarchy of remedies, in which price reduction follows repair and rectification of 
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non-conformity, and precedes or alternates contract termination. International commercial 
practice demonstrates rather modest utilization of this remedy; nevertheless it has certain 
advantages. 
Both French and German civil codes consider this remedy. Under FCC the value of 
reduction should be defined by an expert, according to BGB – by the court. Despite 
explicit absence of equal measure in Common law comparable goals are pursued by 
different means. English sales law is harmonized under EU. UCC stipulates compensation 
of “money allowance” under “perfect tender rule” (right to reject any part of non-
confirming delivery). Hence it indicates that same interest is protected in both systems; 
namely in case of overlap with a claim for damages, where price reduction can provide a 
buyer with better protection as a self-help remedy, even though it “has limited utility”302 
and usually will be superseded by other remedies, ordinarily – by damages’ compensation. 
CISG allows price reduction evaluated at the time of delivery, unless a buyer refuses entire 
delivery or a seller rectifies non-conformity; it also does not preclude cumulating with 
damages. DCFR and PECL also prescribe ex post calculation of the reduced value, but 
prevent cumulating with damages for the same loss.  
Irrespective of certain ambiguities of international harmonization instruments their 
role is significant in reflection of most recent developments in various legal systems and in 
providing for bigger legal certainty than national laws, especially when dealing with 
international contracts
303
. This remedy is implemented in building and construction 
standard contracts, and along with other remedies is available in case of contractual 
breach; such standards prescribe mechanisms for mutual determination of the price 




Even though buyer’s opportunism is not mentioned in relation to this remedy, it 
seems reasonable to request expert appraisal of reduction value. We admit that 
involvement of the court and/or expert increases costs and removes benefits of the self-
help remedy. In such respect mechanisms of price reduction calculation, as well as pre-
negotiated LD or LL clauses may serve same purpose and improve inefficiency. Parties are 
not precluded from re-negotiating contract reformation, which may prevent further 
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litigation or arbitration costs. In any case, if initial agreement is reached by mutual consent, 
it seems reasonable to renegotiate change to the quality-price ratio. If a breaching party 
disagrees with the reduction value, application of this remedy may be challenged; in the 
latter case its self-help nature is hindered and it plays role similar to withholding. On the 
other hand, this remedy responds to the breach of contract by a promisor, and leaving this 
right with an obligee, acting in good faith, and willing to preserve the contract and not 
claim damages instead, also has rational grounds and creates incentives for the due 
performance. I agree with M. Gergen, stating that “contract law permits a party to act in 
response to breach to avoid suffering a loss that may not be adequately compensated with 
damages, even if the response inflicts a loss on the defaulter that is disproportionate to the 
party’s likely avoided loss”305. Such approach is in line with autonomy theories of contract. 
Some state that it is against theory of efficient breach, allowing “punishment” for the 
breach. But I disagree: efficient breach is not precluded and there is no penalizing per se, 
but aggrieved party is given a right to protect herself from potentially uncompensated 
losses. The main goal of the self-help remedies is based on expectation measure – placing 
the promisee in the position she would have been if the contract has been performed. 
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3.6. REMEDY OF WITHHOLDING PERFORMANCE 
3.6.1. Withholding in Civil Law 
Defence of unperformed contract (exceptio non adimpleti contractus, Latin) or 
exception for non-performance (l’exception d’inexécution, French) provides for the right 
of withholding/suspending own performance in the reciprocal obligation and other non-
monetary remedy in addition to specific performance and termination. Essential feature of 
this remedy is that it does not require the non-performance to be fundamental and does not 
call for the court intervention, and therefore called self-help remedy or measure of private 
justice. It is also noted that this remedy goes against theory of efficient breach, since 
provides for the vindication of the right to performance
306
.   
Pursuant to Art. 1612, 1613, 1653, 1707 FCC a creditor in a concurrent obligation 
(bilateral, but not necessarily synallagmatic) is entitled to withhold performance 
(delivery/payment) when a debtor has not performed as required under the terms of the 
contract or there is substantial risk of the debtor’s insolvency based on the 
proportionality/reasonability test
307
. The remedy is of temporary and provisional nature 
and withholding party should be ready to perform immediately upon other party’s 
performance or sufficient assurance of the respective performance. Some justify that 
withholding is thus not exactly remedy for breach, but temporary measure inducing 
performance from another side. If the aggrieved party wishes to bring the contract to an 
end in case the requested obligation remains unperformed and she incurs expenses due to 
delay, she has to revert to the court for an order of resolution intended to end her own duty. 
In my opinion, withholding is a right and an action, intended to secure party’s interests and 
the contract, persuading its performance, and saving external costs of legal enforcement, 
which ensures risk of the contractual breach, hence it qualification as a remedy is not 
erroneous.  
§320 BGB adopts similar rules for synallagmatic contracts only (party who has to 
perform first may withhold performance) subject to standard of good faith. §321 BGB 
(after legislative reform) additionally secures this remedy in case of anticipatory breach – 
when it becomes apparent that the claim for counter-performance is endangered by the 
other party’s lack of ability to perform. Pursuant to §323 BGB in case of fundamental non-
performance the aggrieved party is not precluded from the termination and damages 
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In Finland withholding in case of anticipatory breach is provided under Sec. 61 
FSGA and rules similar to French are adopted for withholding of goods and payment of 
price respectively in Sec. 10 and Sec. 49 FSGA.  
 
3.6.2. Withholding in Common Law 
In the Common Law there is no general equivalent to the French remedy of 
withholding performance. The distinction between two systems is originated from the 
earlier mentioned division of the terms in Common law into conditions and warranties, 
which provides for comparatively wide independence of the parties’ obligations from each 
other (unless they are made condition precedent or explicitly agreed otherwise).  French 
doctrine of cause ensures interdependence of the obligations of both parties, so default of 
one temporary excuses the other, as a consequence of default.  Common law separation of 
the breach into material (condition/ fundamental intermediate term) and less significant 
(warranty) provides for the generally available repudiation of contract without recourse to 
the court in the former case and claim for damages - in the latter.  
Nevertheless in Common law comparable right to withhold performance is covered 
under the doctrines of material breach and substantial performance, unless parties agree 
otherwise
309
. According to Sec. 28 of English SGA (default provision), delivery of the 
goods and payment of the price are concurrent obligations. Pursuant to Sec. 41 of English 
SGA unpaid seller is entitled to retain possession of goods (right of lien or retention). 
Hence withholding would be generally handled in English law by the rules relating to 
termination: party may withhold performance if: i) primary obligation to perform is 
explicitly or implicitly dependent on the performance of the second party; ii) court defines 
second obligation as condition for the contract performance; iii) second party non-
performance would deprive first party from the benefit contracted for
310
. Additionally 
aggrieved party may initiate action for the price and damages. English law also seem to be 
more safeguarding interests of the promisee, allowing her to complete own performance 
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and then recover contract price, unless she has no legitimate interest in performance
311
. 
Pursuant to §238 Restatement (Second) of Contracts if obligations fall due 
simultaneously, it is a condition of each party’s duties to render such performance that 
counterparty either renders or, with manifested present ability to do so, offers performance 
of her part of the simultaneous exchange. Determination of the material breach and hence 
the right to withhold is justified in U.S. based on the following factors of §241 Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts: i) extent of benefit deprivation of non-breaching party; ii) 
availability of adequate compensation for the latter; iii) extent of burden on the breaching 
party (proportionality test); iv) likelihood of due performance; v) willful or in bad faith 
nature of the default
312
. Non-breaching party should meet additional (to the above stated) 
conditions in order to discharge its own obligation to perform, as prescribed in the §242 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts: i) further delay may prevent/hinder reasonable 
substitute transactions; ii) extent to which agreement provides for performance without 
delay. In case of such total breach (excluded when partial performance takes place), 
followed by repudiation injured party should have right to claim damages for total breach, 
but only if value of the contract substantially impaired for her at the time of the breach, 
that allowing her to recover damages based on all her remaining rights to performance, 
would be just and fair according to §243 Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Pursuant to 
§251 Restatement (Second) of Contracts an obligee may demand adequate assurance of 
due performance subject to reasonable suspicions of non-performance; she also may 
suspend (if reasonable) own performance, for which she has not received agreed exchange 
until receipt of assurance. In such case failure to provide assurance may be justified as 
repudiation. 
§2-717 UCC adopts liberal standard regarding sales’ contracts, allowing a buyer of 
goods withhold damages resulted from the seller’s breach, developing in turn standard of 
justified withholding when it is commercially reasonable. Withholding is subject to the 
sufficient notice
313
 and can be applicable only regarding damages for breach under the 
same exact contract. 
American courts engage several standards of defining legitimacy of the withholding 
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(in the absence of the contract provisions), providing for contradictory results and great 
legal uncertainty
314
. First case in which both parties have breached agreed terms by 
concurrent withholding is K&G Construction Co. v. Harris
315
. Usually courts apply the 
doctrine of constructive conditions, submitting duty of each contractual party to perform 
on the other party’s substantial performance of the prior obligation; failure to perform 
substantially when due constitutes breach of contract and allows termination. In case 
substantial performance is rendered, the injured party can only seek damages for non-
material breach. Withholding refers to the situation when aggrieved party demands from 
breaching party to continue performance. Performance suspension issue arises on two 
conditions: 1) contract and obligation is continuing and performed in shipments/ intervals 
(construction, long term sales, leasing, licensing, franchising); 2) breach and withholding 
should take place prior to substantial performance
316
. This constitutes first standard – 
withholding after material breach
317
. Second standard – withholding when justified318 – 
without investigation of the materiality of the breach and purely by evaluating facts of the 
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 See cases Morgan v. Singley, 560 S.W.2d 746, 1978 (allowing withholding when justified), 
http://www.leagle.com/decision/19771306560SW2d746_11208.xml/MORGAN%20v.%20SINGLEY; T. 
Ferguson Constr., Inc. v. Seaalaska Corp., 820 P.2d 1058, 1991 (allowing withholding when circumstances 
warrant), http://www.touchngo.com/sp/html/sp-3772.htm; Arctic Contractors, Inc. v. State, 564 P.2d 30, 
1977, http://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/1977/2595-0.html; Howard S. Lease Constr. Co. & 
Assocs. v. Holly, 725 P.2d 712, 1986 (allowing withholding after first material breach or if withholding is 
subsequently proved valid), https://www.courtlistener.com/alaska/epEH/howard-s-lease-const-co-assoc-v-
holly/; Cox, etc. v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 672 S.W.2d 282,1984 (party must elect either to cancel contract 
or continue contract and give full performance; withholding not allowed), 
http://www.leagle.com/decision/1984954672SW2d282_1917.xml/COX,%20ETC.%20v.%20DELOITTE,%2
0HASKINS%20&%20SELLS; Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 1933 (wrongful withholding), cited in William 
J. Geller, supra note 310, p. 164. 
315
 164 A.2d 451, 1960, (where court has decided that contractor could withhold progress payment following 
the subcontractor’s initial breach of the significant contract obligation), 
http://www.leagle.com/decision/1960528223Md305_1492.xml/K%20&%20G%20CONSTRUCTION%20C
O.%20v.%20HARRIS ; Contra for the wrongful withholding Boomer v. Muir, supra note 314. 
316
 See cases K&G Construction Co. v. Harris, supra note 315 (construction contract); Gemstones, Inc. v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 47 N.F2d 250,1979 (ten years’ sales agreement), 
http://www.leagle.com/decision/197929747NY2d250_1268.xml/GEMSTONES%20v.%20UNION%20CAR
BIDE; Royal McBee Corp. v. Bryant, 217 A.2d 603, 1966 (typewriter lease), 
https://www.courtlistener.com/dc/bbDa/royal-mcbee-corporation-v-bryant/; ARP Films, Inc. v. Marvel 
Entertainment Group, Inc., 952 F.2d 643, 1991 (licensing of copyright rights of cartoon characters), 
http://openjurist.org/952/f2d/643/arp-films-inc-v-marvel-entertainment-group-inc; Original Great Am. 
Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 1992 (franchise of cookie outlets), 
http://openjurist.org/970/f2d/273/original-v-river; Hanks v. GAB Business Servs., Inc., 644 S.W.2d 707, 1983 
(restrictive covenant in sale of insurance adjusting business), 
https://www.courtlistener.com/tex/dA9X/hanks-v-gab-business-services-inc/. 
317
 See also Mark P. Gergen, supra note 32, p. 1409: “Under the Restatement, a material breach that is 
curable justifies suspending performance. A total breach –meaning an incurable material breach – discharges 
the non-defaulting party, justifying his withdrawal from the contract”. 
318





. Third approach requires from an aggrieved party specific selection between 
contract cancellation and affirmation with full performance, meaning that withholding may 
not apply along with continuation of the obligation, and the court would treat withholding 
as cancellation of the contract
320
 (§253 Restatement (Second) of Contracts). 
Handling of this matter by the courts turns to be even more complicated
321
 due to 
interference of other doctrines, e.g. voluntary payment doctrine, which precludes claiming 
overpaid amounts in the originally disputed claims
322
. 
Due to dissonance in court practice and lack of consistent legislative regulation 
withholding terms are usually incorporated in the contract. Nevertheless certain areas of 
American law provide for specialized payment withholding rules, e.g. real estate law has 
provisions on withholding rent as warranty of habitability or legality of the lease
323
.  
Withholding performance also forms part of the duty to mitigate, which was 
proclaimed in case Clark v. Marsiglia
324
. The rule is not applicable if an obligee has an 
interest in completing performance that damages cannot adequately compensate
325
.  
American doctrine offers further development to this remedy, which would allow 
injured party withhold damages caused by default, but only in good faith, and would 
encourage breaching party to continue performance, minimizing risk of incomplete 
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 See cases Morgan v.  Singley, supra note 314; See also Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 
supra note 294 (withholding payment in response to constant delays). 
320
 See cases ARP Films, Inc. v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., supra note 316; White River Development 
Co. v. Meco Systems, Inc., 806 S.W.2d 735, 1991, https://www.courtlistener.com/moctapp/8MAx/white-
river-dev-v-meco-systems/. For commentaries See William J. Geller, supra note 310, p. 178. 
321
 See Mark P. Gergen, supra note 32, p. 1418. 
322
 It means that if a debtor disagrees with the amount she is required to pay, she should first challenge it, and 
only then pay, See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §6 cmt.e, illus. 18 (Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 2001), cited in Mark P. Gergen, supra note 32, p.p. 1423 -1430. Interesting that, for instance in 
Finland the order is reversed: one should first pay and then challenge in order to avoid liability for the late 
payment. Based on Sec.47 of FSGA a buyer is bound by the price indicated in the invoice, unless he notifies 
a seller within reasonable time on disagreement with the price or if the lower price was expressly agreed. 
According to Sec. 5 of Finnish Interest Act (Korkolaki, 633/1982 with amend.) interest for the late payment 
shall be paid from the fixed date and in accordance with Sec. 4a for the whole “delayed amount”; separately 
in case of damages compensation (Sec. 7) only undisputable amount is considered for the interest calculation, 
but the section mentions difficulty to establish such. Therefore usually in Finland any invoice should be first 
paid and notification on disagreement served. On the overpaid amount then interest should be accounted to 
prevent unjust enrichment and it should be returned to the payee. 
323
 Withholding rights are provided in government procurement laws and some others, See William J. Geller, 
supra note 310, p.p. 165-166. 
324
 1 Denio 317 (N.Y.), 1845, http://www.lawnix.com/cases/clark-marsiglia.html. 
325
 For this and other exceptions from the main rule See cases John A. Roebling’s Sons Co. v. Lock-Stitch 
Fence Co., 22. N.E. 518 (III), 1889 (the right of the contractor to complete), 
http://www.forgottenbooks.org/readbook_text/Reports_of_Cases_Decided_in_the_Appellate_Courts_of_the
_State_of_v28_1000370259/185; Davis v. Bronson, 50 N.W. 836, 1892 (contract-defaulter giving the order 
to stop performance shall not pay in full if the other party decided to complete), 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8152&context=penn_law_review.  
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performance, and, at the same time, preserving continuation of the obligation/contract. In 
case of withholding or objection to such, the parties should exchange notices, which allow 




3.6.3. Withholding in International Unification Sources 
According to Art. 9:201 PECL the party may withhold performance until the other 
party tendered performance or performed, if she should perform simultaneously or after the 
counter-party.  
Art. III-3:401 DCFR provides for the same situation and additionally – if a creditor 
should perform first, but reasonably believes that there would be no counter-performance, 
she may withhold – based on the reasonability test. This right will be lost when adequate 
assurance is provided by the other party.  
Art. 58(1) CISG regulates concurrent performances. Art. 72 CISG introduces right of 
withholding performance in case of anticipatory breach.  
 
3.6.4. Intermediate Conclusions 
As demonstrated above, remedy of performance withholding is generally recognized 
in all analyzed jurisdictions and international codifications, despite the lack of statutory 
regulation in Common law. This is self-help, temporary and conditional remedy. After 
exercising of withholding usually one of two options will take place: mutual performance 
or termination of the contract, but it does not preclude its qualification as a remedy.  
In France it is applicable to all bilateral contracts; in Germany only to sinallagmatic. 
Common law provides instead for right of lien or retention and also considers withholding 
as part of mitigation duty. In Common law policy withholding is usually exercised as step 
of repudiation process and is complicated by influence of other practices and doctrines. 
English law favors non-breaching party and allows her to perform and recover price. UCC 
adopts more liberal standard for sales contracts: withholding is available in case of 
commercially reasonable justification; but American courts engage various inconsistent 
standards. Finnish law combines elements of French and Common law systems 
(anticipatory breach). International codifications allow withholding in bilateral contracts 
under standard of reasonability. 
Theory offers to expand withholding on contractual damages under certain 
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 See William J. Geller, supra note 310, p.p. 197 – 203. 
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conditions. At the same time this remedy is criticized for economic inefficiency. In my 
opinion, on the contrary it saves both parties’ expenses: if the risk of non-performance 
exists, it is easier to withhold than perform and then recover damages; efficient breach is 
not precluded. Application of principles of good faith and reasonability seems crucial in 
this regard, as well as combining right of withholding with duty to mitigate damages, as 
implemented in Finnish sales law. In my opinion, despite temporary nature, this measure 
plays functions of remedy and therefore should be fully recognized as such.  
Differences in application of this remedy in various legal orders do not preclude 
convergence of their elements in regulation of the same contractual relationships, as 
demonstrated below concerning standard construction contracts.   
 
4. REMEDIES UNDER STANDARD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS  
4.1. INTERRELATION BETWEEN CONTRACTS FOR SALE OF GOODS AND 
PROVISION OF SERVICE  
In all reviewed jurisdictions contracts for sale of goods and contracts for rendering 
services/performing works have separate legal regulation (whether statutory or not). Such 
diversity pre-determines some variations of the respective remedies, which are available 




Construction contracts in particular demonstrate a complex and challenging case of 
integrated sales and service
328
. In order to understand the extent, to which such contracts 
can be governed by sales’ law, including its international norms, and to which exempt 
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 See section 1.3 of the comments to the CISG Advisory Council Opinion No4 Contracts for the Sale of 
Goods to Be Manufactured or Produced and Mixed Contracts (Article 3 CISG), 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op4.html; See also Jelena Perovi, Selected Critical Issues 
Regarding the Sphere of Application of the CISG, Belgrade Law Review, Year 2011, No. 3, p.p. 181- 195, 
section 2.2, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/perovic.html; Contracts for Services Distinguished 
from Those to Sell Goods, Fordham Law Review, 1946, Vol. 15, p. 92, 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1300&context=flr. 
328
 See e.g. from American Arbitration Association: “Construction disputes are fairly common, and they vary 
in their nature, size, and complexity. Mark Appel, senior vice president of the American Arbitration 
Association, stated that “[t]he construction industry…[is] really the industry that sponsors our work.” (ENR 
2000). Although this statement may initially appear to be an indictment, it simply reflects the complexity of a 
contemporary construction project, which requires the orchestration of numerous interdependent 
components, including information, materials, tools, equipment, and a large number of personnel working for 
independent engineers, contractors, and suppliers. Construction disputes, when not resolved in a timely 
manner, become very expensive – in terms of finances, personnel, time, and opportunity costs”. Construction 
litigation expenditures in the US in 2003 approximated at 5 billion US dollars annually, with trend to 
increase 10% each following year, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/essay/constructiondisputes.authcheckdam.pdf 
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from it, I further refer to the provisions of CISG on the matter and their official 
interpretation. Significance of this example is especially important, because adoption of 
CISG has influenced most of the national sales’ laws and provided for their modification 
and/or harmonization in both Civil and Common law orders
329
. Hence the national 
regulation of the respective matters or its certain parts may be relatively similar to the 
international and interpreted by analogy.  
However it is important to remember that pursuant to Art.4 CISG governs only “the 
formation of the contract and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising 
from such a contract”330. Art.2 CISG also excludes certain types of contracts from its scope 
and Art.3 CISG establishes additional requirements for the application in two sub-sections. 
Under sub-section 3(1) CISG contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or 
produced are to be considered sales unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to 
supply a substantial part of the materials necessary for such manufacture or production. 
Pursuant to sub-section 3(2) CISG the convention does not apply to contracts in which the 
preponderant part of the obligations of the party who furnishes the goods consists in the 
supply of labor or other services. According to Secretariat’s commentary to the article 3 
CISG (1978 Draft)
331
, two cases shall be distinguished and treated separately from the 
regular sales: 1) supply by a buyer of a substantial part of the necessary materials, from 
which the goods to be produced or manufactured by a seller; 2) supply of the labor or other 
services by a seller. According to section 1 of the CISG Advisory Council Opinion No.4 
and sub-section 1.2 of the comments to it even though sub-sections 1 and 2 of the Art. 3 
CISG govern different matters, in complex transactions there may be some reciprocal 
influence in their interpretation and application. The Convention adopts for each case 
dividing criteria: “substantial part” and “preponderant part”.  
Regarding first case number of academics states that term “substantial” refers solely 
to economic value: in order to outlaw CISG byer-provided materials should be higher in 
value (price) than seller-supplied
332
; such opinion is supported in some court awards
333
, but 
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 According to UNCITRAL by 26.09.2013 80 countries have adopted the CISG; See for CISG contracting-
states http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html. 
330
 See Ulrich G. Schroeter, Vienna Sales Convention: Applicability to “Mixed Contracts” and Interaction 
with the 1968 Brussels Convention, Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration, 




 See e.g. John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sale under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 3
d
 ed., 1999, No 106, p.p. 56 - 62; Bradley J. Richards, Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods: Applicability of the United Nations Convention, Iowa Law Review, 1983, Vol. 
 
 93 
quantifying values are set at various rates: from 10 to 50%
334
. CISG Advisory Opinion 
recommended disregarding fixed percentages, but rather base opinion on the overall 
assessment on case-by-case basis (sections 2.8 – 2.9). Some writers and courts justify 
necessity of “essential” criterion application, i.e. evaluation of quality/functionality of the 
provided materials
335
; idea is invoked by different languages’ versions of the Convention: 
“substantial” in English and “part essentielle” in French. Section 2.5 of the commentary to 
the CISG Advisory Opinion notes that criterion “essential” has regained its ancillary role. 
The Opinion further establishes that “economic value” criterion should prevail (section 
2.6) and criterion “essential” should be considered only where “economic value” 
impossible of inappropriate to apply (section 2.7).  
Therefore three tests in determination of “substantial part” can be assumed under 
CISG: 1) dominant economic value (ex ante); 2) supplementary essential test (effect of the 
contribution to the end-product); 3) case-by-case approach, - all of which can be used 
individually, cumulatively, or successively
336 . Additionally “necessity” of supplied 
materials for the end-product production as such should be assessed; materials for 
packaging, transportation and acceptance tests should be excluded from the consideration 
since they do not form part of the end-goods. Supply by a buyer of the designs, drawings, 
technical specifications, technology and formula, is questionable in terms of substantial 
material contribution; they may be accounted only if significantly increase end-product 
                                                                                                                                                                       
69, p.p. 209 – 240, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/richards.htmal; Joseph Lookofsky, The 1980 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in International Encyclopaedia 
of Laws-Contracts, Suppl. 29, J. Herbots and R. Blanpain (eds), Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 
40. Compare with the case where CISG was declared inapplicable because goods were manufactured in 
Yugoslavia entirely from material supplied by the ordering party from Austria, “Brushes and Brooms Case”, 
Supreme Court, Austria, 27.10.1994, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/941027a3.html; 
Warren Khoo, Commentary to Article 3 CISG, in Bianca-Bonell Commentary on the International Sales 
Law, Giuffrè: Milan, 1987, p.p. 41-43, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/khoo-bb3.html. 
333
 See e.g. “Knitwear Case”, District court Berlin, 24.03.1998, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/980324g1.html; “Art Book Case”, Commercial Court of 
Zürich, 10.02.1999, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/990210s1.html; “Windmill Drives 
Case”, Commercial Court of Zürich, 08.04.1999, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/990408s1.html; ICC 8855/1997, JDI, 2000, 4, p.1070. 
Compare with the case, where CISG was declared inapplicable because goods were manufactured in 
Yugoslavia entirely from material supplied by the ordering party from Austria, “Brushes and Brooms Case”, 
supra note 332. 
334
 See supra notes 14 – 19 to the comments to the CISG Advisory Council Opinion No4, supra note 327. 
335
 See Ulrich G. Schroeter, supra note 330, p. 76; See also case A.M.D. Electronique v. Rosenberger, 
Appellate Court Chambéry, France, 25.05.1993, schemes, standards and designs (“essential materials”) were 
provided by the buyer (later criticized for application of domestic doctrine to the international contract), 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/930525f1.html; See contra “Shoes Case”, Appellate Court 
Frankfurt, 18.09.1991, provision of technical instructions cannot justify exclusion from CISG, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/910917g1.html. 
336
 See Jelena Perovi, supra note 327, p. 185. 
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value, but usually are covered by CISG scope
337
. 
Ancillary services, such as packaging, dispatching, transportation, unloading, 
insurance, waste management, even “major engineering effort and planning and conceptual 
work”338 etc. should be excluded from the consideration of the mixed contracts (second 
case). Dominant opinion in doctrine and case law is that “preponderant” should be 
qualified based on the overall assessment (not percentages or quantity), where economic 
value criterion
339




Unlike Art. 3 CISG, §2-102 UCC does not separate assembly contract (where a 
buyer supplies material) (and hybrid contracts in general
341
) from regular sale, and there 
are no unified statutory criteria for distinguishing sale from service. American and UK 
courts have developed significant amount of case law on the matter with no ultimate 
certainty on applicable rules
342
. Growth of the controversial court precedent law could be 
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 See sections 2.12 - 2.14 of the comments to CISG Advisory Council Opinion No4, supra note 327; See 
also cases applying CISG, where material supply is declared insubstantial e.g. “Waste Container Case”, Vb 
94131,  Budapest Arbitration proceeding, 05.12.1995, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/951205h1.html;  
“Shoes case”, supra note 335. 
338
 See “Cylinder Case”, District Court Mainz, Germany, 26.11.1998, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/981126g1.html. 
339
 “Value of the services has to be compared with the value of the whole contract and not with the price of 
the goods only”, See Jelena Perovi, supra note 327, p.p. 186 – 187.  
340
 See cases, where services are declared not “preponderant”: “Hotel Materials Case”, ICC Arbitration 
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Roque Joachim v. Manin Rivière, Appellate Court Grenoble, France, 26.04.1995, 
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“Windows and doors case”, Appellate Court Saarbrücken, Germany, 14.02.2001, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/010214g1.html; “Pizzeria restaurant equipment case”, 
District Court München, Germany, 16.11.2000, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/001116g1.html. Contra “Market study case”, Appellate 
Court Köln, Germany, 26.08.1994, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/940826g1.html. See 
also sections 3.2 -3.4 of the CISG Advisory Council Opinion No4, supra note 327. 
341
 For more on the related qualification problems See Mary Julianne Yard, The Scope of Article 2 of the 
UCC: Classification of the Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods, Creighton Law Review, 1977, Vol. 10, 
p.p. 508 – 520. 
342
 See cases Wells v. 10-X Mfg. Co., 609 F.2d 248, 1979 (the buyer delivers design, fabric, labels and 
packaging for shirt-manufacture that is declared a service contract), http://openjurist.org/609/f2d/248/wells-
v-10-x-manufacturing-company; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Sheridan, 53 F.R.D. 642 (S.D.N.Y.), 1971 (book 
publishing is declared a service, not sale of goods, since supply of materials is secondary),  
https://dspace.creighton.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10504/38971/46_10CreightonLRev508(1976-
1977).pdf?sequence=1; Wm. H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally & Co., 195 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.), 1961 
(printing supplied manuscript is a contract for work, labor, not a sale), 
https://www.courtlistener.com/nysd/8Pa7/wm-h-wise-co-v-rand-mcnally-company/; North American Leisure 
Corp. v. A. & B. Duplicators, Ltd., 468 F.2d 695, 1972 (reproduction of record from a supplied master tape is 
not a sale of goods), https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/468/468.F2d.695.32.33.71-2159.71-
2094.html. But see Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331, 1971 (taking wedding pictures is 
declared selling goods), https://www.courtlistener.com/paed/8u6Y/carpel-v-saget-studios-inc/;  Lake Wales 
Publishing Co. v. Florida Visitor, Inc., 335 So.2d 335, 1976 (compiling, editing and publishing pamphlets is 
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explained by rudiment legislation: both contract types were treated by courts similar in all 
aspects but one – application of the Statue of Frauds (an Act of the Parliament of England 
for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677)
343
, which was later repealed in British 
colonies, but allowed to avoid liability in certain circumstances while was effective.  
In separating sales from services Common law courts often applied the following 
reasoning: in case of work, labor and a service the remuneration was given in return of 
certain skill or energy
344
, while in a sale the consideration was paid for the transfer of title 
or possession, or both
345
. When contracts were interrelated and mixed, e.g. when both 
parties contributed the material, quantitative test was largely applied, meaning that if 
manufacturer supplied less and mostly accessorial parts of the end-product, the contract 
was declared one for work, labor and services
346
.   
Further development of the court practice involved investigation of the parties’ 
                                                                                                                                                                       
declared sales of goods), https://www.courtlistener.com/illappct/cucC/gross-valentino-printing-co-v-clarke/, 
in section I. See also for more on the sale-service dichotomy issues Sale of Goods in Service- Predominated 
Transactions, Fordham Law Review, 1968, Vol. 37:1, p.p. 115 – 122, 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1955&context=flr. 
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 See Contracts for Services Distinguished from Those to Sell Goods, supra note 327, p.p. 111 – 112. See 
also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_frauds#England_and_Wales. In deciding on application of the 
Statute of frauds courts have established three basic rules: 1) Massachusetts rule qualifies contracts for 
manufacture of the goods, which are not part of the stock, as a service (case Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 
450, 1874); 2) New York rule declares services a manufacture of future goods, not existing at the time of the 
contracting (case Crookshand v. Burrell, 18 Johns. 58, 1820); 3) English rule looks into the “essence” of the 
contract (case Clay v. Yates, 1 H.&N. 73, 156 Eng. Rep. 1123, 1856), cited in John Franklin Weeks, When Is 
a Sale a Sale?, Louisiana  Law Review, 1972, Vol.32, p.p. 446 – 452. 
344
 See cases Carlson, Holmes & Bromstad, Inc., v. M.I. Stewart & Co., Inc., 147 Misc. 607, 264 N.Y. Supp. 
277, 1932 (agreement to install fixtures, where supply of material is incidental to service); Gilbert v. 
Copeland, 22 Ga. App. 753, 97 S.E. 251, 1918 (farmer growing crop for another); Garvin Machine Co. v. 
Hutchinson, 1 App. Div. 380, 37 N.Y. Supp. 394, 1896 (manufactured tools are retained and used for 
assembly work for another); Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 Ill. 626, 12 N.E.2d 635, 1937 (lenses and frames 
furnished by optometrist are incidental to the professional service rendered); Granette Products Co. v. A.N. 
Neumann & Co., 200 Iowa 572, 203 N.W. 935, 1925 (court investigated if the party was mere a seller of the 
material or was obliged to supply service and incidental material and was bound to comply with plans and 
specifications); Mack v. Snell, 140 N.Y. 193, 35 N.E. 493, 1893; Austin v. Seligman, 18 Fed. 519, 1883 (was 
performance of services rendered in respect of the hiring party’s chattels or was it sale), All cited in Contracts 
for Services Distinguished from Those to Sell Goods, supra note 327. 
345
 See cases Matter of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. McGoldrick, 279 N.Y. 184, 280 N.Y. 570, 18 N.E.2d 
25,1938; Jackson v. McIntosh, 12 F.2d 676, 1926, cited in Contracts for Services Distinguished from Those 
to Sell Goods, supra note 327; See also Sales- Implied Warranty – Work, Labor and Services, St. John’s Law 
Review, 1937, Vol. 12:1, p. 152. 
346
 See cases Pulcifer v. Page, 32 Me. 404, 1851, https://www.courtlistener.com/meb/akbV/in-re-lyford/, 
section 224; Mack v. Snell, supra note 343; Arnott & Archer v. Kansas Pacific Railway Co., 19 Kan. 95, 
1877, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2832&context=penn_law_review; Sattler 
v. Hallock, 160 N. Y. 291; 73 Am. St. Rep. 686; 46 L. R. A. 679; 54 N. E. 667, 1899, 
https://archive.org/stream/illustrativecas00tiffgoog/illustrativecas00tiffgoog_djvu.txt; Salant v. Pennsylvania 
R.R. Co., 188 App. Div. 851, 177 N.Y. Supp. 475, 1919, 
https://archive.org/stream/newyorksuppleme01appegoog/newyorksuppleme01appegoog_djvu.txt. But see 
case Lee v. Griffin, 1 Best & Smith 272, 23 Eng. Rul. Case 191, 1861 (based on the value of the material the 
contract was declared the sale of goods), 
http://archive.org/stream/handbookoflawofs00falcuoft/handbookoflawofs00falcuoft_djvu.txt. 
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intention (evaluation of the contract “essence”) - qualitative criterion - in addition to 
quantity and value: where bargain primarily assumed exercise of the special (professional) 
skill or the manufacture of the certain goods was not party’s primary business the contract 
was declared one for service
347
.  
Traditionally separate treatment is given to the contracts for building and 
construction. Dominant status of real estate in Common law makes it ultimately the 
prevailing contribution by principle of accession: passing of the title happens once the 
construction becomes immovable on the land, hence any material contribution by the 
laborer is considered accessorial and the consideration is only paid for the work, labor and 
service, not for the ownership transfer
348
. This type of contract is distinguished from 
installing on the buyer’s property the commodity (goods) produced by the manufacturer, 
i.e. installation of the equipment in the house, which should be regarded as sale. In other 
words, Commonwealth courts were applying both quantitative and qualitative tests, 
examining different elements of the bargain. Currently in respect of the mixed service-
goods contracts US courts usually apply “predominant-thrust” test, where prevailing fact in 
the contract is based on the most costly part (quantitate) and secondly - contract purpose 
(essence) is assessed
349
. European writers and courts in various jurisdictions seem to share 
positive approach to the applicable tests
350
.  
Given the described complexity of the matter, the last but not the least issue is 
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 See Ulrich G. Schroeter, supra note 330, p. 78; Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law - The UN-
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna: Manz, 1986, p. 31. See cases 
Genpharm Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema A.S., 361 F. Supp. 2d 49 (E.D.N.Y.), 2005, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/050319u1.html; “Cylinder case”, supra note 338; Alfred 
Dunhill v. Tivoli, Supreme Court, Italy, 09.06.1995, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950609i3.html.  
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whether turn-key construction contracts fall under CISG
351
. Confusion is created by the 
commentary to the sub-section 3(2) CISG, providing as an example of exclusion a contract 
“where the seller agrees to sell machinery and undertakes to set it up in a plant in working 
condition or to supervise its installation. In such cases if the “preponderant part” of the 
obligation of a seller consists of the supply of labor or other services, the contract is not 
subject to the provisions of the Convention”. Many courts in reviewed European 
jurisdictions and US have refused to apply CISG in cases of installation or construction of 
the industrial plant, and other turn-key contracts
352
. Other courts, however, treat them as 
sales of goods
353
. Hence the matter of qualification of the turn-key contract is unsettled and 
requires case-by-case analysis, which creates high legal uncertainty. Therefore it is 
recommended to the parties resolve the matter in the contract by explicitly excluding 
application of the Convention pursuant to Art. 6 CISG.  
Finnish sales’ law, adopting changes invoked by CISG, also incorporated elements 
of Common sales’ law, providing for the special solution to the described controversy. Sec. 
2 FSGA states that the Act does not apply to a contract for the construction of a building or 
other fixed installation or structure on land or in water
354
. By doing so regulation of the 
building industry in Finland is explicitly separated from sales and submitted to 
combination of the mandatory rules prescribed by special legislation and soft law norms, 
based on general terms and conditions, developed in cooperation between industry 
participants. Finnish legal order was influenced by German system, but does not have such 
level of codification. Provision of services in general has partial regulation under the 
Finnish Act on Services Provision (“Laki palvelujen tarjoamisesta”, 1166/2009), but 
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 See section 3.5 of the CISG Advisory Council Opinion No4, supra note 327. 
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 See cases Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 364 A.2d 1221, 1975, 
http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rowley/Gulash.pdf; Duhon v. Three Friends Homebuilders Corp., 396 
So.2d 559, 1981, 
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 See cases Cryogenic Equip., Inc. v. Southern Nitrogen, Inc., 490 F.2d 696, 1974, 
http://openjurist.org/490/f2d/696/cryogenic-equipment-inc-v-southern-nitrogen-inc; County Asphalt, Inc. v. 
Lewis Welding & Engineering Corp., 444 F.2d 372, 1971, http://openjurist.org/444/f2d/372/county-asphalt-
inc-v-lewis-welding-and-engineering-corporation; “Windows and doors case”, supra note 340. 
354
 Finnish Sale of Goods Act provides terms for the anticipatory breach (as in Anglo-American system), 
which gives the right to a party to suspend its performance in case the other party informed on possibility of 
his failure to perform (Section 61 (3)), there are also some possibilities to a party to declare contract avoided, 
if other party is in breach of the certain obligations (Sections 51, 54, 55). 
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mostly as implementation of European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/123/EC and 
for its purposes
355
. Separate construction industry specific regulation is also introduced on 
EU-level
356
. Special nature of this type of contract explains the need for the special 
development and diversity in its regulation.  
 
4.2.  DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 
Started with industrial revolution in Europe in XVIII century and continued in XIX 
century development of the society and economy provided for the significant progress of 
the civil engineering contracts; increasing number and complexity of the objects, 
evolvement of the protection of the workmen rights, brought new elements to the content 
of the contracts, specific for the industry, e.g. new standards and specifications conditioned 




The avant-garde of construction contract case law was shaped in England in XIX 
century and first forms of non-standard and standard contracts progressed. The Royal 
Institute of British Architects (RIBA) developed one of the first standard contracts, and 
they received wide application in the early XX century. On their basis Joint Contracts 
Tribunal (JCT) later developed standard forms of 1963 and 1980. Institution of Civil 
Engineers (ICE) launched first edition of general conditions of contract in 1945.  
The Associated General Contractors of America and the Federation of Americana de 




Fédération Internationale Des Ingénieurs-Conseils (International Federation of 
Consulting Engineers), established in 1913 in Geneva by French, Belgium and Swiss 
association of engineers, with participation of wide number of new members published its 
first edition of the Conditions of Contract (International) for Works of Civil Engineering 
Construction in August 1957
359
. The most often used in the construction of wind energy 




 For EU construction standards see Eurocodes 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/construction/eurocodes/index_en.htm; for EU policies and legislation 
impacting construction see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/construction/policies-
legislation/index_en.htm. 
357
 See Reg Thomas, supra note 26, p.1. 
358
 Id, p. 46. 
359
 Jeremy Glover, FIDIC an overview: the latest developments, comparisons, claims and a look into the 
future, http://www.fenwickelliott.co.uk/files/FIDIC.pdf. 
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plants are Yellow Book, 1999 for design and construction of the plant in accordance with 
employer’s requirements, and Silver Book, 1999 for EPC/Turnkey projects360. 
There is number of other standard agreements in the industry, which have solid 
reputation and wide acceptance in the same business area. For instance ORGALIME (The 
European Engineering Industries Association, with headquarters in Brussels, representing 
the interests at the level of the EU institutions of the European mechanical, electrical, 
electronic and metal articles industries) published in 2003 Turnkey Contract for Industrial 
Works
361
, which was claimed to be more balanced alternative to FIDIC Silver Book. 
FIDIC contract is subjected to respective national law, which unavoidably results in certain 
country-specific adjustments. Variety of effects, which each particular jurisdiction may 
have on FIDIC contract terms, their interpretation and applicability were researched in 
details by International Bar Association
362
. For instance, in US and UK sales law may 
apply to these contracts, while in Germany (§631 BGB) and France (Art. 1779 FCC) they 
will be treated as a separate type of contract
363
. In US in cases where the employer fails to 
grant an appropriate extension for the excusable delay or force the contractor to complete 
prior to the initially agreed date the doctrine of “constructive acceleration” should apply364. 
In UK due to the “prevention principle” (doctrine “acts of prevention”), created by the 
extensive case law, in case the employer by valid act or omission (breach) creates delays in 
the performance, he cannot keep the contractor bound to the original specified completion 
date, on the contrary time becomes “at large”, meaning that completion should be 
performed within reasonable time, precluding claim of liquidated damages
365
. In case of 
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two delay events, occurring within the same period of time and affecting the completion 
date, in UK and US precedent law is applicable regarding concurrent delay and calculation 
of related LD, and each of them has own specifics
366
. At the same time English version of 
freedom of contract doctrine, providing for the literal (not purposeful) interpretation of the 
contract ensures risks of contract terms invalidation by the statute
367
.  In France public 
employer is always entitled to terminate the construction contract irrespective of the 
reasons; pursuant to Art. 1792-5 FCC ten years of strict and several liability of all the 
parties to the construction contract may not be limited in the contract
368
. 
As was described above, German BGB distinguishes work performance contract 
(Werkvertrag) – an exchange contract of services/ works against money subject to two 
requirements: 1) services/ works are successfully completed; 2) performance is accepted 
by the employer
369
. Whenever construction is performed for public needs the contractual 
relationship is governed in addition to BGB by the VOB (2012) (Vergabe- und 
Vertragsordnung für Bauleistungen), which is a German standard of construction contract 
procedures (General Terms and Conditions) formed out of 26 documents with influence 
extending far beyond the state. Private parties (but not public) may apply VOB by the mere 
reference in the contract, as well as modify and adopt deviations
370
 or use other forms of 
contract, including FIDIC, which are also qualified as general terms and conditions 
(“GTC”) under German law. All GTC used within German legal policy should comply 
with special requirements of statutory law, previously the Law on Standard Conditions of 
Business (AGBG), which were replaced in 2002 by special section in BGB (§ 305 BGB et 
seq.)
371
. According to §307(1) BGB “provisions in standard business terms are invalid if, 
contrary to the requirement of good faith, they place the contractual partner of the user at 
an unreasonable disadvantage. An unreasonable disadvantage may also result from the fact 
that the provision is not clear and comprehensible”. Therefore there is a risk that number of 




 See Richard J. Long, Analysis of Concurrent Delay on Construction, Claims, 2013, http://www.long-
intl.com/articles/Long_Intl_Analysis_of_Concurrent_Delay_on_Construction_Claims.pdf.  




 See FIDIC: An Analysis of International Construction Contracts, supra note 362, p. 78. 
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 See Manfred Pieck, supra note 106, p.134. See also German statutes in English translation 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/AGBG.htm. 
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FIDIC provisions will be void and null, e.g. risk transfer terms
372
. Therefore if construction 
contract has close relation to Germany its mandatory rules will be applicable irrespective 
of choice of law and violation of moral principles, principle of good faith and public 
interests should be precluded at all times. 
In Finnish construction industry is widely accepted General Conditions for Building 
Contracts YSE 1998 (RT 16-10660) (“YSE 98”), endorsed by the Finnish Association of 
Building Owners and Construction Clients
373
. They apply if the parties expressly agreed to 
that, nevertheless some aspects of these terms have become part of good business practice 
and should be considered even by foreign contractors performing projects in Finland
374
. 
For instance, according to §29 YSE 98 guarantee (warranty) period for the built object is 
two years, but for hidden defects, as well as those caused negligently, by mistake or 
willfully, the liability will be extended for ten years. 
Other standard contract form available in Scandinavia is General Conditions for the 
Supply and Erection of Machinery and other Mechanical, Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment (NLM 02E), issued in 2002 by the organizations for the engineering industries 
in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
375
. 
All contracts in this area can be divided into multi-party contract or network of 
related agreements with the sole purpose of building and constructing of an industrial 
object. Further specific (variety of participants and additional narrow regulation and 
standards) is conditional to the sector of construction: oil and gas sector, power sector 
(nuclear or renewable (solar, hydro, wind) energy), processing, other industrial facilities, 
buildings or infrastructural objects. Usually construction contract is made between the 
following parties: the employer (purchaser, owner of the plant/building); the contractor 
(supplier, general contractor, providing for the construction and supply of the building 
materials and equipment); the engineer (expert representing the employer, but having 
powers to settle disagreements and supervise the project); the subcontractors, performing 
separate functions of contractor; utility companies and authorities. Common law trend, 
established also in most of FIDIC editions, is on the side of three-party main (framework) 
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agreement, with mandatory participation of the engineer, representing interests of the 
employer, which demonstrates the balance of interests shifted to the advantage of the plant 
owner, customer under the agreement. Continental law trend, reflected in the ORGALIME, 
insists on the strict two-party agreement, each of which has own representative (site-
manager); disputes might be referred to adjudication by an independent expert. 
In practice usually the standard terms or general conditions are used as a basis, 
auxiliary or supplementary contractual document to the main agreement, with stipulation 
of the special conditions or deviations from the general terms. Such main agreement 
between the parties is called in terms of FIDIC Silver Book (“FIDIC”) “Contract 
Agreement” and “Particular Conditions” (Sub-Clauses 1.1, 1.5 and 1.6) or in terms of 
ORGALIME Turnkey contract (“ORGALIME”) “Main Contract Document” (Sub-Clause 
2.2). 
It is worth mentioning that standard construction contracts, reviewed for the purpose 
of this research, use different terms in relation to the purchaser/employer:  FIDIC refers to 
the “Employer” (Sub-Clause 1.1.2.2); ORGALIME utilizes term “Purchaser” (Main 
contract document); same term used in NLM 02E; YSE 98 names the “Client” (Glossary); 
and VOB/B engages the “Principal” (§1 No.3). Nevertheless all forms use term 
“Contractor” in relation to the counterparty, which clearly indicates separation from the 
“Seller” in the sales contract. 
Most common in construction industry for many years has been engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) or so called turn-key contract, under which the 
contractor supplies to the employer complete and ready for operation/production facility
376
. 
It has certain drawbacks, noted as result of growing experience in utilizing EPC form, such 
as heavy losses on the side of contractors, caused high scale of bankruptcies in the industry 
world-wide, and as a consequence - increase in the construction insurance costs, problems 
with projects’ bankability and financing. But flexibility of EPC structure, possibility to 
finance works and deliveries from various sources, as well as utilizing payment guarantees 
and bonds, valuable features of available supervision and disputes settlement ensure its 
future application in the industry. Building and construction industry contracts present 
successful fusion of various remedies, each of which serves its special purpose. For the 
purpose of the current research we consider implementation of the said remedies in four 
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standard forms of the construction contracts: 1) FIDIC Silver Book Conditions of Contract 
for EPC/Turnkey Project, hereinafter in the text referred to as “FIDIC”, 2) ORGALIME 
Turnkey Contract for Industrial Works, hereinafter in the text referred to as 
“ORGALIME”; 3) General Conditions for Building Contracts YSE 1998 (Finnish 
standard), hereinafter in the text referred to as “YSE 98”; 4) The Construction Contract 
Procedures Part B (German standard), hereinafter in the text referred to as “VOB/B”. 
 
4.3.  Intermediate Conclusions 
Performed study demonstrates that division between contract of sale and contract for 
service exists in all reviewed jurisdictions. Nevertheless in Civil law orders this separation 
is incorporated in statutory law, while in Common law it only follows from one part of the 
court practice. Therefore there is less legal certainty in qualification of the contract in 
Commonwealth system. Importance of this detachment becomes obvious when we analyze 
terms of CISG and governed by it system of remedies. CISG introduces hierarchy of 
remedies and restricts or conditions freedom of their application in respect of sale of 
goods. CISG excludes from its scope: 1) goods to be manufactured where substantial part 
of the material is supplied by the buyer; 2) preponderant part of the contract is labor or 
service provided by the seller. Qualification under CISG is based on the following criteria: 
1) economic value (ex ante) as primer criterion; 2) essentiality as supplementary criterion; 
3) case-by-case approach in all cases. 
Civil law engages more liberal approach to termination of the service contract. 
Contract for building and construction often has additional specific regulation both on 
national and international level. In order to avoid qualification of the international 
construction projects under CISG or local sales laws and following uncertainty and 
instability, number of international and national industrial organizations developed 
respective standards of general terms and conditions directed at regulation of specific 
relationships in multiparty construction projects. The risk of national legal order 
interference still remains and parties need to pay close attention to the selection of law, 
governing the contract. Nevertheless soft law codifications play significant role in the 
industry and international contracting and their application along with settlement disputes 
under them have wide practice. These general terms and conditions provide high level of 
unification and harmonization of legal norms from various legal orders. Additionally they 
demonstrate successful fusion of borrowed rules into integrated system of remedies, 
serving both national and international contracting.  
 104 
Below I review and analyze specifics of each earlier studied remedy in the context of 
several industrial standards, both domestic and global, and observe interplay between them 
as elements of the whole remedial system adopted within one contract.  
 
4.4.  SPECIFICS OF SOME REMEDIES UNDER STANDARD CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTS 
4.4.1. Damages’ Compensation 
Usually damages’ compensation is provided under the law as a default remedy in case 
the contract is silent in this matter, but may be specifically set forth in the contract in 
respect to its breach as a whole or regarding a particular term. Most of legal systems allow 
parties to agree in the contract the extent and measure of damages recoverable
377
, but they 
usually provide default provisions, which may or may not be circumvent by the contract 
terms. 
Given that one of the main disadvantages of this remedy, as described previously, is 
usual under-compensation, performed studies demonstrate that in certain circumstances 
Common law makes supra-compensatory damages available under the construction 
contracts based on the economic analysis reasoning
378
. As was explained above, in 
Commonwealth courts breach of a contract is primary evaluated from the “substantial 
performance” doctrine position379, and subsequently – from perspective of measure of 
damages for the contractor’s breach380. Higher measure of damages is grounded in the 
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 In most cases the owner is awarded cost of completion, unless it exceeds diminution in market value, See 
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difficulty for the owner to select subcontractors and supervise construction process, which 
in turn creates incentive for the general contractor to breach
381
. Hence such measure is 
justified when main contractor intentionally or negligently fails to provide for commercially 
reasonable level of supervision or when exact damages are hard to calculate
382
. However, as 
established above, downside of high damages is inefficient contractor’s overinvestment in 
monitoring and respective price increase. 
Damages’ claims in construction from the contractor’s point of view may refer to 
delay, disruption, acceleration, differing site conditions, changes in scope, pass-through and 
termination claims; from the employer’s perspective claims often relate to liquidated 
damages, delay damages, defects damages and damages for termination
383
.  
Standard construction contracts regarding remedy of damages either specify it as a 
separate remedy (sometimes alternative) or joined with other remedies in the limited cases 
(usually when it comes to product liability and third party damage or injury). Typically 
standard contracts prescribe or limit damages’ compensation in the indemnities’ sections 
and limitation of total liability clauses. The latter is considered in a separate sub-section on 
limitation of liability below. 
According to Sub-Clause 8.9 FIDIC “Consequences of Suspension” 384  if the 
Contractor suffers Delay and/or incurs Cost as a result of the Employer’s instruction to 
suspend the Work, subject to notice on such, the Contractor should be entitled to extension 
of time and payment of the Cost (unless he contributes to reason for suspension by faulty 
design and similar); additionally under Sub-Clause 8.10 FIDIC the Contractor should be 
entitled to payment of the Plant and Materials which are delayed in delivery due to the 
suspension. If testing is delayed due to the Employer he should compensate the 
Contractor’s Cost and provide for extension of time if necessary (Sub-Clauses 4.4(5) and 
10.3 FIDIC).  Pursuant to Sub-Clause 15.4 (c) FIDIC “Payment after Termination”:  “After 
a notice of termination [by the Employer]… the Employer may recover from the Contractor 
any losses and damages incurred by the Employer and any extra costs of completing the 
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Works… After recovering any such losses, damages and extra costs, the Employer shall 
pay any balance to the Contractor”385; Sub-Clause 16.4 (c) “Payment on Termination” 
FIDIC: “After a notice of termination [by the Contractor] … the Employer shall promptly 
pay to the Contractor the amount of any loss of profit or other loss or damage sustained by 
the Contractor as a result of this termination”. All other sums due to the Contractor upon 
termination, including value of the Works, Goods and Contractor’s Documents, should be 
calculated according to Sub-Clause 3.5 FIDIC “Determinations”.  Upon optional 
termination the Employer should pay to the Contractor for the performed works, ordered 
materials and works, other related reasonable costs, removal of the Temporary Works and 
Equipment, repatriation of the stuff employed specifically for the purpose of the Works 
(Sub-Clause 19.6 FIDIC). 
ORGALIME refers to damages’ compensation in the following situations. Under 
Sub-Clause 5.4 the party submitted documentation with error or omission should bear the 
costs of additional work or material resulted from such error/omission. In a number of cases 
the Contractor should be compensated for additional cost and expense resulted from the 
delay, suspension or variation due to the Employer, and also from Force-Majeure or the 
Employer’s Risk events (Sub-Clauses 6.5, 7.6 and 10.3 ORGALIME). The Contractor 
should be liable for all defects due to incorrect design under Sub-Clause 17.7 ORGALIME 
(unless they are attributable to the Purchaser’s request). According to Sub-Clause 20.2 the 
Contractor should be liable for and should make good any damage to the Works prior to 
taking-over, unless it is caused by the Purchaser’s negligence or any of the Purchaser’s Risk 
events. Under Sub-Clause 20.4 “Liability for Personal Injury and Damage to Property”: 
“The Contractor shall be liable for damage to the Purchaser’s other property than the Works 
when such damage is caused by the Contractor’s negligence”386. In accordance with Clause 
22 “Confidentiality” ORGALIME: “A party who is in breach of [Confidentiality 
obligations] … shall compensate the other party for the damage caused by such breach”. In 
case the contract is terminated due to either party’s default, the aggrieved party is entitled to 
compensation for the loss she suffered with respective limitations considered below (Sub-
Clauses 19.5 and 19.8 ORGALIME). In case of contract termination under the Purchaser’s 
                                                        
385
 Under Sub-Clauses 15.4 (a) and 15.4 (b) FIDIC the Employer may send a claim to the Contractor and 
withhold money based on such according to Sub-Clause 2.5 “Employer’s Claims”, as well as withhold 
further payments until the costs of design, execution, completion and remedying any defects, damages for 
delay in completion (if any), and other costs incurred by the Employer, have been established.  
386
 Sub-Clause 20.5 ORGALIME refers to an equal liability of the Purchaser in case of damage cause by its 
negligence. 
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discretion he shall compensate to the Contractor under Sub-Clause 18.3 ORGALIME: i) 
unpaid balance for the performed part of the Works; ii) all costs for the material purchase 
prior to the termination notice; iii) all reasonable costs and charges incurred by the 
Contractor due to termination; iv) other direct expenses of the Contractor and his sub-
contractors related to the termination. 
YSE 98 refers to remedy of damages in case where impediment is created by the 
client, another contractor or due to a force-majeure event, and a threat of work suspension 
or delay appears, and the contractor believes that he is entitled to extension or 
compensation of his costs. In such case the contractor should notify the client and 
recommend him to carry out negotiations to reduce and duly calculate the loss or damage 
(§23 (2) YSE 98). If the contract is interrupted due to a force-majeure event, the client 
should compensate the contractor for the site security, heating and other energy costs, and 
the costs of protecting, servicing and maintaining the site as consequence of the interruption 
(§50 YSE 98). In case of justified termination by the client and prevention from the 
contractor’s side for the continuation of the work, he should be liable for compensation of 
all additional loss or damage caused by the delay; additionally damage caused by the fact of 
termination can also be deducted from remuneration to be paid by the client to the 
contractor for the completed part of the work prior to termination (§82(4), §83(2) YSE 98). 
The client in turn should provide compensation for the performed part of the work, use of 
material and equipment on the site taken over upon termination. In case of justified 
termination by the contractor he should be entitled to receive remuneration on pro-rata 
basis for the completed work and compensation for the “demonstrable loss or damage 
incurred from termination …including reasonable compensation for the lost profit” (§86(2) 
YSE 98).  
According to §5 VOB/B in case of the contractor’s delay in completion the principal 
may demand compensation of damages while maintaining the contract or set the reasonable 
deadline for completion with threat of termination upon delay of the latter. Pursuant to §6 
No.5 VOB/B if one party to contract is responsible for the obstacles to performance, the 
other party may claim verifiably incurred damage; additionally indemnification for loss of 
profit may be claimed in case of intentional act or gross negligence. In case principal 
rightfully terminates due to the contractor’s breach, he may demand damage compensation 
due to non-performance (§8 No.2(2) VOB/B). 
Furthermore issue of damages’ compensation under standard contracts in construction 
arising out of the employer’s requested or otherwise necessary extra work or so called 
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“variations”. According to Sub-Clause 13.1 FIDIC the Employer prior to issue of the Turn-
Key Certificate has right to initiate variations (changes to specifications or the ordered 
works) and in general the Contractor should carry them out. Pursuant to Sub-Clauses 13.3 
and 13.5 FIDIC the adjustment to the Contract Price should be determined (including 
“reasonable profit”) and respective Provisional Sums should be paid. Under Sub-Clause 3.5 
FIDIC regarding determinations, if the agreement is not reached between the parties, then 
“the Employer shall make a fair determination”.  
Clause 8 ORGALIME obliges the Contractor to perform requested variations but only 
subject to reached agreement on respective changes to the Contract (price, completion time 
etc.); additionally the Purchaser should reimburse any costs of the Contractor for the 
evaluation of the variation. In both cases the Contractor has to perform variations necessary 
due to changes in law, and all disputes should be subject to dispute resolution.  
YSE 98 provides for the mechanism of building plan, completion date and price 
alterations due to the modifications, demanded by the client, explaining which costs and 
overhead may be included and prescribing right of the client to approve subcontractor’s 
work and its additional costs. If an agreement on the proposed by the contractor tender is 
not reached, it should be carried out and compensated on the cost- price basis. 
According to §2 No.2(2) VOB/B in case the agreed volume of the work during 
execution exceeds 10%, then a new price must be agreed. If requested work was not 
foreseen in the contract, the contractor is entitled to the additional compensation subject to 
notification prior to launch. If a lump sum is agreed and significant addition to the agreed 
performance follows, the reasonable compensation should be granted. Arbitrary deviations 
by the contractor should not be compensated, and such performance should be removed, 
unless the principal accepts such work and then should compensate for it. Additionally the 
principal should reserve the right to order changes in the construction plan; the contractor 
has to perform not agreed, but necessary for the project execution work under the 
principal’s request (§1 No.3-4 VOB/B). 
All discussed above pros and cons of the damages remedy are relevant when it comes 
to the construction contract claims. As a general rule damages for the breach of contract can 
be awarded only if they represent actual loss suffered by the aggrieved party and would 
place her in the same position as if the contract was not breached
387
. From the position of 
                                                        
387
 See cases Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63 F.3d 1169 (ed Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1351, 134 L. Ed.2d 
520, 1995, 517 U.S. 1119, 1996, 
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law unjust enrichment should be prevented and all excessive damages are not recoverable 
irrespective of the method of calculation and representation in the court
388
. In Common law 
jurisdictions punitive or exemplary damages may be claimed as punishment to deter 
misconduct, but they are rarely awarded in construction claims
389
. In certain US states 
punitive damages may be awarded only pursuant to statute
390
. Additionally submitting 
punitive damages claims without substance in fact or in law, or lacking in merit can be 
sanctioned by the court
391
. Improper damages’ calculation may result in failure to obtain 
remedy, e.g. error in damages’ calculation has resulted in award of only nominal damages 
to the contractor in case Indian River Colony Club, Inc. v. Schopke Construction & 
Engineering, Inc.
392
 Hence the diligent calculation of the damages prior to the claim is 
crucial. There are several general methods of calculation available: 1) actual cost; 2) 
estimated cost; 3) total cost
393
, and 4) jury verdict (specific for US). 
Courts are naturally favor actual damages method
394
, also referred to as “segregated” 
                                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.leagle.com/decision/1995123263F3d1169_11096.xml/PETEREIT%20v.%20S.B.%20THOMAS,
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 See cases Anthony v. Security Pacific Financial Servs., Inc. 75 F.3d 311 (7
th
 Cir.), 1996, 
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Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459 (3d Cir.), 1992, http://openjurist.org/983/f2d/459/keenan-v-city-of-philadelphia-
j; Nakajima v. General Motors Corp., 857 F. Supp. 100 (D.D.C.), 1994, https://casetext.com/case/nakajima-
v-general-motors-corp; Bourque v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 906 F. Supp 348 (M.D. La.), 1995, 
https://www.courtlistener.com/lamd/bU8n/bourque-v-nan-ya-plastics-corp-america/. 
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 See cases McGinnis v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 42 F.3d 1273, 1994, 
http://openjurist.org/42/f3d/1273/mcginnis-v-kentucky-fried-chicken-of-california; Ambraziunas v. Bank of 
Boulder, 846 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Colo.), 1994, https://www.courtlistener.com/cod/9DAc/ambraziunas-v-bank-
of-boulder/; Bourque v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., supra note 388. 
391
 See William Schwartzkopf, John J. McNamara, supra note 233, p. 6. 
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 619 So.2d 6, 1993, 
http://www.leagle.com/decision/1993625619So2d6_1623.xml/INDIAN%20RIVER%20COLONY%20CLU
B%20v.%20SCHOPKE%20CONST.%20&%20ENGINEERING,%20INC. See also U. S. ex. Virginia Beach 
Mechanical Serv., Inc. v. Samco Construction Co., 39 F. Supp.2d 661, 1999 (general contractor’s records 




 See William Schwartzkopf, John J. McNamara, supra note 233, p. 11; See also Karl Silverberg, 
Construction Contract Damages: A Critical Analysis of the “Total Cost” Method of Valuing Damages for 
“Extra Work”, Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development, 2003, Vol. 17: 3, p. 16, 
http://www.king-king-law.com/Articles/03_TotalCost.pdf. 
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 See Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930, F.2d 872, 1991 (stating courts preference for the method), 
http://openjurist.org/930/f2d/872/dawco-construction-inc-v-united-states. 
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or “discrete” cost method, based on full documentation of the expenses and evaluation of 
their reasonableness. Hence lack of evidence in accounting records may result in denial of 
claims
395
. Estimation requires rational accuracy and comparative analysis with similar 
situations. 
Total cost method is the most preferable to the contractor, who would like to claim 
damages as difference between total actual costs incurred (plus overhead and profit) and the 
bid amount. Unfortunately often this measure is rejected by the courts due to the flaws in 
the following items
396
: 1) the impracticability of proving actual losses directly; 2) the 
reasonableness of the contractor’s bid; 3) the reasonableness of the contractor’s actual 
costs; and 4) lack of the contractor’s responsibility for the added costs397. Therefore four-
prong test should be carried out in order to establish all above stated elements
398
. 
Despite challenges associated with the total cost method it is recognized and 
acceptable in certain circumstances, e.g. when actions of the employer prevent the 
contractor from the detailed bookkeeping and direct causal link is established between 
those actions and contractor’s damages399, alternatively if other methods are difficult to 
utilize or they do not serve effective quantification of the damages
400
. 
It is important to keep in mind that not all the damages caused by either party may be 
limited or otherwise regulated in the contract because of the mandatory provisions of the 
governing law. Usually damages to parties’ property should be compensated pursuant to the 
applicable law, if they are caused by willful misconduct or gross negligence (Sub-Clause 
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Schwartzkopf, John J. McNamara, supra note 233, p. 15; Accord Tom Shaw, Inc. v. United States, 824 F.2d 
980, 1987, http://openjurist.org/824/f2d/980/tom-shaw-inc-v-united-states; Anchorage v. Frank Coluccio 
Const. Co., 826 P.2d 316, 1992, https://www.courtlistener.com/alaska/7pDv/anchorage-v-frank-coluccio-
const-co/. 
397
 These criteria were first established in the case WRB Corp. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 409, 1968, cited 
in case Servidone Construction Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 860, 863 (Fed.Cir.), 1991, 
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http://www.cohenseglias.com/federal-contracting-database/total-cost-approach. 
398
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Brothers Constructors v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 74, 2001, (describing second prong analysis), 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/fedclaim/2001/98326cp.pdf; 
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 See e.g. case C. Norman Peterson Co. v. Container Corp. of America, 172 Cal. App. 3d 628, 1985, 
http://law.justia.com/cases/california/calapp3d/172/628.html;. 
400
 See case Thalle Construction Co., Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Company, Inc., 39 F.3d 412, 1994, 
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17.6 FIDIC; Sub-Clauses 20.4 - 20.5 ORGALIME). Personal injury damages and damages 
to third parties’ property are governed by the mandatory norms and in general cannot be 
limited or restricted, and are called “product liability”401 (Sub-Clause 18.3 FIDIC; Sub-
Clause 20.6 ORGALIME). 
In practice both parties should insure product liability risks in accordance with 
respective insurance terms and conditions of the contracts (Clause 18 FIDIC “Insurance”; 
Clause 21 ORGALIME “Insurance”). 
 
4.4.2. Specific Performance and Substitute Performance  
Not always compensation of damages is offered as a primer or alternative remedy 
under the standard construction contracts; often it is conditioned to initial request for the 
substitute performance or specific performance in the form of the remedial works/ 
mandatory repairs.  
Sub-Clause 4.1 FIDIC defines Contractor’s contractual obligation as follows: 
“design, execute and complete the Works in accordance with the Contract, and … remedy 
any defects in the Works”. Sub-Clause 11.1 FIDIC obligates the Contractor by the end of 
the Defects Notification Period to “execute all work required to remedy defects or damage, 
as may be notified by the Employer on or before the expiry of the” said period. According 
to Sub-Clause 5.8 FIDIC all defects in the Contractor’s Documents should be corrected at 
the Contractor’s cost, notwithstanding any consent or approval under this Clause. If the 
Contractor does not comply with the Employer’s request for the Remedial Work, the 
Employer is entitled to employ and pay other persons (at the Contractor’s cost) to carry out 
the work (Sub-Clause 7.6 FIDIC). In case the Contractor fails to carry out Completion 
Tests within 21 days’ period upon notice from the Employer, the Employer’s personnel 
may proceed with the Tests at the risk and cost of the Contractor (Sub-Clause 9.2(3) 
FIDIC). Pursuant to Sub-Clause 11.2 FIDIC all defects in the design of the Works, Plant, 
Materials or workmanship, as well as improper operation or maintenance attributable to the 
Contractor should be remedied at the risk and cost of the Contractor. Sub-Clause 11.4 
FIDIC provides the Employer with various options in case of the Contractor’s failure to 
remedy defects, including the possibility to carry out work himself or by others, in a 
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reasonable manner and at the Contractor’s cost (but in this case not his risk). If the 
Purchaser is in delay for removal from the Contractor’s premises of his materials upon 
termination, then the Contractor is entitled to remove them to the suitable location for 
storage at the Purchaser’s cost and risk (Sub-Clause 18.7 ORGALIME). 
ORGALIME offers substitute performance in a limited number of cases, e.g. under 
Sub-Section 15.4 the Contractor may remedy defects not attributable to him and replace 
any wearing parts at the expense of the Purchaser prior to the Tests after Completion, if the 
Purchaser fails to do so. But if the Contractor fails to remedy a notified defect attributable 
to him within grace period, the Purchaser may himself take necessary reasonable measures 
to remedy it at the Contractor’s cost (Sub-Clause 17.14 ORGALIME). Specific 
performance as a primer remedy is considered on several occasions. If upon join inspection 
after Mechanical Completion the Purchaser notifies to the Contractor work, which should 
be additionally performed or corrected, the Contractor should perform under the request 
prior to the commissioning (Sub-Clause 12.3 ORGALIME), otherwise the expert shall 
resolve the dispute. In case Completion Tests fail the Contractor should immediately 
remedy the deviation (Sub-Clause 13.5 ORGALIME); if the Contractor declares himself 
unable to remedy such deviation, the Purchaser is entitled to the liquidated damages for 
performance. Prior to the Tests after the Completion the Contractor should be given chance 
to inspect, test and adjust Works and remedy the defects he is liable for (Sub-Clause 15.4 
ORGALIME). If the Contractor fails to pass Tests after Completion he should immediately 
remedy the deviation (Sub-Clause 15.8 ORGALIME), but if unable to do so – pay the 
Purchaser liquidated damages. Pursuant to Sub-Clause 17.1 ORGALIME the Contractor 
should remedy any defects in the Works, which are due to faulty design, materials or 
workmanship.  
§26 YSE 98 sets forth liability of the contractor for implementation of the building 
contract, as well as modification and additional work. Pursuant to §43 YSE 98 the 
contractor is obliged to implement modifications demanded by the client unless they 
significantly change the nature of the contract and it should be subject to the separate 
written agreement, excluding small and urgent modifications. In case the final result or any 
part of it does not meet the requirements of the contract it should be repaired or replaced by 
the contractor under §27(1) YSE 98, unless the correction is not necessary or its cost would 
be unreasonable, in which case the contractor should reimburse loss in value under §27(2) 
YSE 98. The contractor should at his own expense repair the defects emerging in the 
building work during the guarantee period, unless they occur due to reasons beyond his 
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control; if the contractor delays in carrying out the repair, the client may do the work at the 
contractor’s expense upon a written notice. According to §72 YSE 98 the contractor must 
without delay carry out measures, which are found during the handover inspection to be his 
responsibility. In general if the contractor neglects any of his contractual obligations the 
client has right to ensure that obligation is fulfilled at the expense of the contractor, unless 
the contractor performs within reasonable time upon the client’s request (§91 YSE 98). 
VOB/B also refers to remedies of the specific performance and substitute 
performance. According to §12 No.3 VOB/B acceptance of the work may be denied by the 
principal due to material defects until they are remedied. Under §13 No.5(1) VOB/B the 
contractor is obliged to remedy at his own cost all defects appearing during limitation 
period for warranty claims, which are attributable to his performance. If the contractor fails 
to meet the request on remedy within reasonable time set by the principal, the latter may 
remedy defects at the contractor’s cost (§13 No.5(2) VOB/B). 
UNCITRAL Guide to the construction contracts advises to provide for the obligation 
of the employer to send a written notice to the contractor on the engagement of the 
substitute contractor and terms of the agreement in all cases
402
. Guide also instructs to 
divide between serious and not serious defects, and diversify available remedies based on 
that, escalating from the repair of the defects and entire change of the defecting part, refusal 
of acceptance and refusal of payment for defective part, demand modifications and of re-
testing after modifications, price reduction, engagement of repairs by third party at the 
expenses of the contractor, up to termination of the contract and demand to remove 





Alternative to the remedy of damages in certain cases is penalty, which does not 
require the proof of loss. These two remedies usually cannot be accumulated in relation to 
the same breach, as described above. In construction contracts penalty is typically 
incorporated in the form of the remedy for the late performance (delay)
404
.  
For instance, penalty as interest for the late payment is stated in the Sub-Clause 14.8 
FIDIC (called “financing charges”); Sub-Clause 9.3 ORGALIME (called “late payment 
interest”); §41 YSE 98 (rate defined under Finnish Interest Act). In case of delay FIDIC 
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and ORGALIME provide for the liquidated damages, therefore these two standards do not 
use term penalty and do not distinguish between penalty and LD, instead use various terms 
by defining other penal remedies separate from LD and damages (costs, losses) 
compensation.  
§18 YSE 98 explicitly provides for the “penalty” calculated in the way similar to that 
used in order standards to calculate LD (0,05% of the contract price per contract day 
calculated for maximum of 50 working days unless the contractor acted willfully or in 
gross negligence). Reference to the agreed in advance penalty in case of delay caused by 
client is made in §35(1) YSE 98. 
§8 No.7 VOB/B states that “a time-related contractual penalty incurred due to default 
may only be demanded for the period up to the termination date of the contract”. If 
penalties are provided in the contract, then pursuant to §11 VOB/B §§339-345 BGB shall 
apply. If the principal accepted the work, he may demand the penalty only if he reserved 
such right at the acceptance. 
UNCITRAL Guide to the construction contracts recommends stipulating the amount, 
which simultaneously provides reasonable compensation to the purchaser and applies 
“moderate pressure” on the contractor405, in order to prevent interference from different 
legal orders restraining penalties. 
 
4.4.4. Liquidated Damages and Limitation of Liability  
Liquidated damages (LD) and limitation of liability (LL) clauses widely utilized in 
the construction industry contracts. LD clauses are usually applied in the cases of delay and 
extension of time for the performance; LL usually considers total liability under the 
contract or its respective part (particular obligation). 
Common law doctrine has developed three types of delay – i) “critical”, caused by the 
employer; ii) “culpable”, attributable to the contractor, and iii) caused by the “neutral” 
events, – and related system of concurrent and sequential delay406. Nevertheless there are 
different approaches engaged in American and English law in respect of the concurrent 
delay and related award of LD. US contract law implies warranty that neither party may 
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delay and hinder the due performance of the other party
407
, therefore in case of concurrent 
delay both parties are in default. American courts and arbitration provide examples of three 
solutions to the issue: 1) “time but no money”; 2) apportionment; 3) liability based on the 
detailed delay analysis. First approach derives from the early cases, when apportionment 
was prohibited
408
. Later this rule was abandoned due to popularity of the LD clauses, 
complexity of the actual contract relationships and principle of fairness
409
. Under the 
modern rule in favor of apportionment American courts define ratio between each party’s 
fault, investigate bad faith in the owner’s actions, and based on the findings may award 
LD
410. In other words, where it is possible to separate costs resulting from each party’s 
cause, courts apportion delay damages. In case where segregation is not possible, no LD are 
awarded, but the extension of time is granted instead
411
. It is important to mention that the 
contractor bears the burden of proof with reasonable degree of accuracy
412
. 
In English law the prevention principle is predominant
413
, as was described above. 
First approach is based on a “dominant cause”, insisting that only one risk event is 
dominant for the project delay. However application of this approach is overruled in case 
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H. Fairweather & Co. Ltd. v. London Borough of Wandsworth (1987)
 414
 due to various 
drawbacks
415
. Second approach is known as “Malmaison”416; accordingly if there are two 
relevant events and one of them is the employer’s risk, the contractor should be entitled to 
time extension and other event(s) should be ignored. Principle of apportionment is not 
accepted in English courts. 
 Resolving conflict between penalty and LD is worth mentioning new emerging 
approach, expressed in the construction case Azimut-Benetti Spa v. Darrell Marcus 
Healey
417
, where the court has not applied standard test of genuine pre-estimate, but instead 
– “commercial justification” rising from “professionalism” of both contracting parties (they 
have had access to the expert advice and terms have been entered freely) that makes 
unenforceability of the LD clause as penalty unarguable. Additionally dominant purpose of 
the clause has been evaluated and declared not deterring the breach. The court has upheld 
the agreement and the LD clause. 
Standard construction contracts provide for LD clauses in various cases: delay, non-
compliant performance, and non-performance. Specific for the industry is also a 
compensation for the lost productivity, which in English law is related to the late 
performance
418
, and compensating for the surplus the employer would get, if the contract is 
performed on time. Additionally often guarantees/warranties provided by the Contractor 
under the construction contract are supplemented by the liquidated damages clauses and 
limitation of the aggregate (total) liability of the Contractor.  
Pursuant to Sub-Clause 8.7 FIDIC the Contractor in delay should pay delay damages 
(“sum, stated in the Particular Conditions”), calculated for each day of default at the 
stipulated in the contract rate, however, the total amount of which should be limited to a 
stipulated maximum; these damages should be exclusive remedy for this type of default 
and keep the contract and obligations intact. Sub-Clause 12.4 FIDIC “Failure to Pass Tests 
after Completion” provides for possibility to recover damages for non-performance (“sum 
                                                        
414
 39 Build.L.R. 106, QBD (OR), 1987. 
415
 Difficulty with the choice of the prevailing event in practice; conflict with prevention principle and other, 
See Richard J. Long, supra note 366, p. 14; Kimberley Eyssell, supra note 366, p. 4. 
416
 Based on the case, which created precedent, Henry Boot Construction Ltd. v. Malmaison Hotel Ltd., BLR 
509, 2000, http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/175.html  
417
 132 Con LR, 2010, http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2010/2234.html; for commentary See 
Andrew Hales, Claiming Liquidated Damages: Azimut-Benetti vs. Darell Marcus Healey, 2014, 
http://www.building.co.uk/claiming-liquidated-damages-azimut-benetti-vs-darrell-marcus-
healey/5006765.article. See also Daniel Brawn, Extensions of the Time and Liquidated Damages in 
Construction Contracts in England and Wales, International Journal of Law in the Built Environment, 2012, 
Vol. 4:1, p.p.75 – 90. 
418
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is stated in the contract or its method of calculation is defined”), which may be defined as 
liquidated damages, but the Contractor first should provide for the adjustments and 
modifications of the works, attempting to rectify non-performance. Total liability should 
be limited to the sum stipulated in the Particular Conditions (Sub-Clause 17.6 FIDIC). 
Sub-Clauses 16.1 and 16.2 ORGALIME explicitly refer to respectively Liquidated 
Damages for Delay and Liquidated Damages for Performance; Sub-Clause 16.3 
ORGALIME limits the Aggregate Liquidated Damages. Accordingly in case the Works do 
not fulfill the performance undertaking, requirements for testing or guarantee specified in 
the Contract and the Contractor declares himself unable to remedy the deviation (Sub-
Clauses 13.5, 15.8, 16.2 ORGALIME) the Purchaser is entitled to LD, with limitation of 
Performance Liquidated Damages to 5 % of the contract price (Sub-Clause 16.3 
ORGALIME). So called “termination fee” stipulated in case of the contract termination 
“for the Purchaser’s convenience”, in my opinion, can be treated as LD or a penalty: 4% of 
the Contract Price or 6% of the unpaid part of the Contract Price (Sub-Clause 18.4 
ORGALIME). 
YSE 98 does not explicitly mention liquidated damages. 
§8 No.1(2) VOB/B refers to entitlement of the contractor to the “stipulated 
compensation” in case of the contract termination by the principal. 
Limitation of liability (LL) is implemented in Sub-Clause 17.1 (b) FIDIC 
“Indemnities”: “The Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the Employer … against 
and from all claims, damages, losses and expenses (including legal fees and expenses) in 
respect of: damage to or loss of any property, real or personal (other than Works), to the 
extent that such damage or loss: (i) arises out of or in the course of or by reason of the 
design, execution and completion of the Works and the remedying of any defects, and (ii) is 
not attributable to any negligence, willful act or breach of the Contract by the Employer…” 
and the Sub-Clause 17.6 FIDIC “Limitation of Liability”: “Neither Party shall be liable to 
the other Party for loss of use of any Works, loss of profit, loss of any contract or for any 
indirect or consequential loss or damage which may be suffered by the other Party in 
connection with the Contract, other than under [Payment on Termination] and [Indemnities 
clauses]”. Additionally scope of liability is regulated by the provisions related to the 
warranty period, in terms of Sub-Clause 1.1.3.7 FIDIC “Defects Notification Period”, 
which by default should be limited to one year, unless Particular Conditions provide 
otherwise. Under Clause 11.3 FIDIC this period may be extended for the period when the 
Work or any Section of it may not be used due to defects, but not longer than for two years.  
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Liability of the Contractor is limited if the Tests After Completion were postponed 
for more than 180 days after the agreed time due to the reasons not attributable to the 
Contractor – the Works should be deemed passed the Tests in such case (Sub-Clause 15.5. 
ORGALIME). Sub-Clause 16.5 ORGALIME limits right of the Purchaser to collect LD not 
only by amount, but also by introducing limited period for the claim – 180 days from the 
prescribed date. In accordance with Sub-Clause 17.1 ORGALIME deviation from the 
performance guarantee should not be itself considered a defect. According to Sub-Clause 
17.2 ORGALIME the Contractor’s liability should only cover defects, which appear within 
the warranty period, which may be extended not more than for one more year (Sub-Clause 
17.4 ORGALIME). Pursuant to Clause 17.5 ORGALIME the Contractor is exempt from 
liability for defects caused by number of circumstances arising after taking over, such as 
improper operating conditions, incorrect maintenance etc. Additionally Sub-Clause 17.10 
ORGALIME provides possibility for sharing expenses for remedying the defects between 
both parties. Clause 25 ORGALIME “Limitation of Liability” states: “The remedies for 
breach of contract which are specified in these conditions shall be the sole remedies 
available. Neither party shall, except as specified in the Contract, whether in contract, tort 
(including negligence) or otherwise, be liable for or obliged to indemnify the other party for 
any direct or indirect loss or damage such as, but not limited to, loss of profit, loss of use or 
production, loss of data and loss of contracts. This limitation of liability shall not apply, 
however, where such loss or damage has been cause by willful misconduct or Gross 
Negligence”.  
Default provisions of §25 YSE 98 state that each party’s liability should include 
obligation to compensate all loss or damage caused by breach or act to another party, 
except for the loss or damage, which could have not been prevented “by taking the utmost 
care”. Failure of the client to notify obvious defect to the contractor shifts liability for the 
following additional loss or damage caused by the defect to him, unless it is caused by 
serious negligence or abandoned work (§62 YSE 98); therefore the contractor’s liability is 
limited, where the client contributes to the caused damage. In similar way if the client 
neglects contractor’s warning regarding non-compliance of the goods or contract 
documentation, provided by the former or the third party, the client bears the undertaken 
and notified risk (§33 YSE 98). Liability during guarantee period is limited to two years 
(§29 YSE 98), and to ten years in respect of hidden defects or defects caused by gross 
negligence (§30 YSE 98). If either party neglects participation in the necessary 
measurement, results carried out in the presence of one party becomes binding on both, 
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except for the obvious fault (§67 YSE 98). Neither contracting party is liable for loss or 
damage which she could not have avoided even by taking the utmost case (§25(2) YSE 98) 
or in case of a force-majeure even (§35(3), §85 YSE 98) 
§10 VOB/B establishes that parties should be liable to each other for the own fault 
and for the fault of their legal agents in line with German doctrine of culpable liability. If 
the principal avoids acceptance, the work should be considered accepted twelve working 
days after serving notice on acceptance by the contractor or upon utilization of the work by 
the principal de facto (§12VOB/B). If no limitation period for warranty claims is agreed in 
the contract, it should be four years for construction work and two years for other related 
work, machinery and equipment, and one year for accessories (§13 No.4 VOB/B). 
Additionally contract may provide for restriction and extension of liability in “justified 
special cases” (§13 No.4 VOB/B). 
UNCITRAL Guide to the construction contracts recommends that the agreed sum of 
the compensation (LD) is fixed by accessions and the limit to the escalation is introduced 
(LL). Limitation may apply not in all cases and once it is reached, parties should optionally 
agree on another remedy. It is essential to provide detailed conditions of 
warranties/guaranties to avoid over- and under-performance. It is also important to 
understand that LL clauses generally cannot circumvent provided indemnities, which 
usually releasing the other party from all and any possible expenses and losses at the 
expenses of the party committing to the indemnity
419
. Hence in order to avoid conflict 
between desirable limitation of liability and total indemnities parties should pay special 
attention to their drafting and careful utilization of total indemnification, which may not be 
enforceable in certain jurisdictions.  
 
4.4.5. Price Adjustment 
Remedy of price adjustment in construction contracts may take form of either price 
reduction or price increase, or definition of a “reasonable price”. 
Reduction of price is usually provided in case of contractor’s inability to remedy the 
defects which do not preclude exploitation of the result of the works.  
Under Sub-Clause 9.4 FIDIC in case the Works or Section fail to pass the Tests on 
Completion repeatedly, the Employer may issue Taking-Over Certificate and the Contract 
Price should be reduced by the amount corresponding to the reduced value as result of the 
                                                        
419
 See e.g. Sub-Clauses 17.1, 17.5 FIDIC; Sub-Clause 23.2 ORGALIME. 
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failure. If the Contractor fails to remedy notified defect or damage by the set date and the 
work is to be executed at the cost of the Contractor, the Employer may agree or determine a 
reasonable price reduction in the Contract Price (Sub-Clause 11.4 FIDIC).  
Under Sub-Clause 17.14 ORGALIME if the Contractor fails to remedy remaining 
defect and the Purchaser chooses not to repair it at the Contractor’s costs or the defect 
persists after such repair, the Purchaser may demand price reduction corresponding to the 
reduction in value of the Works due to the defect, but not more than aggregate of 15% from 
the Contract Price.   
Pursuant to §27(2) YSE 98 if the defect in the finished result is such that its 
correction is not necessary and the cost of correction would be unreasonable, the contractor, 
instead of affecting a repair or replacement, is obliged to reimburse the loss in value, the 
amount of which is defined in accordance with the principles of the contract or agreed 
additionally. In accordance with §29(3) YSE 98 for the defects which do not essentially 
inconvenience the use of the finished result, parties may agree on the reimbursement for the 
reduction in value.     
Under §13 No. 6 VOB/B if the remedy of the defects is unreasonable for the principal 
or is impossible, or would require disproportionate expense and is therefore refused by the 
contractor, the principal may reduce the compensation by declaration to the contractor 
based on §638 BGB. 
Price increase is usually considered in case of variation or suspension of works due to 
the Employer; but there are other reasons for increase as well. Suspension is interruption in 
the performance requested by the Employer and compensated by him.  
Under Sub-Clauses 8.9 (1 b), 8.10 FIDIC and Sub-Clause 16.1 (4 b) FIDIC in case of 
suspension the Contractor is entitled to be paid value of the Plant and Material suspended in 
delivery for more than 28 days, other related costs and reasonable profit, which should be 
added to the Contract Price. If the Employer hinders performance of the Completion Tests 
more than 14 days the Contractor is entitled to the payment of the related costs plus 
reasonable profit, which should be added to the price subject to respective notice to the 
Employer (Sub-Clause 10.3 (2b) FIDIC). According to Sub-Clause 12.4 (3) FIDIC if the 
Employer hinders Contractor’s access to the site in order to investigate tests’ failure or 
carry out modifications, the Contractor should be entitled to the related costs and 
reasonable profit, added to the Contract Price (subject to notice).  
Pursuant to Sub-Clause 10.3 ORGALIME in case of voluntary suspension the 
Purchaser should compensate to the Contractor “all necessary expenses arising from: a) de- 
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and remobilization of the personnel and equipment; b) safeguarding the Works and 
…related items; c) personnel, subcontractors, equipment kept available; d) moving the 
Works; d) other expenses…as a result of suspension”. 
YSE 98 does not explicitly provide for the price adjustment due to suspension, 
nevertheless §35(1) YSE 98 states that if building contract work is completely or partially 
interrupted of delayed for a reason due to the client, the latter is obliged to compensate the 
additional costs indicated by the contractor if alternative penalty for delay was not agreed in 
advance. 
In case of hindrance and interruption of execution §6 No.5 VOB/B provides for 
compensation of damages in accordance with statutory provisions. 
Variations are changes in the scope, design or manner of the execution of the works, 
requested by the Employer and carried out by the Contractor. 
Under Sub-Clause 13.3 (4) FIDIC in case of instructing or approving Variation the 
Employer should agree or determine adjustments to the Contract Price, including 
reasonable profit and Contractor’s proposal for the Contract Price; in case of Variations 
additional Provisional Sums’ payments are regulated under Sub-Clause 13.5 FIDIC. 
According to Sub-Clause 13.7 FIDIC the Contract Price should be adjusted to take into 
account increase or decrease in Cost from a change in the Laws.   
According to Sub-Clause 8.3 ORGALIME in case of variations the Contract Price, 
the Time for Completion and other terms of the Contract should be amended to reasonable 
reflect the consequences of variation. Pursuant to Sub-Clause 8.6 ORGALIME the 
Purchaser should reimburse any Contractor’s costs due to examining the consequences of 
the requested variation.  
Plan modifications and related price changes are regulated on general level in chapter 
6 YSE 98. 
According to §2 VOB/B in case of volume of works changing more than 10% 
respective changes to the price must be agreed prior to work execution. 
Since the nature of this remedy is restoration of proportion between the value which 
the employer receives and the price to be paid for it
420
, it is advisable that the contract 
prevents him from recovering simultaneously price reduction and damages for the same 
loss.  
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4.4.6. Withholding performance 
Remedy of withholding performance under the construction contracts is usually 
expressed as a party’s right to suspend performance.  
Under Sub-Clause 15.4 (b) FIDIC the Employer may withhold payment to the 
Contractor until establishment of all costs incurred by the Employer up to the moment of 
termination in his initiative. Additionally FIDIC provides for the instrument of “Retention 
money”, which can be withhold by the Employer and released upon due performance (Sub-
Clauses 1.1.4.7, 14.3(2(c)) and 14.9 FIDIC).When the Employer fails to perform the 
Contractor may suspend performance subject to 21-days’-notice until the payment without 
prejudice to the interest for the late payment (Sub-Clause 16.1 FIDIC).  
Pursuant to Sub-Clause 9.4 ORGALIME the Contractor is entitled to suspend 
performance upon 7-days’-notice, if the Purchaser fails to pay on time, until payment of the 
amount due and interest. According to Sub-Clause 9.5 ORGALIME the Purchaser is 
entitled to withhold part of the payment upon taking over for securing remedy of the defects 
appeared at taking over until completion of such remedy. Upon termination for his 
convenience the Employer may deduct from termination fee amount of his claims notified 
to the Contractor prior to termination (Sub-Clause 18.4(2) ORGALIME). 
§42 YSE 98 entitles the client to withhold from the contract price: i) value of the 
repair for the defect attributed to the contractor until completion of repair; ii) penalty for 
delay and other applicable penalties; iii) sum corresponding to the value of the agreed 
security for the guarantee period until provision of the said security; iv) compensation for 
the loss or damage to third party, for which the contractor is liable; v) other client’s 
receivables falling due; vi) undisputable amount of the sub-contractor’s work without 
prejudice to the contractor’s right to present his views on the subject. In case of contract 
termination the client is entitled to withhold the price until final settlement of the accounts 
(§83(3) YSE 98). The contractor my withheld performance in case of delay in payment or 
provision of the security and be compensated by the client for the costs caused by the 
interruption in the performance (§84(3) and §86(3) YSE 98). 
According to §16 No.1(2) VOB/B counterclaims can be withheld. “Other retentions 
may only be made in cases foreseen by the contract or the statutory provisions”. 
Despite its temporary character this remedy is actively and effectively used in 






Industrial standard forms usually provide both parties with right to terminate the 
agreement (for convenience or default) and regulate the order of payment after termination.  
According to Sub-Clause 11.4 (2b) FIDIC in case Contractor fails to remedy defect 
and it should be repaired by the third party at Contractor’s cost and the defect or damage 
substantially deprives the Employer of the whole benefit of the Works or their major part, 
the Employer may choose to terminate the Contract as a whole or in respect of the defective 
part and without prejudice to any other rights the Employer is entitled to recover all sums 
paid for such Works or the respective part, as well as financing costs and cost of the 
dismantling defective Works (restitution). Under Sub-Clause 15.2 FIDIC the Employer is 
entitled to terminate the contract i.e. in case the Contractor fails to perform its particular 
obligations and rectify defects within proposed time, assigns the agreement in avoidance of 
prohibition, becomes bankrupt or insolvent, or goes into liquidation in additional to his 
right to terminate for own convenience (Sub-Clause 15.5 FIDIC). Upon effect of the notice 
on termination the Employer may serve the claim on payments, withhold further payments 
and/or recover losses, damages and additional costs under Sub-Clause 15.4 FIDIC. The 
contractor is entitled to terminate the contract in case the Employer fails to fulfill his 
particular obligations, to rectify the breach in additional time, or substantially breaches his 
obligations, breaches the assignment order, keeps the unreasonable suspension, becomes 
bankrupt or insolvent, or goes into liquidation (Sub-Clause 16.2 FIDIC). Upon such 
termination the Employer has to pay to the Contractor outstanding balance, compensation 
of incurred costs, removal costs, some labor costs, and also – loss of profit or other loss/ 
damage resulting from the termination (Sub-Clauses 16.4, 19.6 FIDIC). 
The Purchaser may terminate the contract if the Contractor failed to remedy 
reappeared substantial defect (Sub-Clause 17.14 ORGALIME). In accordance with Sub-
Clause 18.1 ORGALIME the Purchaser is entitled to terminate the contract for his 
convenience and then he should pay to the Contractor unpaid balance for the performed 
works, some costs, termination charges (LD/penalties), removal costs (Sub-Clauses 18.3, 
18.4, 18.7 ORGALIME).  The Purchaser is also entitled to terminate the contract in case of 
the Contractor’s default (Sub-Clauses 19.1 – 19.3 ORGALIME) and Contractor’s 
insolvency (Sub-Clause 19.4 ORGALIME). In this case the Purchaser is entitled to 
compensation of suffered loss (not more than 15% of the contract price) and in addition – 
liquidated damages (Sub-Clause 19.5 ORGALIME), minus the Contractor’s compensation 
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for the completed part of the Works without defects (Sub-Clause 19.9 ORGALIME). The 
Contractor may terminate the Contract in case of voluntary suspension exceeding 180 days 
subject to 14-days’-period notice. The Contractor additionally entitled to initiate 
termination in case of the Purchaser’s breach of the payment terms and failure to remedy it 
within stated period of time (Sub-Clause 19.6 ORGALIME) and in case of Purchaser’s 
insolvency (Sub-Clause 19.7 ORGALIME). In these cases the Contractor is entitled to 
receive compensation for the suffered loss, not exceeding the Contract Price (Sub-Clause 
19.8 ORGALIME). 
According to §78 YSE 98 the client is entitled to terminate the contract: a) if the 
contractor does not observe the agreed starting date or working so slowly that he clearly 
would not finish by the agreed deadline; b) if the building works develop essentially against 
the agreed terms; c) the contractor has not provided the agreed security – subject to the 
notice with provision of the reasonable time to rectify the breach. The following reasons 
also entitle the client to terminate: i) bankruptcy or incapacity of the contractor (§79 YSE 
98); ii) force-majeure (for long and indefinite period) (§80 YSE 98); iii) death of the 
contractor-physical person (§81 YSE 98). Upon termination the accounts should be settled 
in accordance with the rules prescribed in §§82 – 83 YSE 98. The contractor is entitled to 
terminate in case the client neglects his obligation to pay, is declared bankrupt or 
demonstrated his incapacity (§84 YSE 98); in the above cases the contractor instead may 
interrupt the work until the assurance from the client with compensation for the additional 
costs caused by interruption (withhold performance). In case of force-majeure for a long 
and indefinite period the contractor may terminate the contract (§85 YSE 98). Upon 
termination the contractor is entitled for the payment for the performed work and 
reasonable confirmed loss due to the termination (§86(2) YSE 98).  
According to §8 VOB/B the principal may terminate the contract at any time prior to 
the completion subject to payment of the stipulated compensation to the contractor, which 
should be settled in accordance with §5 No.5 VOB/B. The principal is also entitled to 
terminate: i) if contractor fails to remedy the defect by repair or replacement subject to 
notice of warning (§8 No. 3(1) and §4 No.7 VOB/B); ii) if contractor delays the 
commencement of works or is in default with the completion subject to warning notice (§8 
No. 3(1) and §5 No.4 VOB/B). After such contract withdrawal the principal is entitled to 
complete the work by own force of third party’s at the contractor’s expense without 
prejudice to right for claiming resulting further damages (§8 No. 3(2) VOB/B); he also 
may use equipment at the site against reasonable compensation (§8 No. 3(3) VOB/B). 
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Termination should be declared within 12 working days after the grounds for termination 
become known (§8 No. 4 VOB/B). The contractor may terminate if: a) the principal fails to 
perform act necessary for the performance; the principal in payment delay or other default. 
Termination may be subject to grace period if provided in the contract. Executed work 
should be settled in accordance with the contractual prices or reasonable prices in 
accordance with §642 BGB (§9 No.3 VOB/B). 
UNCITRAL Guide calls termination – a remedy of last resort421 applicable in cases 
of incurable violation or failure, or irreversible financial circumstances, which may prevent 
works from normal continuation like bankruptcy or similar conditions (liquidation, 
insolvency, assignment of assets, reorganization, change of control etc.), and other 
impediments like force-majeure events in case they last for long periods of time. 
Additionally the employer should be able to terminate for his convenience. The Guide 
correctly states that general legal rules on contracts’ termination usually take into account 
mostly sales contracts and, therefore, less suitable for the construction contracts. 
Additionally some legal orders permit termination only if it is expressly stated in the 
contract as a remedy. Hence it is advisable to include detailed termination clauses into the 
respective agreement, given that both parties should primary resort to other available 
remedies (specific or substitute performance, suspending, demand of defects’ cure, re-
negotiation, price adjustment, damages’ claim). It is recommended to consider procedure 
of project site vacation, further utilization of the materials and equipment delivered to the 
site or purchased for the project performance, take-over performed part of the construction, 
including necessary documentation and design rights, further destiny of sub-contracting 
agreements and respective payments, and settlement accounts between the parties, 
including lost profits due to the premature termination depending on the cause for the 
termination. In order to ensure protection against interference of different legal orders it is 
advisable to describe which provisions of the contract shall survive termination, e.g. 
quality guarantees for the performed part of the works, remedies for the defects in the 
taken-over part, arbitration and confidentiality clauses.  
 
4.4.8. Intermediate Conclusions 
As demonstrated in this work damages are usually a default remedy under any law, 
but more precise terms can be stipulated in the contract.  
                                                        
421
 Id, p. 267. 
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In the standard construction contracts contractor’s damages normally secure losses 
due to delay, interruption, speeding up, altering terms and termination. Employer’s 
damages are usually ensured in cases of delay, termination and defects. Compensation of 
damages may be independent or joined with other remedy. FIDIC refers to damages 
compensation in cases of suspension (together with time extension), termination and as 
product liability. ORGALIME offers wider scope of damages rectification: error, defects, 
product liability, confidentiality breach, termination. YSE 98 provides for compensation of 
damages in case of impediment for performance (with time extension), including situations 
of force-majeure (risk with the client), termination (including lost profit). VOB/B 
stipulates damages for delay, obstacle for performance and due to non-performance 
(including lost profits in case of intentional act or gross negligence). Additionally 
compensation of damages should be guaranteed in case of variations. In this case FIDIC 
leaves determination of the costs with the Employer. ORGALIME ensures mutual 
agreement. YSE 98 proposes cost-price basis if a separate agreement not reached. VOB/B 
combines mechanism of agreed compensation in one case and reasonable compensation – 
in other. Since award of damages always requires establishing of the actual losses, legal 
practice developed several methods of damages calculation. Mostly used are actual cost 
method, requiring detailed accounting and proof (preferred by the courts), and total cost 
measure, offering more liberal ways of establishing costs (beneficial to the claiming party). 
Usually damages may be limited in the contract, with exception of product liability issues, 
willful misconduct and gross negligence and provided indemnities. It is recommended to 
cover all damages with insurance. 
Reflecting some similarities with sales law in certain limited cases construction 
contract standards incorporate hierarchy of remedies, conditioning claim of damages to the 
prior claim of specific or acquiring the substitute performance. FIDIC offers combination 
specific and substitute performances against Contractor in cases of defects rectification, 
tests’ failure and non-performance of the required modifications. ORGALIME does 
provide same remedies against both contractual parties in cases of failure to perform 
additional work, correction, modification, rectify defects or complete tests. YSE 98 offers 
specific performance remedy in case of modification, defects correction (with alternative 
of price deduction), and at the same time – general right of the client to engage third party 
at the cost of the failed contractor. VOB/B gives both option of the remedy in case of 
rectification of defects prior to acceptance. It is advisable to ensure written notice in every 
case of engaging third party for the substitute performance and division of remedies into 
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serious and simple with varying applicable remedies and utilizing hierarchy of remedies. 
Penalty is often considered as simplified alternative to the damages. FIDIC, 
ORGALIME and YSE offer penalty for the late payment, but only YSE utilizes explicit 
term “penalty”. FIDIC and ORGALIME terminology-wise do not distinguish between 
penalty, LD and other charges in case of contractual breach. Additionally YSE 98 
stipulates penalty for late performance of both parties. VOB/B also allows explicit penalty, 
subjected to statutory regulation in case parties are willing to include it in the contract.  
LD are usually applicable in delay obligations along with extension of time. 
Common law adopted complex system of delay qualification, but UK and US approaches 
vary. US courts make awards of three types: i) time but no money; ii) apportionment; iii) 
case-by-case establishment of liability. In English law prevailing is “malmaisonian” 
approach of nullifying any other effects in case of employer’s failure; slightly presented 
dominant cause doctrine and no apportionment. As recent practice shows problems of 
division between penalty and LD in Common law may be solved by application 
“commercial justification” evaluation in B2B contracts. In standard construction contracts 
LD are traditionally provided for delay, non-compliance, non-performance, and lost 
productivity. FIDIC does not use term “LD”, nevertheless prescribes them for delayed 
performance of the Contractor and declares exclusive remedy, coupled with LL clauses. 
Additionally LD applicable to tests defaults following failures of specific performance. 
ORGALIME explicitly names LD with LL in all cases of delay and failures in testing; it 
also establishes termination fee for the Employer’s convenience. VOB/B mentions 
“stipulated compensation” in case of termination. YSE 98 does not have explicit notion of 
LD, utilizing term “penalty” in all cases. 
LL is stipulated in all standard forms in similar set of cases, but mostly limiting 
liability during warranty period. LL does not supersede total indemnity clauses. 
Remedy of price adjustment in standard construction contracts is divided into price 
increase, decrease and definition of reasonable amount. Under FIDIC provided for defects 
and testing failure as determination of reasonable amount by the Employer. Pursuant to 
ORGALIME  decrease should correspond to value in case of defects, in case of dispute it 
should be settled by a third party. Under YSE 98 decrease for defect should either be 
defined based on the terms of the contract or separate agreement on the matter. Right to 
define price decrease by declaration is reserved by VOB/B for the principal. Price increase 
is discussed in cases of variation and suspension. Price increase in case of suspension is 
not mentioned in YSE 98 and VOB/B, but provided indirectly. Price increase for variations 
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is ensured in all standards. It is recommended to prevent cumulating of the price 
adjustment with damages’ claim for the defects. 
Withholding is provided under FIDIC for both contractual parties, but additionally 
subject to notice and grace period, if applied by the Contractor. ORGALIME stipulates the 
same, but grace period is shorter. YSE 98 also offers it for both parties, but the Employer 
has to compensate additional costs for interruption. VOB/B refers to withholding regarding 
counterclaims and other cases – if only prescribed in the contract separately.  
Termination is ensured in all standards for convenience or default and available for 
both counter-parties. It is a remedy of last choice after failed primary remedies or in case 
of incurable defects, preventing use of the final result, or adverse financial change in 




5. Final Conclusion 
In simple terms, main incentive to enter an agreement is commercial assumption that 
the result of the agreement is mutually beneficial for the parties, and the performance, 
which each party should receive, is more desirable and has more value than the counter-
performance. Therefore contractual parties usually bargain for the exchange of 
performance. But circumstances, both internal and external to the parties, tend to change, 
especially in the long-term relationships and international environment, in such as 
transnational construction projects, often involving many actors from different industries 
and jurisdictions. Hence the breach of a contract is inevitable reality of the market 
economy and contracting parties should be prepared to face it and deal with it.  
If actors in the market intend to become contractual parties, have sufficient 
information about the performance and its value, wealth of the counter-party and have 
access to the expert advice, as well as comparable negotiating powers, they, in general, 
have better possibilities to conclude an efficient contract and have reasonable incentives 
for efficient post-contractual behavior. They can better evaluate the possible damages or 
provide for more efficient calculation of the liquidated damages. 
However quite often, or even in most of cases, the parties have to deal with the lack 
of information and bargaining positions are unequal. Then there is a high risk of over- or 
under-compensatory measures, but even more importantly – inefficient, unjust and 
inadequate measures, implemented in the remedial terms. 
All existing differences in Civil and Common law systems derive from reviewed 
specifics of the historical development of academic thought and legal practice and 
emphasis on the primer factors affected shaping of each legal order, such as moral and 
economic considerations. 
In the contemporary state of affairs we can observe conflict between main principles 
of the contract law: freedom of contract against its binding nature; autonomy of personal 
will against legal enforcement; legal certainty against fairness, justice and reasonability. In 
this study I attempted to approach the contract in its dialectic complexity and to perceive 
remedies as system of checks and balances, enforcing simultaneously all principles in 
respective proportions and ensuring final social good in comparatively more economically 
efficient legal form. The entire concept of dividing remedies into compensatory and non-
compensatory does no longer seem to be pertinent. Remedies have various functions and 
should create flexible system which may adjust to changes in circumstances and serve 
parties in case the obligation needs modification or termination in perspective. 
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Remedies constitute an important part of each contract; some of them intend to 
secure the contract when appropriate, the other – aim to end the entire obligation or any 
part of it when necessary. Most of legal orders make available system of remedies 
applicable by default; nevertheless relying on such solution in hope for fair or 
economically efficient outcome is not acceptable in the international contracting. Contract 
law is a flexible, autonomous sphere, thus the parties can and should undertake efforts to 
balance system of remedies by exploiting different combinations and approaches. Diligent 
approach will require clear understanding of unique features, advantages and negative 
outcomes of each remedy separately and its role in the system. Judicial intervention is still 
necessary regarding remedies with higher risk of party’s opportunism and/or in situations 
where fair bargaining could be impaired. Nevertheless this should not preclude parties 
from using self-help remedies when possible, even in cases where the last word of 
justification is with the court.  
This study is dedicated to the following remedies currently available under an 
international contract: specific performance; damages’ compensation; termination of 
contract; liquidated damages and penalty; price reduction and performance withholding. 
International contract law offers wider variety of more diversified and detailed options, but 
essentially they all derive from the described types. For instance, ordinary sales contract 
provide for the remedy of repair or re-delivery of conforming goods. In my opinion, both 
these alternatives are covered under specific performance (substitute performance) and 
additionally secured by the enforceable hierarchy of other remedies.  
All reviewed jurisdictions ensure possibility to claim specific performance under 
certain conditions. In all of them damages are considered as an alternative remedy (with 
slightly reversed general preference in Common law). Civil law policies contemplate these 
measures as exclusive for each other, but not Common law orders. Specific performance 
has obvious advantages: it secures entity of contract, serves economic principle of 
indifference, implements original bargain and stimulates information exchange. 
Nevertheless it also has drawbacks, creating legal uncertainty, tolerating misuse of right 
and precluding efficient breach. As response to economic needs many systems developed 
measure decreasing inefficiency of specific performance in the form of alternative 
(surrogate, cover, substitute) performance subject to reasonability standard.  
Theory challenges nature of termination as a remedy. Based on the performed 
analysis I consider these objections irrelevant and unsubstantiated. Functions of 
termination and related restitution permit concluding that termination is a remedy. In 
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Germany and Common law jurisdictions it is a measure of private enforcement and in 
France it requires public interference, unless otherwise explicitly stated in the contract. 
Nevertheless according to legal statistics, court plays equally important role in upholding 
or rescinding agreement in all reviewed orders. It is always exclusive with specific 
performance, but often pairs with damages’. Termination is criticized for hindering 
stability of contract, moral hazard, and risk of opportunism. In order to enhance its 
efficiency it should be perspective (differ from the contract nullification) and should be 
restricted to the cases of fundamental breach, conditions of which advisable to clarify in 
the contract between the parties for avoidance of misinterpretations. 
Qualification and application of damages has high diversity in all reviewed 
jurisdictions. In all policies we can find evidence that damages are generally divided into 
delay and non-performance, where the former easily cumulated with other remedies and 
the latter are usually exclusive in the Civil law jurisdictions. Damages are always secured 
by law as default remedy. Defining criteria for the acceptable losses vary in all legal orders 
(directness, remoteness, foreseeability), but causal link should be commonly established 
via various tests. Contractual liability is usually strict – not dependent on the fault (with 
variation in Germany)
422
. Generally accepted measure of calculation is expectation, but 
both ex ante and ex post options may be applied. In all cases aggrieved party has to prove 
sustained loss in order to get award of damages, which brings notion of actual loss close to 
reliance. Some jurisdictions and international codifications allow recovery of lost profit 
and future losses and that brings notion of expectation close with expectation loss. General 
duty of mitigation has penetrated Civil law irrespective of explicit absence in the statutory 
laws. This remedy may lead to both over- and under-performance, is characterized by high 
legal uncertainty and extensive costs of recovery. Clarification of damages recoverable 
under the contract and agreed measures of their establishment, as well as flexibility in 
applicable measures for calculation on case-by-case basis may enhance efficiency. 
Although practice indicates that best way of elimination of flaws and pitfalls in application 
of this remedy may be achieved through the tailored contract terms such as LD clauses. 
Costs of pre-contractual negotiations in such case should be significantly lower than 
                                                        
422
 This work does not investigate effect of the fault factor (negligence, willful misconduct, error and 
mistake, etc.) on the contractual liability. For instance, product liability may not be limited in the contract, as 
well as, according to the terms of the reviewed standard contracts, damages, defects, caused to the 
counterparty or non-performance otherwise due to negligence or willful misconduct, but the scope of this 
study does not permit investigation of this additional aspect. Hence related matters are only mentioned in the 
work and require separate research. 
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transactional and legal costs upon breach in case of default statutory damages’ rules given 
uncertainty of judiciary discretion.  
Both penalty and LD are pre-determined at contract formation sums, excluding need 
to establish actual loss, to be paid only in case of non-excusable breach of the main 
obligation; stimulate performance of the initial bargain and limit liability in case of 
efficient breach, and preclude unjust enrichment. The following distinctions exist between 
LD and penalty: 1) conditions for validity depend on punitive nature attributable to penalty 
but not LD; 2) calculation ex post (penalty) and ex ante (LD); 3) different approaches to 
accumulation with other remedies; 4) right of the court to reduce amount of penalty. Thus 
legal uncertainty is created in all considered orders: in Common law order court may set 
aside the LD clause as excessive and in Civil law jurisdiction – court may reduce penalty. 
Penalty is accepted in Civil law orders, but banned in Common law, while notice of 
punitive damages has reversed acceptance; meanwhile, in my opinion, principle difference 
between them is not substantial, which should be recognized in respective legal orders and 
improve legal certainty. LD clause is intended to preclude over-liquidation, while LL 
clause prevents under-liquidation and requires establishment of the actual losses, unlike 
LD. Efficiency of LD and penalty clauses may be enhanced by evaluation of the factors of 
fairness and awareness at the contract formation, assessment of actual balance and risk 
sharing between the negotiating powers and reasonability of pre-estimate, shifting focus of 
judiciary attention from the appraisal of the stipulated amount. Nevertheless the 
excessiveness of the latter should be weighed based on: 1) comparison of the pre-estimated 
damages with the actual damages suffered; 2) legitimate interests of the parties, covering 
promisee’s non-pecuniary interests; 3) category of contract and its standard nature; 4) 
circumstances in which contract was made, bargaining positions of the parties; 5) was the 
breach in good or bad faith. Compensation of damages and award of penalty/LD should 
exclude each other. 
Price reduction is wide-incorporated monetary remedy under sales laws, but 
statistically is not often referred to. By default, depending of the statutory terms, reduction 
value may be defined by a court, an expert and the aggrieved party itself. This remedy 
gains functionality when compensation of damages is not adequate or difficult to acquire 
and the party would like to accept performance with defect and time is of essence. Pre-
negotiated mechanism of reduction value calculation should ensure legal certainty and 
increase efficiency. In my opinion, this remedy does not preclude efficient breach, 
providing response to the change of quality by ensuring corresponding change of the price. 
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Utilization of this remedy in building and construction contracts affirms its functionality 
under rationally negotiated conditions. 
Performance withholding is self-help, temporary and conditional remedy, recognized 
in all reviewed jurisdictions albeit lack of legislative regulation in Common law. 
Withholding usually precedes either termination or consequential mutual performance or 
provision of performance security. As a right it is often stipulated in the sales laws and 
adopted in many international codifications. Despite critics of inefficiency, I think that this 
measure ensures interests of both parties and does not preclude economically reasonable 
termination of the contract, given that it meets standard of reasonability and good faith and 
is combined with mitigation duty.  
Construction contract standards present an example of codified mixed contract, 
applied to the long-term relationships in both national and international sphere, which 
allows to research different angles of remedial system incorporated in it. 
Based on the performed analysis of the building and construction contract, 
combining elements of sale of goods and provision of services, my conclusion is that 
generally it should be treated separately from the sales contract, as adopted e.g. in FSGA. 
Qualifying criteria introduced by CISG should be considered regarding other types of 
services when ratio between sale and service is unclear, but not the contracts regarding 
“construction of a building or other fixed installation or structure on land or in water”. This 
division is important because usually sales’ law is more restraining regarding remedy of 
termination and adopts stricter hierarchy of remedies, while statutory regulation of service, 
and construction in particular, is more liberal, flexible and more efficient, it also provides 
system of remedies, adopted for the needs of the industry, and better safeguards specific 
interests.  
In the construction industry standard forms of the general terms and conditions (soft 
law codifications) illustrate good example of rational combination of different types of the 
remedies depending on each separate situation and for each particular breach of the 
agreement.  
On the example of several international and national standards (FIDIC, ORGALIME, 
YSE 98 and VOB/B) I have analyzed effective fusion of liquidated damages and penalties 
for the delayed performance, defects in the performance and in case of termination for 
convenience; various damages’ compensation divided depending on the category of the 
breach and type of losses to be compensated in the respective cases, including fault factor, 
which increases liability; application  of specific performance and substitute performance 
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in certain situations of defective performance, along with suspension and other forms of 
withholding, price adjustment due to number of comprehensive causes and termination of 
the agreement in case of different breaches (failure of completion tests, guarantees, 
warranties); all rounded with the system of liability limitation in particular cases and under 
the contract in total. Standard construction contracts adopt system of balancing various 
breaches with the respective remedies, depending of the nature of the both and interests of 
the parties, requiring diversified protection in every case. The role of tailored agreement or 
agreed deviation from the general terms is to provide for specific measurements of 
liquidated damages, values of penalties and limitations of aggregate liability or liability 
under the particular clause.  
Usually in this type of contracts resort to each remedy requires reasonable and fair 
attitude of both parties, which is incorporated in the standard terms, e.g. through the 
system of limitation periods for the presenting and settling claims, obligations to send 
mutual notifications and provide grace periods for the rectification in good will, 
implication of mitigation duty, introduction of the default chain or hierarchy of remedies 
and allowing termination of the contract in perspective when either other measures are 
exhausted or economic circumstances of the parties change. Such diversified and flexible 
approach, providing the parties with wide liberty of discretion and autonomy, at the same 
time balanced with numerous restrictions, self-help mechanisms and system of expedited 
settlement of disputes, utilizes all available remedies and enhancing their economic 
efficiency within one contract. 
In summation, despite all visible contradictions in the remedial systems across 
jurisdictions we can see general trend of convergence between various policies and their 
elements. World events of the recent decades brought ratio between moral and economy 
and its influence on the formation of the legislation to approximately equal level in all 
orders. Harmonization within Europe is stimulated by the institutions of the European 
Union and increasing role of its judiciary power. Enhanced complexity and instability of 
the world economy demands unified and discrete solutions for the international trade and 
level of protection for foreign counterparties equal to national. Complete legal certainty is 
an ideal and cannot be reached, but it can be increased along with economic efficiency of 
the elements of the contract law, where remedies play key role. 
Standard building and construction contracts present a successful example of 
harmonization and utilization of the whole specter of contractual remedies developed both 
on the international and national levels. These forms offer option of enhancing economic 
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efficiency of each separate remedy as well as productive interplay between all remedies as 
elements of integrated system, which allow contractual parties to divide various interests 
within one contract and diversify levels of protection for each respective area, utilizing one 
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